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Park Chung Hee (presidential term: 1961-1979) is, arguably, the most significant 
leader in the Korean Peninsula’s modern history. His governance has many trademark 
elements that have been thoroughly analyzed. These include his economic plans and 
violent dealings against his political opposition. One often overlooked variable, however, 
is the significant traces of early Korean nationalism (1890s-1930s) that defined his 
regime. Park employed these ideas, although controversial, to completely change a nation 
that was teetering on the brink of destruction into what is now, one of the most well-
known republics in the world – economically, technologically, and culturally. It is 
important, therefore, to investigate how early nationalism affected and shaped Park’s 
tenure, and more importantly, how it still affects South Korea today. 
 There are two main nationalist ideologies that affected Park’s rule. First are the 
teachings of early nineteenth century Korean nationalists, most prominently Sin Chaeho 
and Choe Namson. These philosophies gave Park the foundations to base his eventual 
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regime upon. Specifically, Sin and Choe’s take on the Tan’gun creation myth promoted 
that the Korean people are entitled to a prosperous and homogenized land. This was also 
one element of their minjok tenet – minjok loosely translating to “the Korean people.” It 
is an ethnonationalist philosophy implying that all Koreans and the lands from where 
they originated are bound together by blood. Second, Park took those theories and mixed 
them with a Social Darwinist, Neo-Confucian ideology, one modeled after what he 
learned from his brief Imperial Japanese military career; this is otherwise known as 
bushido. When fused together, these elements created a unique institution that was 
evident throughout every aspect of a Park-era South Korea. 
It was not until the 1980s onwards that an affluent South Korean citizenry sought 
a more advanced republican-like polity. From this time on they out grew their need for 
Park-styled autocracy and nationalism. Through intense and daily mass protests, many of 
which ended in bloodshed, South Koreans infused old minjok nationalist themes with 
dissent; this union was called minjung. Minjung loosely translates to “mass people”, 
however during the protests the term was solidified under the definition of “the will of 
the [Korean] masses.” Therefore, minjung is now synonymous with South Korean-styled 
democracy. As a result, the end of the decade finally saw the last relic of Park’s 
governance. His successor, Chun Doo-hwan, was ousted as South Korea ascended into 
the pantheon of highly developed democracies.  
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Introduction 
 South Korea’s third president, former general, and strongman Park Chung Hee 
(1917-1979) is one of the most controversial figures in Korean history. Common 
opinions of the former president (term: 1961-1979) range from veneration to critical 
scorn with little to no middle ground. The former general was no stranger to controversy 
since his forceful takeover (coup d’état) of the presidency in 1961. Park’s frequent use of 
brutal totalitarian measures, such as discarding due process of law and frequent torture of 
alleged dissenters, garnered him an infamous reputation. To add further antipathy, in 
2016 his daughter and former president, Park Geun-hye, was impeached on corruption 
charges. Ultimately, a significant portion of modern Korean historians and younger 
generations aptly label the elder Park a power-hungry “dictator” who instilled a “reign of 
terror.”1 
 Park’s fiscal accomplishments, however, receive praise by older generations and 
international spectators, especially in the developing world. Before Park’s coup, South 
Korea came out of a civil war (1950-1953) in terrible shape economically, physically, 
and psychologically. Its position was so bleak that most global powers, including the US, 
labeled the South as “a hopeless case of poverty, social anomie, and political instability 
that was destined to lose in the inter-Korea competition to become the sole legitimate 
government of the entire Korean peoples.”2 Indeed, this is not an easy reputation to 
overcome. 
                                                 
1 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From “Land of the Morning Calm” to States in 
Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 471. 
2 Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik, “The Taming and Tamed by the United States,” in The Park 
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 60. 
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The situation domestically was so dire that Park enacted swift, decisive, and 
efficient reforms – through side-stepping democratic procedures and habeus corpus rights 
– that resulted in international admiration. Within a generation, Park’s governance 
brought a war-torn and destitute Korea into global prosperity and prestige; and, therefore, 
it may be palpable to see why developing and emerging markets, such as BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) countries, are attracted to Park’s autocratic, yet rapid, 
“developmental state” system.3 
Sentiments about Park’s legacy are bipolar, and both Korean and international 
scholars have extensively examined the matter. Park’s leadership, economic programs, 
and contemporary sociopolitical perceptions are popular subjects for many historians, 
political scientists, and economists. The alleviation of poverty, the skillful navigation of 
Cold War politics, and the creation of a technocratic culture are trademarks of the Park 
Era. However, a less covered, yet equally important subject, centers around South Korean 
nationalism. 
Park’s governance capitalized on five centuries worth of Korean nationalist 
culture. This deep tradition – learned during a brief World War II Japanese military 
career – consequently influenced a young Park and cemented his world view. The Park 
Era created a new nationalist culture that played a major role in his presidency. Even 
during his last years and after death, one mired in waning prestige, this type of 
nationalism shaped his legacy while deeply affecting his successors. Ultimately, modern 
                                                 
3 Jong-Sung You, “Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access Order: The Case 
of South Korea,” in In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development, 
ed., Barry R. Weingast, Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Steven B. Webb (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), PDF e-book, 294. 
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South Korean nationalist and patriotic sentiments still influence Park’s legacy, good and 
bad, both domestically and abroad. 
As for the setting and chronology, the thesis takes elements from Ancient Korea 
(Gojoseon) all the way until the present. The beginning of the timeline commences 
during the Gojoseon era (unknown-108 BCE). There is no specific date for the origins of 
Gojoseon; however, mythological tales place it as far back as 2333 BCE.  After 
Gojoseon, the peninsula split into Three Kingdoms – Goguryeo (37B CE-668 CE), 
Baekje (18 BCE-660 CE), and Silla (57 BCE -935 CE).4 
 The Silla Kingdom eventually conquered the other kingdoms and united them 
under one banner: The Unified Silla (668-935 CE). Unified Silla held a majority of the 
peninsula for a while, but Goguryeo refugees resettled in the north and they later set the 
foundations for the Balhae Kingdom (698-926 CE) and the Later Goguryeo Kingdom 
(901-918CE). The Later Goguryeo would become Goryeo.5 
 After numerous border skirmishes, corrupt in-court politics, and northern nomadic 
invasions, the kingdoms fell, and a new entity emerged from the ashes, the Goryeo 
Dynasty (918-1392 CE).6 This era is known for constant battles against Khitan-
Manchurian and steppe tribes, and, as such, the battles culminated when Yuan Mongols 
annexed Goryeo (1270-1356 CE).7 
In 1356, Goryeo gained back their rule as Mongol authority weakened; this was 
short lived (1356-1392 CE), however, as Goryeo finally exhausted themselves from 
                                                 
4 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 32-42. 
5 Ibid., 91. 
6 Ibid., 122 
7 Ibid., 165. 
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centuries of never-ending wars. Between 1388 and 1392 CE, a disgruntled general, Yi 
Seong-gye, and his troops rebelled against Goryeo elites and eventually usurped the 
throne to become Korea’s last and longest-lived dynasty: The Joseon Dynasty.8 
 The Joseon era lasted for five centuries (1392-1897 CE) and is known as Korea’s 
“renaissance” due to a meticulous bureaucracy and domestic technological innovations. 
This era is famously known for King Sejong the Great – the founder of the modern 
Korean alphabet, hangul – and the Imjin Wars of 1592 (The Japanese Invasion Wars of 
1592). 
Due to numerous wars, the eighteenth and nineteenth century saw an increasingly 
isolated Korea mirroring that of their Qing neighbors. Japanese neighbors to the south, 
however, modernized at an unprecedented pace under the rule of Emperor Meiji (1867-
1912). Unbeknownst to Korea and Qing China, Meiji Japan and the Great Western 
Powers spelled the doom of East Asia’s dynastic orders.9 
 The Fall of Joseon (1897) occurred due to numerous peasant revolts, aristocratic 
corruption, and a severely outdated socioeconomic structure.10 Instantaneously, a short-
lived Korean Empire (1897-1910) was founded with the intent to modernize. This did not 
occur as Imperial Japan (1868-1945) set up their hegemony in the Pacific. Consequently, 
Korea was colonized and annexed by Japan; and aptly, this era is known as Colonial 
Korea (1910-1945).11 During this period, more importantly, Park Chung Hee was born 
(1917-1979). 
                                                 
8 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 186. 
9 Ibid., 321. 
10 Ibid., 306. 
11 Ibid., 305, 348-356. 
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The end of World War II (1945) split Korea into two military government states, 
a Soviet-Chinese coalition backed North Korea, and an American-UN coalition backed 
South Korea. In 1946, Park came back to Korea after a short stint in the Imperial 
Japanese Army (1945-1946). The Koreas engaged in a bloody civil war (1950-1953) that 
ended in a stalemate (1953 Korean Armistice Agreement). Park quickly rose ranks during 
the Korean War and, now a general, enacted a coup on May 16, 1961.12 
Park, now the executive and president of South Korea, held presidential elections 
in 1963, 1967, and 1971, winning each one; however, 1971 was a close contest. 
Consequently, Park suspended democratic procedures in 1972 by enacting the Yushin 
constitution. Park ruled for another seven years, and, in 1979, he was assassinated. His 
successor was military general Chun Doo-hwan, and like Park, enacted a coup in 1980 to 
gain leadership.13 
In 1988, President Chun was ousted due to numerous urban protests and pressure 
from the international world. From 1988 to the present, the Sixth Republic of Korea was 
founded. This republic was the first to hold direct elections in the last sixteen years ago. 
South Koreans have since directly elected seven presidents since Park’s death and Chun’s 
ousting.14 For a better representation, Figures I and II are presented as a visual timeline 
and chronology of Park’s nationalism.  
                                                 
12 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 407-420. 
13 Ibid., 422-425, 446-450. 
14 Ibid., 519-525. 
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The thesis is structured accordingly: an introduction, six chapters, and a 
conclusion; it is organized chronologically from 1910 to 2016. Chapter One is a literature 
review titled “Nationalism Before and During Park’s Tenure (1910-1979).” It starts 
before World War II and gives a brief history on nationalist origins. This era is important 
because it explains how five centuries of Joseon culture (1392-1897) influenced the 
founding fathers of the modern Korean states.15 Furthermore, the chapter establishes the 
individuals and institutions that shaped Park’s nationalist agendas and the sociological 
aspects that went into his reforms. Accordingly, Chapter Two analyzes and summarizes 
the materials in the first chapter. 
Chapter Three is a literature review titled “Nationalism After Park’s Death (1980-
1988).” It focuses on the effects that Park-styled nationalism had on his successors; 
particularly, on Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency (term: 1980-1987). Chun’s tenure is 
important, not only because of the similarities with Park’s government, but the 
consequences it had in birthing “New Nationalism” for a younger generation.16 Chapter 
Four follows up with an analysis. 
Chapter Five is the final literature review titled “Park’s Legacy and Nationalism 
Today (1989 Onwards).” This chapter provides the framework for “New Nationalism.” 
Specifically, it details how old nationalism conflicts with modern nationalism and in turn 
shapes twenty-first century Koreans. Chapter Six, thus, is the final analysis with research 
                                                 
15 Korean academics place great significance on the Joseon Era. This era was noted for its 
numerous and meticulously written historical records. In public education curriculum, much of Korean 
history – from Korea’s legendary creation (2333 BCE’s creation myth) to the late nineteenth century – is 
derived from the many works of prominent Joseon scholars, such as the literati-scholar group Sarim. See 
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 191. 
16 John Lie and Myoungkyu Park, “South Korea in 2005: Economic Dynamism, Generational 
Conflict, and Social Transformations,” Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 61. 
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ending with the 2016 impeachment of Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, and 
the protests surrounding her. 
The research is composed with a mix of secondary and primary sources. 
Secondary sources include monographs, academic journals, newspaper articles, and 
textbooks – mostly in English but Korean sources are used as well. Primary materials 
include portions taken from South Korea’s constitution; speeches and letters from the 
Presidential Archives; and interviews from prominent opposition leaders and 
eyewitnesses. Visual aids are also provided and come in the form of graphs and charts 
with data extracted from polls and surveys; maps and images, both self-replicated and 
taken from sources; and self-made chronology timelines. 
 With help from colleagues, I include translations for data labels, transcript and 
speech passages, and excerpts from Korean-only monographs.17 Depending on the 
source’s translation methods, English Romanization interchangeably uses current Korea 
Revised Romanization (RRK) and older McCune Reischauer (MCR) systems.18 
                                                 
17 Special thanks to my colleagues Kwak Myung-gi and Choi Gu-hyung for assistance with 
research conducted in Korean, translations, and proofreading. 
18 McCune Reischauer (MCR) was the first Korean Romanization system. It was implemented 
in 1937 by missionaries, historians, and translators George M. McCune and Edwin O. Reischauer. Due to 
the Korean language’s highly syllabic nature, the MCR system is noted for using apostrophes – hyphens 
in some cases – to denote syllables and phonetic markers. For example, 한글 is spelled “han’gŭl” and 박정
희 is spelled “Pak (Bak) Chŏng’hŭi.” However, the South Korean government, in conjunction with the 
National Academy of the Korean Language and the Ministry of Tourism, recently adopted Revised 
Romanization of Korea (Gugeoui romaja pyogibeop, or RRK) in 2000. RRK loses MCR’s syllabic and 
phonetic markers, using spaces instead – hyphens in some cases – when translated. While not as 
phonetically accurate as MCR, the adoption is meant to simplify the learning of the Korean and English 
languages and to help promote easily accessible reading for visitors. For example, 평양 in MCR is spelled 
“P’yŏngyang (or P’yŏng’yang and P’yŏng-yang),” but in RRK it is simply “Pyongyang.” Additionally, 
“Pak (Bak) Chŏng’hŭi” is “Park Chung Hee” in RRK. 
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Name ordering follows the Chinese-influenced hanja writing order; accordingly, 
family names are first followed by given name.19 However, in footnotes, names are in 
American English order with family name last. For example, Kim Jinwung is Jinwung 
Kim in footnotes. The exceptions to this are the names of well-known Korean leaders, 
such as Park Chung Hee, Kim Il-sung, and Kim Dae-jung. As such, they are always 
referred to by family name first. 
 Additionally, some Chinese Romanization is present, and research uses the two 
most prominent systems, Wade-Giles and Pinyin. Wade-Giles is widely used in Taiwan 
(Republic of China) while Pinyin is employed in China (People’s Republic of China). 
Likewise, some Romanized words are interchangeably used in accordance to the source’s 
method; and in addition, Mandarin and Cantonese spellings are interchangeable 
depending on the source.20 
 
  
                                                 
19 Hanja was Korea’s first writing system and was taken from the Chinese script. While there is 
no specific date of origin, Chinese writing was introduced to the peninsula during the third century CE. 
The Hangul alphabet then replaced hanja script in the fifteenth century. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 63. 
20 For example, Chiang Kai-shek (Pinyin: Chiang Chieh-shih) and Kuomintang (Pinyin: Kuo-
min Tang) are Cantonese Wade-Giles Romanizations while Mao Zedong (WG: Mao Tse-tung) and Deng 
Xiaoping (WG: Teng Hsiao-p’ing) are Romanized in Mandarin Pinyin. 
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Chapter I: 
Literature Review – Nationalism Before and During Park’s Tenure (1910-1979) 
  
12 
 
 
Korean nationalism is a complex subject with origins dating back thousands of 
years. This literature review begins in the early 1900s and introduces an analysis on 
Korea’s ancient folklore origins and the pivotal Tan’gun creation story. From there, the 
two pivotal forefathers of Korean nationalism, Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson, are 
examined as well. The timeline shifts to the birth of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
onto Park’s life during the 1940s to the late 1960s. This section analyzes the ROK’s first 
president, Rhee Syngman, and the philosophical aspects behinds Park’s agenda. Finally, 
the literature provides a brief explanation of South Korea’s economy – urban and rural – 
and the military ventures behind Park’s Korea. 
 
The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship 
 Roger L. Janelli researches the origins of Korean folklore and how it became a 
piece of modern nationalist history.1 Janelli suggests that Colonial Korea (1910-1945) 
underwent a reassessment and reorientation of Korean folklore under Japanese Imperial 
reign. He also notes the similarities that Korean scholarship has with its Japanese 
counterparts. Janelli apprises that “Korean intellectuals obtained their introduction to 
modern scholarship through the Japanese.”2 The Japanese, even though they rewrote 
history through their perspectives, influenced Korean scholars with the framework to 
create their version of twentieth-century nationalism. 
However, there are challenges to those viewpoints and Janelli uses a 1978 
anthology, Han'guk minsok haksa (The History of Korean Folklore), to show a counter-
                                                 
1 Roger L. Janelli is an East Asian languages and culture professor at Indiana University. 
2 Roger L. Janelli, “The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship,” Journal of American 
Folklore 99, no. 391 (Winter 1986): 25. 
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perspective on Japanese origins. According to Han’guk, Korean folklore scholarship had 
its beginnings before the colonial era. Specifically, indigenous origins emerged during 
the seventeenth century when Joseon-Ming scholars ventured into the realms of 
mythology.3 
Janelli’s thesis centers around the different pedigrees used to influence modern 
day nationalism. He uses four prominent Korean nationalists – Choe Namson, Yi Nung-
hwa, Son Chin-tae, and Song Sok-ha – as his case studies.4 Janelli emphasizes how their 
Eastern and Western educations influenced twentieth-century Korean scholarship. Simply 
put, Janelli’s Korean variables are derived from Eastern and Western academic sources. 
Furthermore, Janelli details the actions of Choe and Yi. He notes that Korea’s centuries-
long tributary status with China greatly affected them.5 On a whole, Korean academia 
looked upon the tributary relationship positively. “It gave [Koreans] a sense of place. . . a 
place lower than that of China but higher than that of Japan.”6 This stance, however, was 
critically questioned during the Japanese Imperial Era (1868-1945).7 
Specifically, the way Japan – a lower status tributary state – upended a centuries-
old institution and became the dominant force in the region was a paradox to early 
nationalists. Due to this, most Korean academic institutions – from elementary to higher 
education campuses – were forced to study and assimilate into Japanese cultural 
institutions. This included Japanese history, mythologies, and language.8 
                                                 
3 Janelli, 25. 
4 In accordance with East Asian name ordering, family names (last name) are first followed by 
given names (first name). 
5 Janelli, “Origins of Korean Folklore,” 27. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Chizuko T. Allen, “Northeast Asia Centered Around Korea: Ch'oe Namson's View of 
History,” Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 4 (November 1990): 794. 
8 Janelli, “Origins of Korean Folklore,” 34. 
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 Additionally, Japanese traditional worldviews, such as Shinto shaman folklore, 
are also another important factor. However, Choe and Yi turned these institutions around 
and used them to start a new nationalist movement, later known as Munhwa undong (also 
known as the Cultural Movement and Cultural Nationalism). Instead of rallying around 
Japanese shamanistic folklore, Choe – later expanded by Yi – chose the Tan’gun tale as 
the archetype legend to rally behind. Janelli also suggests that Tan’gun was a perfect 
choice because of the similar shamanistic Shinto themes.9 In essence, both spiritual 
teachings emphasized that gods created people to serve in their land, thus tying the 
heavens, the people, and earth into one. 
 This had a profound effect not only for Choe and Yi but also on future folklore 
scholars, Son Chin-tae and Song Sok-ha. Although both scholars expanded on Korean 
folktales, Son and Song incorporated Western thought – through the teachings of early-
British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor – to solidify Tan’gun as part of the Korean ethnic 
identity. Also, keep in mind that early anthropological frameworks were heavily centered 
on Social Darwinism. In short, Son and Song infused cultural homogeneity onto Korean 
folklore with the intention of separating the Korean race – one that was more ancient and 
purer – from their Japanese overlords.10 
 The article concludes in 1961, an era that marked the new political and academic 
alliance between the newly-made Republic of Korea and the United States. The union 
helped foster American anthropological methods – in particular, heavy public promotion 
of folklore through theater, books, and television – into a fusion of Japanese and British 
                                                 
9 Janelli, 34. 
10 Ibid., 37. 
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intellectualism.11 Janelli ties this to the impact it had on Park Chung Hee’s rule. 
Explicitly, Park perceived outside threats, or any remnant of Chinese and Japanese 
culture, as destroying millennia’s worth of Korean traditions. In turn, Park heavily 
encouraged public academia to focus on Tan’gun and other traditional stories, and hence, 
pushed similar nationalist agendas that Choe and early nationalists championed.12 
 
The Tan’gun Story 
According to the Samguk Yusa, the story of Tan’gun (Dan’gun) is told as a fable. 
The Heavenly King Hwan’in had a son, Hwan’ung. Hwan’ung wished to live among his 
father’s earthly people. Hwan’in saw the ambition in his son’s eyes and granted him his 
wish. Hwan’ung was then bestowed fertile land in the Myohang Mountains (located in 
North Korea); three heavenly treasures used to empower him with societal gifts – such as 
agriculture, art, and law; and three-thousand loyal followers.13 
After years of happiness and wise governance, Hwan’ung was surprised to find a 
“she-bear” and “tigress” living alone in a cave together, both diligently praying to his 
father. Out of curiosity, he heard their pleas to become humans so that they may live in 
his kingdom under the benevolent rule of Hwan’in The Heavenly Father. Hwan’ung, 
however, chose to grant only one of them their wish and only if they could pass his test. 
The test included eating mugworts and garlics – considered holy foods in that 
region – for a hundred days straight. Both beasts ate the sacred foods but shortly after the 
tigress gave up and retired back into the cave. However, the she-bear continued to eat the 
                                                 
11 Janelli, 42. 
12 Ibid., 43. 
13 Samguk Yusa, “Book One: Wonder I (the Founding of the Kingdoms),” trans, Tae-Hung Ha 
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1972), PDF e-book, 32. 
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foods for twenty-one straight days even after she technically passed the test. Moved by 
this, Hwan’ung granted her wish and she became a woman; she was now known as 
Ung’nyeo.14 
Even living under Hwan’ung’s prosperous kingdom and among fellow humans, 
Ung’nyeo was still lonely and yearned to raise a child. The woman prayed to the Heavens 
again in hopes of becoming blessed with a baby. Hwan’ung, saddened by her sorrow and 
loneliness, heard her prayers and married her. The woman then bore his son and named 
him Tan’gun.15 
In 2333 BCE, when Tan’gun came of age he was bestowed lands – under the 
guidance of Hwan’in and Hwan’ung – that extended over the peninsula and into the 
Manchurian regions. These lands would eventually become Gojoseon (2333-108 BCE). 
Tan’gun then ruled wisely, just like his father, for 1500 years until King Wu of the Chou 
Dynasty placed Kija on the throne (1122 BCE).16 
By then Tan’gun was satisfied with the society he and his father built; this 
civilization would later become the Korean people. With his purpose fulfilled, Tan’gun 
moved to Asadal – a region located around the North Korean-Manchurian border – so 
that he may ascend onto the Heavens and be with his father and grandfather. 
 
Nationalism According to Choe Namson 
Choe Namson (1890-1957) was a leading Korean scholar and independence 
activist. Choe is credited with establishing, along with Sin Chaeho (1880-1936), modern 
                                                 
14 Samguk Yusa, 32. 
15 Ibid., 33. 
16 Ibid. 
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Korean nationalism. In this context, modern nationalism emerged during Korea’s 
Japanese colonial era (1910-1945) and continues to be built upon through 
reinterpretations of Choe and Sin’s teachings.17 Professor Chizuko T. Allen’s details 
these two prominent Korean scholars and their influence on nationalism. Allen’s article 
mostly emphasizes Choe’s works, and thus, structures it to reflect factors that influenced 
Choe’s political stances.18 
Allen describes the aspects that Chinese scholar and reformist Liang Qichao 
(1873-1929) had on a young Choe. Liang’s pro-Social Darwinist stances played a large 
role in Choe’s works. Liang argued that “white and yellow races” had the potential to be 
“world-historical people”; in other words, cultures who have the capacity to expand 
outward from their origin country can leave an impact on world history. In contrast, the 
“lesser historical people” were the opposite, as in cultures having little to no impact on 
world history. This is the reason stronger cultures subjugate weaker ones.19 
Choe espoused views similar to Liang’s thesis. In a 1917 issue of the Korean 
newspaper Taehan maeil sinbo, Choe wrote that “The modern age is the age of power in 
which the powerful survive while the weak perish . . . It is a competition of intelligence, 
physical fitness, material, economic, and organizational power.”20 This viewpoint is 
important because it highlights the emergence of Choe-inspired nationalism; more 
importantly, this new Korean nationalism was based on ethnic, cultural, and historical 
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18 Chizuko T. Allen is an Asian-Pacific American professor at the University of Hawaii at 
Manoa 
19 Allen, “Northeast Asia,” 789. 
20 Ibid. 
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supremacy. Put differently, ethnicity and ancient culture were primary variables that 
helped shape Park’s nationalist agendas. 
Choe’s views were tested and radically altered during the 1910 Imperial Japanese 
annexation. Along the standards of Liang and Choe’s early works, Koreans were now on 
the lower end of the Social Darwinist spectrum. They were the “lesser historical people” 
while the Imperial Japanese were “world-historical people.” To combat this demotion, 
Choe looked to the ancient past for answers. 
Social Darwinism implies that colonial Koreans were considered a weaker 
culture, therefore, Choe chose to study the earliest documents on Korean society to find 
his answers. He used the thirteenth century Korean-Chinese anthology Samguk yusa as 
the foundation for his new thesis; hence, Choe’s argument relied on the strength of 
Korean antiquity. He used the creation tale of Tan’gun – orally passed down since 2300 
BCE – to posit that ancient Korean culture (Gojoseon culture) is much older and robust 
than the culture of their Japanese counterparts.21 
In other words, Japan was currently in a higher “world-historical position” than 
Korea due to their imperial dominance over the region. Historically, however, Japan’s 
status pales in comparison to the longevity shown through the Tan’gun tale. Korean 
culture, therefore, has a more permanent position in world history and is in a higher 
“historical position” than Japan.22 
Furthermore, Allen analyzes Choe’s evolution by comparing him to other Asian 
nationalist movements. Similar parallels from certain Southern Chinese and Manchurian 
cultures have Tan’gun-like symbolism. Allen argues that Korean nationalism, and to a 
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lesser extent the region surrounding it, was a byproduct of the era’s Social Darwinist 
movement. Likewise, this was Choe’s and future Korean nationalists’ response to 
imperialism. They sought to place Korea – culturally and historically – above Japanese 
and Chinese counterparts by emphasizing and building upon their ancient history.23 
 
Nationalism According to Sin Chaeho 
East Asian scholar Andre Schmid highlights an often overlooked, yet crucial, 
philosophy derived from Sin Chaeho.24 As another leading nationalist, Sin’s teachings 
have similar themes – emphasis on strong historical culture – as Choe Namson’s. 
However, some principles are wholly distinct from other nationalists’ ideas. Specifically, 
Sin linked race and nation as one; therefore, he was an opponent of state patriotism as 
these entities come and go. Instead, Sin promoted that a people’s shared race, culture, and 
language were the most important elements in Korea’s search for autonomy. Most 
importantly, he added a physical element to his philosophy. Similar to Zionist ideas about 
Israel, Sin was a strong advocate for ethnicity and land.25 
Sin implied that Koreans were now tied to the land that their ancestry lived on. 
This philosophy was known as minjok, one that easily complemented Choe’s teachings. 
While folklore was Choe’s primary philosophical vehicle, the peninsula and the past 
lands of Ancient Korea were Sin’s driving force. A physical element to nationalism was 
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24 Andre Schmid is an East Asian Studies professor at the University of Toronto. 
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now present and magnified by Choe’s spiritual folklore. Akin to the Daoist notion of Yin 
and Yang, Sin was Choe’s “yin” and vice versa.26 
 Schmid underscores that geography was Sin’s key motif. The conventional 
narrative on what constituted Korean land was cemented during the Joseon era (1392-
1897). Joseon academia implied that most of Korean history is relegated only to the 
peninsula.27 However, seventeenth century Korean historian Yi Ik – an unorthodox 
Joseon historian who challenged Sinocentric teachings – also influenced Sin.28 Through 
this effect, Sin endorsed, as put by Schmid, a “Manchurian Connection.” Sin argued that 
Korean history, specifically the Gojoseon (circa 2000 BCE – 108 BCE), Buyeo Kingdom 
(circa 200 BCE – 494 CE), and Goguryeo (37BCE – 668 CE) eras, had strong 
connections to Manchuria. 
 The importance of Sin’s minjok philosophy is the claim of extending the Korean 
nation outside the peninsula. An intended effect was that this new credence – now written 
under a new historical anthology called the Toksa Sillon – amplified Choe’s Tan’gun 
folklore. In that tale, Tan’gun reigned exclusively over the lands of Manchuria and the 
peninsula. This was Sin’s ethno-geographical teachings, and they were meant to promote 
Korean uniqueness and demote Sinitic influences. In contrast, the Ming-Joseon inspired 
Kija Joseon legend is a prime example of a Sinitically influenced tale that relegates 
Korean shamanistic origins.29 
                                                 
26 Schmid, 27. 
27 Ibid., 29. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Kija (Gija) Joseon is an alternative Sinocentric creation tale. The myth, found in the Chinese 
historical anthology Samguk Yusa, credits King Gija as the uncle of Shang Dynasty King Zhou. After the 
Zhou overtook the Shang (1042BCE), Gija fled to the Manuchurian-Korean outskirts along with his 
close followers. Subsequently, Gija founded a new society based on the knowledge of Shang and Zhou 
institutions, thus Gija Joseon (Ancient Kija Korea) was established. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 12. 
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The conclusion focuses on the many reinterpretations of Sin’s teaching. 
Numerous scholars, future nationalists, and political leaders based their principles on 
Sin’s agendas, and none were more evident than a young Park. According to Schmid, 
Park’s regime “was eager to enlist a nationalist history for its own political purpose,” so 
that he could legitimize his forceful takeover of the government.30 
By doing so, Park’s academic administration dismissed the Manchurian aspects 
associated with minjok. Instead, Park reinterpreted the teachings of Toksa Sillon to focus 
more on the Three Kingdoms of Baekchae, Goguryo, and Silla. Park specifically 
emphasized a victorious Silla Kingdom uniting the other two kingdoms into its realm. 
This was politically convenient for Park as his regime was birthed in the former Silla 
regions of Korea.31 
                                                 
30 Schmid, “Rediscovering Manchuria,” 41. 
31 It is noteworthy that Sin Chaeho and Park Chung Hee were born in former Silla territory. 
Map 1.1. From left to right, a map of the Three Kingdoms and of modern-day South Korea. The 
right map has a marker placed on Gumi-si, the birthplace of Park Chung Hee.Source: (left) 
Wikimedia Commons; and (right) Google Maps. 
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The Importance of Korean Uniqueness 
 Janelli pointed out the importance that cultural homogeneity played for early 
nationalists, James B. Palais’s research expands on Janelli’s “unique” aspects.32 Palais’s 
thesis centers on defining and labelling the importance of Korean “uniqueness.”33 
“Uniqueness” in this context means the cultural and historical pride that was stripped 
away during the colonial era.34  
 Palais notes that during Colonial Korea the Japanese government “forced [Korean 
academia] to accept the dogma of Japanese historical scholarship.” The intended purpose 
was to promote Japanese cultural superiority while portraying the Joseon Dynasty (1392-
1910) as “backwards and stagnate.”35 The Joseon Age is important because South 
Koreans hold this era as a cultural, academic, and technological zenith.36 Joseon Korea 
saw a myriad of advancements in agriculture, commerce, and naval logistics that, 
according to modern South Korean historians, instilled “developments towards 
capitalism.”37 
 The majority of Palais’s article postulates how nationalist themes, pioneered by 
leading intellectuals such as Choe Namson and Sin Chaeho, are a detriment in 
distinguishing Korean culture from the rest of the world. The reason being that South 
Korean’s over adulation of the Joseon era – especially, the capitalism-inspired logistics 
and trade innovations – mirrors the histories of many Western nations. Furthermore, the 
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tendency to shun Chinese influences also weakens the credibility of modern Korean 
scholars. It is a well-known fact that the Sinosphere contributed immensely in the Asian 
continent’s societal advancement, and therefore, should not be easily regulated.38 
 Instead, Palais suggests that Korean historiography should focus and expand on 
the unique events occurred throughout its storied history. He concludes by listing 
exclusive events within the peninsula’s long past.39 Two prominent examples are the 
stability of the yangban and aristocratic system.40 Specifically, he stresses how a distinct 
elite class held immense influence for a long and mostly uninterrupted span. 
Subsequently, this leads to the second example: the longevity of Korean dynasties. 
Korean dynastic eras were longer, more stable, and relatively more peaceful when 
compared to their Chinese and Japanese counterparts.41 Therefore, based on those 
grounds alone, gives Korean historians enough material to make a worthy case for global 
distinction. 
 
The Nationalist Aspects of Cheondogyo and Donghak 
 Kirsten Bell focuses on the often-overlooked spiritual and religious movements 
inspired by nationalism. Bell examines a specific religious movement called Cheondogyo 
and its relationship with modern Korean nationalism. Cheondogyo is a religion based on 
                                                 
38 Palais, 414. 
39 Ibid., 419. 
40 Joseon class structure was shaped like a pyramid with the emperor at the very top. Below the 
emperor were yangban who were composed of royalty, scholars, and military officials; below them were 
the chungin who were composed of artisan-skilled and professionally trained individuals, such as 
physicians, technicians, and translators; and below them were the sangmin, or peasantry, who were 
mostly agrarian. The bottom, or cheonmin, consisted of “unclean professions,” such as butchers, jail-
keepers, performers, and prostitutes. The only class lower than cheonmin were slaves (noye), indentured 
servants (nobi), and prisoners (jwe’in). See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 192. 
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Donghak; these religions are an anti-foreigner neo-Confucian movement founded by 
Joseon activist Choe Je-u (1824-1864).42 Cheondogyo’s main principle emphasizes that 
to attain spiritual enlightenment, human equality for all classes must be achieved. 
Cheondogyo began in 1860 and gained a plethora of followers during Korea’s 
colonial era. The religion was appealing to the masses partly because it condemned 
economic abuses and corruption within the government.43 Also known as the “Donghak 
Peasant Revolt of 1894,” this movement was the culmination of decades of the yangban’s 
abuses against the peasantry. The rapid adoption of Cheondogyo by sangmin – 
impoverished commoners – was a byproduct of this revolution. 
The importance of the revolution came in 1910 during Japanese occupation. Many 
of the former Donghak rebels transformed Cheondogyo into an ideological symbol of 
“indigenous nationalism.” Cheondogyo and Donghak eventually became unique 
historical events that stood for rebellion against Japanese, Chinese, and Western 
influences.44 Succinctly put, the Donghak movements created Cheondogyo and in turn 
transformed it into a symbol of rebellion against foreign subjugation. 
The post-colonial era (1945-1960s) saw the return of Cheondogyo and Donghak; 
both North and South Korean states shaped the ideology to better suit each political 
agenda. For South Korea, the April Revolution of 1960 was a turning point.45 The April 
Revolution had symbolic ties to the religious movement and played a hand in President 
                                                 
42 Kirsten Bell, “Cheondogyo and the Donghak Revolution: The (Un)making of a Religion,” 
Korea Journal 44, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 125. 
43 Bell, 127. 
44 Bell, 129. 
45 The April Revolution overthrew the First Republic of Korea (1948-1960) and forced Rhee 
Syngman to flee in exile. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 430. 
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Rhee Syngman’s ousting in the same year. A year later in 1961, Park Chung Hee, through 
a military coup, took the reins of the government. 
Park’s first task was to modernize and stabilize South Korea. He shaped Donghak 
to help garner support for his developmental campaigns. Park combined the religion’s 
“indigenous” aspects with his brand of “democratic, nationalistic, and modern political 
ideologies.”46 This led to a campaign to “revitalize” Korean culture. The revitalization 
created one of Park’s core policies, Minjokjeok minjujuui, or “nationalist democracy,” 
that began after Park’s final consolidation during the 1963 presidential election.47 
Bell concludes that modern Koreans associate Donghak with – quoting Park from 
a 1970 speech – the “Koreanization of democracy” and the advancement of “principles 
not directly imported from any Western democracy.”48 Otherwise put, Park’s campaign 
for absolute power was not only vindicated through questionable elections but by also 
tying indigenous philosophies with notions that foreign elements – this includes Western-
styled democracy – are suspect and alien to Korean culture.49 
 
Monuments and Modernization: Park Chung Hee’s Remaking of Yi Sunsin 
Korean scholar Park Saeyoung critiques Park Chung Hee’s philosophical 
conceptions, patriotic view, and nationalist agendas.50 Although those concepts are 
                                                 
46 “Indigenous” means a spiritual philosophy that was created on Korean soil and is unique only 
to that heritage. In contrast, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity are elements not native to the 
peninsula. See Kirsten Bell, “Cheondogyo,” 127. 
47 Bell, “Cheondogyo,” 129. 
48 Ibid., 130. 
49 Bell’s conclusion analyzes the lasting effects. Even though Cheondogyo is a waning religion, 
its impact is forever known in Korean historiography. Alongside Donghak, the history of the religion is 
promoted by both North and South Korean Ministries of Culture and Tourism and is a testament to the 
peninsula’s anti-Japanese legacy. See Kirsten Bell, 147. 
50 Saeyoung Park is a lecturer of Korean Studies at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. 
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orthodox in political rhetoric, Park Saeyoung analyzes a nuanced variable that played a 
role in early nationalism: symbolizing historical monuments.51 The monument in 
examination is of Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545-1598), also known as Hyeonchungsa, located 
in Asan, South Chungcheong (Chungcheongnam-do) Province. 
For context, Admiral Yi is considered one of the two greatest Korean historical 
figures, the other being King Sejong (1397-1450) the inventor of the Korean alphabet 
(hangul). Yi became an admiral during the Imjin War against Japanese invaders (1592-
1598). He is noted for his humble beginnings, having no formal naval education, and 
decisively defending the Korean coast from a vastly superior Japanese navy, all without 
losing a single battle in the process.52 
In 1962 President Park was obsessed with remodeling and venerating 
Hyeonchungsa. As part of his modernization campaigns, he sought to make the small and 
humble monument into a “mass spectacle.”53 Park combined a new symbolic meaning to 
Yi’s monument – the strenuous task of modernization achieved through arduous work. 
Park noted that “[We] have such a great ancestor as [Yi Sunsin]. We have to work hard to 
follow his example.”54 Thereby, tying the will of Admiral Yi to the people. 
Park Saeyoung posits that Park’s obsession with Yi was situated within the 
troubled relationship the admiral had with Joseon and yangban elites.55 Influenced by Sin 
Chaeho, Park sought to find the root causes of Korea’s failure during the humiliating 
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colonial era. Sin attributed that the failures were due to a corrupt, weak, and “effeminate” 
yangban.56 Coincidentally, they were the very same elites that punished and demoted 
Admiral Yi due to in-court fighting. These stances, therefore, were heavily promoted by 
Park.57 
Furthermore, Saeyoung notes that Yi’s veneration was politically beneficial for 
the new Park regime as he aligned himself with the Admiral’s unwavering patriotism. 
More importantly, Park analogized a type of messiah-complex with Yi and himself. In 
Park Chung Hee’s view, Admiral Yi single-handedly saved Joseon Korea from total 
defeat. Unsurprisingly, the strongman conveniently left out information about crucial 
Chinese Ming reinforcements. In the end, Park emulated Yi by presenting himself as a 
redeemer to a beaten-down South Korea. Plainly put, Park was an “architect of national” 
and economic restoration; otherwise known as a “developmental dictator” to foreign 
analysts.58 
Saeyoung concludes by suggesting that “Park’s act of [creating a modern, national 
hero] was also a process of creating the image of a static singular and inferior Joseon 
past.”59 Notably, the monument modernization campaigns harken back to Sin Chaeho’s 
minjok philosophy. Sin sought to demote Sinitic influences in Korean folklore, via the 
promotion of Tangun, while Park sought to ignore Ming contributions during the Imjin 
War. While these are two exclusively separate historical events, they both fall within 
similar anti-Sinitic themes.60 
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  Map 1.2. Location of Hyeonchungsa. The site is in Asan, Chungcheongnam Province (Chungnam). Source: 
Google Maps. 
 
Figure 1.1. Temples and shrines located within the Hyeonchungsa site. Please note that the top right photo is a replica 
of Admiral Yi’s Geobukseon (“spiked-turtle warship”). Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of Culture website. 
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Yushin Constitution, the New Political Economy, and the Kim Dae-Jung Affair 
 Korean professor Han Sungjoo emphasizes that Park Chung Hee’s main goal was 
to transform Korea from a “political democracy” into an “administrative democracy.”61 
Han’s article, published in 1974, examines the events that led to one of South Korea’s 
most politically volatile eras.62 “Administrative democracy” means after a presidential 
election, the executive should consolidate legislative and judicial powers – in so doing, 
going against the constitution – in order to streamline needed economic reforms.63 Park’s 
reelection in 1971 affirmed these stances, and thus, a new constitution was immediately 
drafted and put into effect. 
 The new charter was ratified in 1972 and named the Constitution for 
Revitalization Reforms (Yushin honpop), or more commonly known as Yushin. The 
constitution abolished presidential terms and gave all government powers – economic, 
military, judicial, and legislative – to the executive.64 The consolidation helped Park 
enact economic reforms that resulted in astronomical GDP growth, about 10 percent 
annual average growth since 1973. One of the main policies that assisted in the boom was 
the reliance on low-interest Japanese and American loans.65 This resulted in an 
international perspective that Korea was an economic success story – a once destitute and 
war-ravaged nation emerging from the ashes as a capitalist phoenix. Domestically, 
however, the Yushin era violently antagonized any form of dissent and opposition in 
order to achieve national affluency.66 
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 For example, and during the high-growth years, the “Kim Dae-Jung Affair” 
erupted after the 1971 presidential election. Opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung lost to Park 
in a hotly-contested election – the Park camp was accused of vote tampering by many 
protestors.67 Shortly thereafter, Park suspended the constitution, enacted Yushin, and Kim 
– fearing for his life – went into self-imposed exile. Immediately, Kim underwent an 
international tour to inform, lecture, and decry the “military dictatorship and tyranny” of 
Park’s regime.68 
 As a result, mass student demonstrations erupted in a struggle to “restore 
democracy.”69 Influential religious leaders later joined the protests, thereby embodying 
historical collaboration such as the Donghak movement.70 In combination with Kim’s 
international tour, Park’s government received global scorn and embarrassment. The 
negative responses from South Korea’s two closest economic partners – America and 
Japan – threatened to halt sorely needed investment capital, thus endangering Park’s 
Yushin economic reforms.71 
 In retaliation, Park ordered the Korean CIA to kidnap Kim from his Tokyo hotel 
and return him to Seoul under treason charges. The abduction was successful; however, 
Japan’s Tanaka Cabinet was infuriated on grounds of sovereign encroachment. 
Consequently, Tanaka temporarily withheld $1.3 billion of Japanese investment.72 
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Eventually, the Park government lessened Kim’s punishment to house arrest, thereby 
appeasing economic partners. 
Nevertheless, the damage was already done both socially and politically.73 As an 
unintended consequence, the Korean public noticed the strong fiscal dependency rooted 
in Japanese diplomatic relations. Above all, the scandal educed comparisons with 
Imperial Japan’s colonial domination; specifically, Park ordering encroachment on 
foreign lands, clandestine kidnappings, and life-threatening suppression. Therefore, 
Park’s image as a defender from external forces – in the vain of Admiral Yi – was forever 
tarnished. 
Han concludes with a somber analysis on the consequences of Yushin and the 
“Kim Scandal.” Even with all the scandals, Han posits that since the 1970s marked an era 
of exceptional economic growth, “[the Park government] will be able to ride out the 
current wave of protests,” and perhaps save his image for years to come.74 
                                                 
73 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 471. 
74 Sungjoo Han, “Political Economy,” 47. 
Figure 1.2. From left to right, 1971 campaign photos of Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae 
Jung. Please note how Park’s poster has no Chinese characters (hanja) while Kim’s 
poster has hanja above his hangul name (김대중). Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Clientelism and Similarities with the Japanese Economy 
 Park’s agenda and Korean conglomerates are deeply connected and reliant on one 
another. This connection also brought political and socioeconomic contentions that are 
prevalent today. Korean scholar Nam Chang-hee published an article shortly after the 
1992 presidential election describing these issues firsthand.75 For context, the winner of 
the 1992 election was anti-corporatist candidate Kim Young-sam – one of Park Chung 
Hee’s strongest and oldest opposition members. Nam focuses on one of President Kim’s 
main political tenets, anti-corporatism, and briefly details the history that led to the 
dominance of Korean mega-corporations – better known as chaebol.76 
 Nam starts by defining the keyword to his article, “clientelism.” Clientelism, also 
known as “the patron-client model,” is defined as favorable exchanges between a weaker 
and a stronger entity at the expense of the community. In Nam’s case, the state is a 
“domineering patron,” chaebol is the “obedient client,” and the “community” are 
taxpayers and future generations.77 It is also noteworthy that this is a “symbiotic 
relationship” according to economist Chong Ku-hyon.78 Meaning, domineering and 
obedient positions may change back and forth at any time. 
 Nam gives a brief history of South Korea’s political instability soon after the 1953 
Armistice Agreement. He notes that compared to the North, the South had an arduous 
task of legitimizing itself. It had to cast itself as a better alternative than the North and the 
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“hated Japanese” colonists.79 Public illegitimacy arose due to President Rhee Syngman’s 
leniency towards “traitors.” They were usually collaborators and business elites who had 
ties to the Japanese and benefitted from colonial institutions. Rhee argued that learning 
from their expertise could help stabilize Korea politically and economically.80 
Accordingly, Korean nationalists and the Rhee Administration clashed, thereby 
weakening his rule and leading to the forceful takeover by General Park. 
 Before the coup, Park was a former Japanese Manchukuo (Manchuria) military 
officer educated through Imperial establishments. Likewise, Park was an admirer of Meiji 
reforms (1868-1912) – noted for rapidly modernizing Japan’s feudal society into a Great 
Power – and strongly supported “clientelistic industrial expansion” in conjunction with a 
strong “ultranationalistic samurai-military” ethic. 
Otherwise put, Park supported a Meiji-style zaibatsu system – family-owned 
mega-corporations with strong state backing – mixed with bushido – a samurai ethic that 
emphasizes warrior strength over the weak. Moreover, Park accentuated the need for a 
paternal “Confucian style harmony” between military, businesses, and labor.81 In turn, 
Park’s fervent ideologies mixed with newly-acquired Yushin powers birthed the chaebol 
system. This birth cemented that “hated Japanese colonial institutions” were now heavily 
engrained into South Korea’s market economy and labor force.82 
 The dominance of chaebol was a strong factor for South Korea’s astonishing 
twenty-five-year economic boom from 1972 up until the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
One chaebol practice that helped ensure guaranteed growth was the exploitation of heavy 
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state-controlled ventures. This was also coupled with limitless funding through state-
owned commercial banks. For example, massive and profitable infrastructure projects, 
such as dams and freeways, were sometimes exclusively given to instantaneously state-
created chaebol, such as Pohang Steel. In turn, chaebol outsourced labor – both menial 
and specialized – to smaller firms for pennies-on-the-dollar.83 They then reinvested the 
remaining funds into lucrative, yet risky, capital ventures such as high-interest loaning, 
thereby becoming financial institutions themselves. 
These practices allowed most chaebol to severely undermine market wages intent 
on manufacturing high-priced goods at low-cost capital. In hindsight, this business model 
sounds immoral and perilous for consumers and laborers; however, during the economic 
boom, all players were rewarded. As chaebol grew in wealth, unemployment lowered, 
incumbent politicians grew in influence, and above all – and once inaccessible to the 
average Korean – an overabundance of consumer goods clothed, fed, and created leisure 
time on a massive scale.84 
 In effect, chaebol corporations grew into monopolies that held unchecked powers 
over laborers and smaller firms. Since this was a “symbiotic relationship,” ruling party 
members had access to chaebol capital in the pursuit to fund their agendas. None was 
more pervasive than Park’s successor Chun Doo-hwan (1931- ). Chun publicly sought 
chaebol resources to aid political allies and his economic policies.85 Examples of 
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prominent chaebol who paid yearly allowances to Chun included Samsung, LG, and 
Hyundai.86 
Nam concludes on the changes that the Korean economy is currently undergoing; 
specifically, he refers to Kim Young-sam’s 1992 presidential campaign and the 
generation that elected him. Kim’s election is noted for weakening chaebol power – 
inclusive of “clientelism” – due to a more educated and politically active population. 
Nam posits that President Kim instilled much needed public confidence for Koreans to 
move to a more fair and prosperous market economy.87 
 
  
                                                 
86 Chico Harlan, “South Korea Goes After the Fortune of Chun Doo-hwan, Its Last Military 
Strongman,” Washington Post, August 14, 2013. 
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Figure 1.3. Syngman Rhee’s official presidential 
portrait. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
Figure 1.4. Chun Doo-hwan’s official presidential 
portrait. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Syngman Rhee: The Importance of South Korea’s First President 
 Keyes Beech published a newspaper article in 1960 shortly after Rhee Syngman’s 
presidential abdication on April 26.88 Beech wrote about the experiences of several 
student protesters, Baek Won-bai and Kim Byung-cheul, who supported ousting Rhee’s 
regime. However, before Beech describes Rhee’s downfall, he explains the circumstances 
that led to Rhee’s former supporters abandoning him. First, Beech emphasizes the 
importance of American and UN aid propping up Rhee’s failed presidency. Akin to a 
political experiment, America’s primary goal was to invest $2 billion in economic aid in 
the hopes of morphing an impoverished nation into a free-market “showcase of 
democracy.”89 
Even with massive monetary aid, the newborn Republic of Korea was anything 
but an initial success. Instead it was more of a “one-party dictatorship which enforced the 
tyranny of the majority.”90 Accusations of Rhee’s administration pocketing much of the 
international aid were numerous.91 All this culminated in 1956 after a close presidential 
election; Rhee won 56 percent of the vote against Cho Bong-am, an ex-communist, who 
was hanged after Rhee’s inauguration. Furthermore, Rhee foresaw the great risk of losing 
the upcoming 1960 presidential election, and in mysterious circumstances, his electoral 
opponents died, thus causing him to run unopposed.92 
                                                 
88 Keyes Beech (1914-1990) was a Pulitzer Prize awarded journalist who covered the Korean 
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Fast-forward to Kim and Baek, these were two out of many young protesters who 
were infuriated over Rhee’s transgressions. While Kim and Baek protested despotism, 
Beech notes the similarities that both students had with a young Rhee. From 1896 to 
1904, the onset of Korea’s colonial age, then-student Rhee protested – and later was 
imprisoned on charges of sedition – against Imperial Japanese and Russian influences.93 
These early ideologies later evolved into anti-communist stances, therefore suggesting 
that a younger Rhee shared some pro-democratic characteristics with that of his 
protesters. 
Additionally, Beech explains how these protests culminated in March 1960 when 
government authorities killed student activists in the port town of Masan. Soon after, 
nationwide protests erupted with Seoul being at the heart of it all. Known as the April 19 
Revolution, protestors stormed the Blue House – equivalent to the US White House – 
with Rhee barely escaping. Rhee’s hand-picked successor Vice President Lee Ki-poong, 
known as the last remnant of the dictatorial regime, was equally ousted. Lee’s family, 
assisted by his son Lee Kang-seok, committed suicide days later.94  
The conclusion deals with Rhee’s exile in Hawaii and the risky predicament that 
the US put itself in by supporting a universally despised dictator. In other words, at the 
height of the Cold War Rhee’s dictatorship caused a discomfort in a politically unstable 
part of Asia, thereby hurting democratic legitimacy within the continent.95 However, US 
officials did comment that “[Americans] could also feel much better. . . that the Rhee 
regime was no longer on their conscience. . . [and] feel satisfaction over the fact that the 
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revolt against Rhee's dictatorship was not Communist-led but undertaken by those who 
wanted ‘democracy like in America.’”96 Therefore, in hindsight, the ousting of Rhee was 
also a relief for American officials. 
 
The Pros and Cons of Korean Ethnic Nationalism 
Yin Seow Jing details the impacts, both positive and negative, that ethnic 
nationalism has on contemporary South Korea.97 Yin starts by reiterating the historical 
context behind the movement. She recounts Tan’gun origins and how it gave “South 
Koreans a national identity” and justification for “ethnic homogeneity.”98 She also adds 
colonialism as a primary factor that inadvertently awakened Korean national pride. In her 
own words, “Japan, through her conquest of rule of Korea, caused the awakening and 
sustaining of Korean nationalism.”99 
 Midway through the article, Yin breaks down the positive and negative effects 
that “ethnic homogeneity” had on modernization. The pros came through the rapid 
development of industry and commerce, thus leading to the massive alleviation of 
poverty. She attributes this success, in part, to the universally agreed upon goal of 
poverty alleviation through any means necessary. In other words, because prominent 
leaders, such as then-general Park Chung Hee, strongly pushed for Korean “cultural [and 
economic] superiority,” Koreans, in turn, were inspired to push their great nation into 
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international prominence.100 The cost of affluency, however, came through the iron-fisted 
and brutal rule of the Park and Chun Doo-hwan regimes. 
 The most notable aspect though was the effect it had on ethnic relations. The end 
of the article highlights the importance of a “common bloodline” that transcended 
socioeconomic classes. It gave Koreans a profound sense of pride and “exceptionalism” 
after decades of humiliating subjugation.101 Conversely, an accidental consequence was 
that it would “distance [Koreans] from others,” and that they would feel “a sense of duty 
to facilitate only their own people.”102 Thereby, the article’s conclusion is on a negative 
note warning how ethnic nationalism can disguise xenophobia as a societal norm. 
 
A Disguised Consequence, Part I: Park’s Currency Reform 
Australian Professor Kim Hyung-A posits that South Korea’s transformation 
under Park “was not a static but a dynamic set of institutional arrangements that 
continuously transformed during the years of the junta.”103 Professor Kim, therefore, 
focuses on the complex and unorthodox state-building that occurred during General 
Park’s junta (1961-1963).104 Specifically, Park’s reforms did not modernize the country 
instantaneously, but rather, there was an intricate step-by-step process. Furthermore, she 
explains the major reforms that contributed to these successes. Within those steps, of 
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course, came unintended consequences, and one – scapegoating Chinese culture – that 
coincided with Park’s ethnic nationalism. 
Kim lays out the two most prominent institutions credited for spearheading 
economic reforms, the Park-created Supreme Council of National Reconstruction 
(SCNR) and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Under them were 
subordinate departments tasked with implementing policies within their respective 
jurisdiction. These institutions were the Ministries of Commerce & Industry (MCI), 
Finance (MOF), Home Affairs (MHA), and the Economic Planning Board (EPB).105 The 
main agents of immediate politico-economic change, however, were the EPB, MOF, and 
KCIA. 
One of Park’s major reforms was restructuring the all-but-worthless Korean 
currency, the Korean hwan.106 To accomplish this, the KCIA and MOF collaborated with 
US President Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 
an effort to reintroduce a new US-pegged currency – the Korean won (KRW). This was 
intended to raise capital investment through new American, then later Japanese, backed 
loans. The reform failed initially as Korean officials miscalculated the distrust the 
average citizen had with banks. Thereby, the new currency exchanges were nonexistent 
as citizens sought to avoid most financial institutions.107 
Even though this was a miscalculation, KCIA and MOF officials – through 
census-taking measures – found out that most of the public hoarded massive amounts of 
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cash in personal household stashes.108 All the more suspect was the notable size of the 
ethnic Chinese population living on Korean soil.109 The amount of wealth and cash 
Korean-born Chinese held during a destitute era caught Park’s attention. This new 
revelation later shaped Park’s modernization policies, while concurrently sparking an 
anti-Chinese campaign. 
 
A Disguised Consequence, Part II: Park’s Anti-Chinese Campaign 
Chapter Two in Nadia Y. Kim’s monograph mentions an indirect, albeit brief, 
outcome from Korean ethnic nationalism.110 Specifically, Kim describes Park Chung 
Hee’s use of a pure Korean ideology to advance socioeconomic goals.111 Kim begins the 
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chapter with a brief history on Sin Chaeho and how he symbolized Tan’gun as a 
“homogenized bloodline” all Koreans shared. She also suggests that the modern 
utilization of this myth may have been influenced by Imperial Japanese propaganda, one 
centered on a pure and dominant Asian race.112 This analogy is vital because Park used 
the tale as a symbol of Korean unity. 
 Culmination occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when the tale was revived as 
one of Park’s tenets. In addition, Kim relates research from other Korean scholars to help 
link Tan’gun as a way to legitimize Park’s authoritarian rule. Most notably, Park used the 
idea of a homogenized and hardworking ancestry to instill a common goal among a low-
morale constituency. Subsequently, the support gathered was used to push xenophobic 
policies subtly disguised as protectionism. 
Such examples were introduced after the MOF and KCIA failed at their task of 
currency reform.113 As noted, even though this was a premature failure, Park’s junta 
noticed the rising affluence in Korea’s small, yet prominent, Chinese community. Park’s 
government was afraid of the notion that a very small group of prosperous foreign 
inhabitants could have the ability to garner considerable influence. Likewise, the fear of 
foreign elites – akin to former Imperial Japanese elites – living amongst Korean natives 
did not sit well with Park’s nationalist agendas because it threatened to unravel his 
minjok-inspired platforms.114 
Subsequently, this assumption birthed Park’s most discriminatory policies. In 
conjunction with the MOF, EPB, and KCIA, Park ordered the confiscation of supposed 
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hoarded cash. While this affected Korean citizens as well, the policy was meant to 
damage the finances of the Chinese community in order to coerce emigration out of 
Korea.115 Furthermore, these policies were created to diminish the Chinese influence – 
cultural and financial – that Park purportedly warned his Korean brethren of. 
As a result, more anti-Chinese policies aimed to diminish these Sinitic influences 
were implemented. For example, Park pressured schools to discontinue teaching hanja – 
a Chinese script used as the main writing system before hangul.116 This climaxed in 1971 
when Park officially banned hanja. A decree known as Hangul Jeon-yong, roughly 
translated to the “Hangul-Only Policy,” coupled with very strict Chinese immigration 
laws completed Park’s ethnonationalist campaigns.117 
 
History of Korean Confucianism 
 Chung Chai-sik and Kim Jinwung explains the effects that Confucian traditions 
had in a modernizing Korea.118 Chung’s thesis sets out to answer how Confucianism 
evolved to “assume responsibility for maintaining the [Korean] collective identity,” and 
what the limits were in “articulating political and social programs” towards the goal of 
“creating a modern nation-state.”119 Simply put, both author’s give some context on the 
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history of Korea’s Neo-Confucian ideologies, whereas Chung relates this to modern 
Korean nationalism.120 
 Chung gives a succinct history – similarly, complementing Kim’s composition – 
of Confucianism and its dispersion from China to the peninsula.121 The high culture and 
technologically advanced society, from Tang China (618-907 CE) to the Song (960-1279 
CE) Dynasties, diffused onto the Kingdom of Goryeo (918-1392 CE).122 More 
importantly, high culture, through Chinese literary classics, spread among Goryeo literati 
elites.123 In effect, Confucian morals and etiquette guided academic and royal statutes. 
Confucianism in Korea quickly became an elite philosophical order and was heavily 
propagated to sangmin and cheonmin, respectively known as the common and lowest 
classes.124 As such, these classes were expected to fall in line with Confucian-inspired 
decrees.125 
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 Turning towards the dawn of the Joseon era (1392-1897CE), Korean 
Confucianism became an official state tenet – known as the Neo-Confucian sect Ch’eng-
chu – used to guide the new society.126 However, during the sixteenth century the 
disillusioned and maltreated lower classes gradually stepped away from the out-of-touch 
Ch’eng-chu philosophy. Likewise, most of the rural masses discovered other Neo-
Confucian offshoots that aligned more with their everyday situations. 
 The most prominent of these ideologies was silhak. Silhak is a seventeenth-
century Neo-Confucian doctrine – influenced by Song scholar Zhu Xi’s (1130 CE – 1200 
CE) teachings – that deemphasized spiritual elements promoted by yangban scholars. In 
response, silhak scholars focused on a more practical and “physical” approach.127 
Essentially, silhak encouraged equality through social, legal, and technological reform. 
Reforms included equal land distribution, taxation, and the study and exchange of 
agricultural sciences – usually from Chinese and Western sources.128 
 Chung’s thesis highlights that the most significant aspect of silhak was the 
deviation from centuries-old Chinese classics – teachings that were impractical to the 
uneducated masses.129 Eventually, silhak evolved to become an aboriginal aspect of 
Korean culture that was born from the masses as a response to yangban stubbornness and 
unsympathetic rule. 
 
                                                 
126 Chung, 62. 
127 Yangban Confucian elites focused more on the ritualistic aspects while silhak scholars, like 
Yi Ik (1681-1763 CE), emphasized knowledge that benefitted the masses. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 261. 
128 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 261. 
129 Chung, “Confucian Tradition,” 70. 
 
46 
 
 
The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part I: The Foundations 
 Han Seung-Mi examines the hidden ideals within the New Community Movement 
(NCM). Known in Korean as Saemaul undong (1970-1980), the NCM was Park Chung 
Hee’s second-most defining economic policy after the chaebol system.130 Han’s thesis 
focuses on Park and the NCM’s “anti-elitist and populist ideals” and how they manifested 
into a native form of “state populism.”131 Her research delves into characteristics that 
made the NCM popular with rural communities; these communities were the bedrock of 
Park’s support. Additionally, she explains the successes, failures, ironies, and legacies 
left behind. 
 Han starts by giving a concise history behind NCM motifs. From 1945 to the 
early 1960s, a politically impotent South Korea failed to pass effective land and industry 
reforms. Most of the population were still agrarian, and unemployment – from the poor to 
the highly-skilled – was chronically high. The ruling Democratic Party (Minjoo Dang) – 
the opposition party of the recently-ousted President Rhee – enacted an Economic 
Development Plan in 1960. 
The plan was modeled after India and prioritized “comparative advantage” in 
agricultural development; however, this was short lived and in May 16, 1961, General 
Park enacted his infamous military coup.132 Instead of following the Indian model, Park 
changed it to the “Japanese model,” one that prioritized commodity inflation – in this 
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case, the state artificially inflated the value of rice. Instantaneously, rice farming 
communities began to accumulate wealth.133 
 Likewise, the NCM was incredibly popular with the agrarian public. Seeing this 
as an opportunity to push countryside economic and propaganda reforms, Park 
implemented “Japanese-style mental training.”134 “Mental training” emphasized 
“Weberian” work ethics modeled by economist Ninoyama Ginjiro.135 In other words, the 
“culture of poverty” and economic failures were attributed to “laziness, despair, and 
intemperance.”136 As a cure, a strong executive leader, like a father, was needed to guide 
society towards a collective, ardent, and successful work ethic. 
 Park accomplished this by enacting five-year plans intended to modernize the 
countryside. Modernization included paved roads, telecommunications, public schooling, 
and the adoption of modern farming methods. Anecdotes even came to play as Park 
officials considered the replacement of thatched-roofing – considered synonymous with 
poverty – with tiled-roofing as a measure of success. In so doing, villages and towns that 
successfully completed the efforts were rewarded and overcompensated with extra aid; 
therefore, incentives to quickly modernize became a community’s main priority.137 
 The NCM was such an initial success that it placed the government in an ironic 
predicament. During this era, urban lifestyle was considered a characteristic of the elites; 
cities held all the top university and civic jobs.138 Consequently, as the rural communities 
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developed so did their logistics. Newly-build highways connected many isolated towns 
with corresponding metropolises. In turn, the rising rural middle-classes migrated in 
droves to urban hotspots in the pursuit of educational opportunities for their children. 
Simply put, elite services were now in the grasp of once-impoverished farming families. 
This inadvertent effect, therefore, was just one variable that worked against Park’s 
campaign; and this partly contributed to the NCM’s downfall shortly after his death.139 
 
  
                                                 
139 Seung-Mi Han, 77. 
Figure 1.6. Pictured above are typical farming communities before the advent of the NCM. Please note the building 
style of the houses. Park officials considered thatched roofing synonymous with poverty. Source: Gyeonggi Province 
Saemaul Undong Museum. 
 
Figure 1.7. Left, unpaved town roads before reforms. Right, Park Chung Hee (pictured in the very center front) along 
with technocrats surveying an NCM village. Source: Seoul Saemaul Undong Museum. 
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The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part II: The Relationship to Nationalism 
 It is important to stress that the NCM was not only an economic policy but an 
initiative cloaked in nationalist sentiments. Han labels the NCM as part of a campaign to 
push heavy urban and rural modernization. The intent was to subtly showcase support for 
state populism: in other words, display patriotism.140 This ideology helped the NCM 
achieve its broad popularity among two different generations, the elderly and the youth. 
Heavy modernization was attributed to the “passionate youth” who led forth the 
strenuous labor while the elder generations led the administrative planning. This was, 
simply put, a community affair that emanated bipan seryok, an aura of “anti-
governmental (anti-centralized) force.”141 
 Initially, this proved to be a perfect match as many rural communities rapidly 
developed. According to Korean economists and historians, the NCM and rural 
modernization was one major variable for South Korea’s economic miracle, better known 
as the “Miracle on the Han River.”142 However, these plans could not succeed on sheer 
work ethics alone. The NCM, along with its chaebol counterpart, greatly benefitted from 
American economic aid and Japanese factory investments.143 
 More importantly and in-line with Park’s Neo-Confucian-inspired ideologies, the 
government gave local jurisdiction to communities. Village leaders distributed 
developmental resources while the youth fervently backed their leadership. Furthermore, 
Park’s promulgation of his minjok-inspired work ethics seemed to go in tandem with this 
labor structure. Put another way, the NCM created, intentionally or not, a new 
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socioeconomic hierarchy – one conveniently based on a sequential order of power – that 
began with the highest authority, President Park. 
Park then trickled-down power to lesser entities, in this case rural communities. 
These areas were led by elders who relayed tasks to younger laborers; explicitly, new 
minjok ethics were entrenched with Confucianism. This was now the official “national 
ethos” that Park’s Korea heavily relied on, akin to a top-down authoritarian power 
structure.144 
 
The Importance of Saemaul Undong, Part III: Confucian Ironies 
The initial aftermath of the NCM clashed with Park’s moral ideologies. To give 
context, during the 1950s many farmers and influential village leaders sold their land – 
after a series of natural disasters – to the state’s newly-made Land Reform committee. In 
the pursuit of better opportunities, many of them migrated to the cities.145 It is worth 
noting that not all village leaders, usually elderly in age and somewhat well-off, migrated 
to the cities. Some stayed behind in their locality to become NCM bureaucrats.146 
Shortly after the 1961 coup, Park noticed this trend and took advantage of it by 
restructuring Land Reform policies.147 The intent was to expedite the buyout of land, 
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usually from desperate poverty-stricken landowners, at a fraction of the market-cost. In 
urgent need to get the NCM off the ground, the state immediately gave out – usually at 
interest-free contractual agreements – newly-bought land to ambitious “fresh faces.”148 
These “fresh faces” consisted of experienced, often young, agrarian tradesmen 
and farmers; likewise, this resulted in the movement’s successful start. Through state-
backed initiatives – inflated rice prices and extra subsidies for higher annual yields – 
young landowners enthusiastically toiled in the fields; it was only a matter of time before 
they benefitted. 149 Eventually, and at little to no startup cost, a new rustic generation of 
laborers accrued a fine amount of wealth.150 
Due to the new prosperity and dependency on successful young laborers, Han 
posits that the NCM’s policies were an ironic ideology that clashed with Park’s “state 
populism.” She better defines this disparity as an “egalitarian ethos [colliding] with 
breathless mechanism of national mobilization.”151 In other words, the NCM was 
intended to raise the rural socioeconomic standards to levels set by their urban 
counterparts. Ironically, socioeconomic advancement successfully occurred for the 
younger generation while older generations – many of whom were now city-dwellers – 
were mired in poverty. 
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Consequently, the countryside’s millennium-old Confucian order, or “natural 
order of things” was severely upended.152 While there are other incremental variables that 
played into this upheaval, Han posits a striking concept. Village elders – Park’s chosen 
NCM administrators – unknowingly had their powers severely undermined by wealthy 
young farmers.153 Plainly speaking, age was now only a number, the filial era quickly 
passed, and young nouveau-riche ruled the towns. The class reversal did not eliminate all 
Confucian aspects, however. Patriarchal elements were still prevalent, and rural elites 
were usually young men while the poverty-stricken were elderly, women, and the 
disabled. 
Nevertheless, the gerontocratic system that ruled the peninsula for a thousand 
years gave way to entrepreneurship. This meant that the average Korean youth had a way 
to climb the social ladder through meritocracy and hard work – a path difficult to pursue 
at an elderly age. This trend was not exclusive to the countryside either. In the booming 
cities across the nation, a new generation was gaining prominence through chaebol-
guided entrepreneurship. Small-to-medium sized businesses flourished while public 
investment was high.154 Seismic societal shifts were here to stay, even if it did collide 
with the old Confucian order. 
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South Korea’s Role in the Vietnam War, Part I: Park’s Reasons 
 American and Western involvement in the Vietnam War (1955-1975) is a 
contentious issue; however, Kim Se Jin’s article, written during the peak of the war 
(1970), details the positive impact that it had on a fledgling Republic of Korea (ROK).155 
Kim’s posits that the Vietnam War’s effects were mostly positive for South Koreans. The 
war bolstered an already burgeoning economy and garnered international prestige for 
ROK soldiers and hardworking Korean expatriates.156 
The background to South Korea’s involvement began in 1965 when President 
Lyndon B. Johnson rapidly built up American presence in Southeast Asia.157 America 
had a challenging time convincing other allies to commit to major armed supporting 
roles. However, the US found a close ally in the still-infant ROK, and more importantly, 
a confidant in President Park Chung-Hee.158 Consequently, an all too eager Park sent 
47,000 troops, from 1965 to 1973, to the narrow Southeast Asian nation; in doing so, the 
ROK was the largest contingent of non-American forces sent.159 
 Kim, and drawing parallels to Kim Jinwung’s analysis, gives three main reasons 
that Park was keen to aid America. First, Park’s pro-American military occupation of the 
ROK complemented his anti-communist stance. In context, before US-UN Korean War 
intervention, North Korea easily overpowered the South. Undoubtedly, the northern 
communist military was still vastly superior – in terms of training, funding, and 
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technology – to the ROK. Park knew of this embarrassing state and needed full US 
protection along the 38th Parallel (DMZ) border.160 
The second reason was to modernize the severely antiquated, undermanned, and 
underfunded ROK military. Because the country dedicated all its resources to 
modernizing industry, infrastructure, and commerce, military expenditures were minute. 
Park knew the ROK’s strong commitment to the war entitled them unprecedented 
amounts of American military advisors, technology, and funding.161 Otherwise speaking, 
reforming the military into modern-day standards was too expensive for Park’s 
government, so letting another government, the US, eagerly do the task was the perfect 
solution. Moreover, Park knew a strengthened military guaranteed security for his radical 
reforms. 
Lastly, and more notably, Park knew the enormous economic benefits in 
transitioning Korea into a war-production economy.162 An abundance of zero-interest 
American loans were easily acquired as a result, and thus, played an important variable in 
Korea’s economic boom. On a micro-economic level, newly-raised wages – for soldiers 
and expatriate civilians willing to work in a wartime environment – combined with a 
frugal mindset, allowed future accumulation of substantial savings for most Korean 
households.163 
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As an effect, Korea’s middle-class surge was partly based on the rural origins of 
many conscripted soldiers. The average soldier’s salary, usually the whole annual wage, 
was remitted back to their farming communities. This scenario, dubbed the “Vietnam 
Income,” coupled with the 1970s Saemaul Undong reforms, only amplified the value of 
transferred savings.164 Additionally, this also played a slight variable in legitimizing the 
newly-circulated Korean won because international exchanges were more prevalent from 
the financial activities of many overseas Korean workers.165 
 
South Korea’s Role in the Vietnam War, Part I: The Consequences 
 First and foremost, all of Park’s visions, militarily and economically, were at their 
peak during the Vietnam War. The war was a success for South Korea on all fronts; the 
economy and per capita income flourished at an astronomical rate; and, at the same time, 
Park’s military rapidly modernized into a formidable fighting force. As Kim notes, “both 
in terms of immediate and long-term effects, the Vietnam War represents the watershed 
of [South Korean] growth.”166 Concurrently, and behind the scenes, Park’s political 
influence grew both domestically and internationally. 
Domestically, Park’s opposition eerily predicted that the rapid militarization and 
involvement “might transform South Korea into a garrison state in which the 
predominant position of the military could result in the permanent entrenchment of the 
                                                 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 410. 
164 Se Jin Kim, “South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam,” 523. 
165 Young Jo Lee, “The Countryside,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South 
Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF 
e-book, 355. 
166 Se Jin Kim, “South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam,” 522. 
 
56 
 
 
military-oriented government of Chung-hee Park.”167 However, the opposition’s voice 
fell on deaf ears as the National Assembly was dominated by Park’s political party, the 
Minjoo gonghwadang, known as the Democratic Republican Party (DRP).168 Likewise, 
the war played a variable in consolidating the DRP’s decade-long legislative dominance 
while also cementing Park’s future electoral rubberstamps.169 
Internationally, Korean-American relations were closer than ever. Gone were the 
days when Americans viewed them as “just a burdensome military protectorate.”170 
When it came to Asian-Pacific affairs, Park’s ROK were now “friends, allies, and 
partners of free Asia.” To make matters better, the ROK were equal negotiating partners, 
in trade and military affairs, alongside the Japanese and Taiwanese.171 South Korea, 
furthermore, was now a powerhouse in Asia as was evident in 1966 when Seoul hosted 
the now-defunct Asian Pacific Conference (ASPAC).172 That leading role would later 
help the ROK build economic alliances around the continent, and, in turn, set the small 
peninsula up to become an exporting behemoth.173 
Most notably, Park – once thought of as an illegitimate strongman – was now one 
of Asia’s iconic twentieth century leaders.174 Simultaneously, Park’s successful 
consolidation at home and America’s attention solely focused on Vietnam allowed him 
unchecked power. As such, the world “tried not to get in the way of Park in South Korean 
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domestic politics.”175 In other words, the international community was mostly unaware, 
apathetic, or perhaps willfully ignorant towards Korean politics. 
It is also worth noting that Korea’s Vietnamese endeavors, while mostly positive, 
had some negative effects as well. Alongside thousands of casualties, inflation and the 
annual cost of living – around 12 to 13 percent – shot up substantially.176 Secondly, North 
and South Korean relations soured as diplomacy took a backseat to military 
competitiveness. Finally, Park’s power-hungry addiction to military-might eventually 
played a role in his death.177 
 
The Peak of the Park Era 
The fall and death of Park Chung Hee (assassinated in October 26, 1979) is a 
controversial topic in Korean academia; nonetheless, it is a well-covered and debated 
subject. Topics such as why the regime fell, why a close confidant assassinated Park, and 
the volatile aftermath are all part of the lore that makes this one of the most infamous 
events in modern South Korean history. The monographs The Park Chung Hee Era and A 
History of Korea complement each other by giving an exhaustive take on this 
unpredictable time.178 
In October 17, 1972, Park enacted a “palace coup” by instating the infamous 
Yushin Constitution. Although another seven years took place before Park’s 
assassination, Yushin and the creation of the Fourth Republic (1972-1981) was the 
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beginning of the end.179 This era was the peak of Park’s presidency as all opposition was 
effectively silenced, and support in rural communities was at an all-time high. Combined 
with the swift modernization of the armed forces and the rise of the new export-driven 
economy, it seemed as if Park’s regime was invincible.180 
 
The Fall and Death of Park Chung Hee 
The end of the 1970s revealed cracks in Park’s political armor. Shortly after 
Yushin, the opposition, now known as the New Democratic Party (Shin Minjoo-Dang), 
slowly gained domestic and international support after Kim Dae-Jung was arrested. The 
fiasco that occurred over the “Kim Dae-Jung Affair” rattled protestors around the nation. 
Thousands of students, intellectuals, and urbanites – many of whom were geriatric and 
poverty stricken – protested daily. Dissent and dissatisfaction only amplified as Park’s 
armed forces clashed, arrested, and tortured thousands of citizens.181 
On the international end, the Vietnam Conflict was over, the Watergate Scandal 
concluded, and Jimmy Carter was elected US President in 1976. Without any more 
diplomatic interruptions, and partly due to the commotion caused by Kim Dae-Jung, the 
Carter Administration finally noticed the discord within the Korean peninsula. In turn, 
Carter threatened to withdraw US military aid and infantry divisions.182 The planned 
removal caused a panic not only within the Park regime but among the public as well. 
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While the ROK military were magnitudes better than what they were before the Vietnam 
War, they were still on the losing end against a triple entente – North Korea, China, and 
the Soviet Union – of antagonists.183 Losing America’s support would leave them 
vulnerable and destroy all their hard-earned gains. 
Perhaps the greatest hit to Park’s national prestige was the blow the economy took 
during the Oil Shocks. The first Oil Shock in 1973 shook the Korean economy, but 
Park’s efforts to secure cheap loans from the IMF, Japan, and America kept the flow of 
industry capital running smoothly.184 However, the 1979 Oil Shock caused a global 
recession that South Korea was unable to avert. Due to Park’s image as an anti-
democratic strongman, America and Japan were hesitant to publicly aid an autocratic 
regime, especially after the Western interventionist fiasco in Vietnam.185 
Misfortunes finally caught up with Park in October 26, 1979, also known as the 
“10.26 Incident.” During a cold autumn night in Seoul, Park’s best friend and KCIA 
director Kim Jae-kyu, after an intense dinner argument, shot and killed Park along with 
his chief bodyguard Cha Ji-chul. From the sudden military takeover in 1961 and until 
eighteen years later, the Park Era finally came to a sudden end. Nevertheless, even with 
Park’s death, political tranquility was still out of reach for the East Asian Republic. 
* * * 
The Park Era was most notable for the blood spilled during his radical reforms. 
Conversely, this period simultaneously laid the foundations that steered a penniless and 
lawless country into an orderly economic superpower. Ultimately, Park’s political and 
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economic agendas are still eternally-debated, however, there is no denying the enormous 
imprints he left on Korea and modern state-building agendas. Chapter II, therefore, sets to 
analyze the background and initial impressions of Park’s new, unique, and heavy-handed 
state nationalism. 
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Chapter II: 
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The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were tumultuous for Korea; its economy, 
social structure and political system changed dramatically. These changes were largely 
due to confrontation with outside forces. Before Park Chung Hee’s birth (1917-1979), 
Korea was in an era of wilderness. A millennia’s worth of Middle Kingdom influence 
was coming to an end, and with that, an end to centuries-worth of cordial “tributary” 
relations with China.1 The peninsula was shaken and permanently altered by the change 
of status quo.2 This was no-more evident than through the actions of a newly dominant 
and industrialized Japan. 
Roger Janelli posits that tribute systems gave the East Asian region a stratified 
order. In particular, “It gave [Koreans] a sense of place . . . a place lower than that of 
China but higher than that of Japan.”3 The ascent of Imperial Japan (1868-1945), 
however, upended this age-old system, and therefore, laid the foundations for not only 
Korean nationalism but also the institutions that shaped Park’s agendas. 
Among Westerners, the tribute system may appear as an imbalanced convention 
wherein subordinates are coerced into submission; however, this was very advantageous 
for Korea. As Jinwung Kim notes, Ancient China looked upon “Choson (Korea)” as a 
utopia.4 From the early seventh century BCE, some Chinese kingdoms such as the Qi 
                                                 
1 According to American University professor Ji-young Lee the words “tribute system” is a 
“Western invention.” In Lee’s monograph, China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian 
Domination, there was no East Asian name for this “system.” However, American Sinologist John King 
Fairbanks coined this term as he posits that this system is an extension of “Confucian hierarchic social 
order.” In other words, China was on top of the world order while surrounding regions were its 
subordinates. See Ji-Young Lee, China's Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian 
Domination (New York City: Columbia Press University, 2016), PDF e-book, 29. 
2 Roger L. Janelli, “The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship,” Journal of American Folklore 
99, no. 391 (Winter 1986): 25. 
3 Janelli, 27. 
4 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From “Land of the Morning Calm” to States in Conflict 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 12. 
 
63 
 
 
state, traded frequently with Gojoseon (Tan’gun Joseon), thereby suggesting a healthy 
flourishing economy amidst Zhou China’s explosive warring era (1046-256 BCE). As 
further evident, Confucius (551-479 BCE) – no stranger to violence and war – referenced 
Old Joseon as a peaceful society even wishing to “lead a life there.”5 Therefore, the 
“Land of the Morning Calm” did not earn that name overnight. Throughout its ancient 
history Korea was known for order, stability, and peace. This is especially true 
considering that the peninsula is wedged between two regional powers, China and Japan. 
Even more so, these were times when China and Japan had frequent domestic 
conflicts. Chinese dynasties had numerous splintering kingdoms, power-hungry 
commanders, and peasant revolts; while the Japanese, since the 1100s, had societies 
primarily set up to appease warlord governments and their samurai warriors.6 
Contrastingly, Korean historical stability is palpable through the longevity of their 
dynasties, specifically over a thousand-year rule of the combined Goryeo and Joseon 
Dynasties (918-1897 CE). Finally, this longevity gave rise to another longstanding 
cultural phenomenon, the yangban aristocracy, which is central to Park’s initial stances. 
Yangban was a small yet extremely powerful group of elites who were a social 
class one step below the highest order, royal nobility. Yangban derived its foundation 
from Goryeo’s veneration of academics (literati) and bureaucrats who were usually 
composed of Confucian scholars, civil servants, and royal eunuchs. During the Goryeo 
Age (918-1392 CE), the aristocracy was divided into two – at this time they were not 
called yangban but instead mun-ban (civil administrators and scholars) and mu-ban 
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(high-ranking military officials and politicians).7 However, in the Joseon era (1392-1897 
CE), both classes naturally merged into one, yangban; likewise, through centuries of 
upper-class rule, yangban were entrenched in every aspect of Korean society. Simply put, 
yangban were extremely powerful elites that ruled Korea for a very long time. 
This chapter, therefore, sets to contextualize the importance that Japanese 
imperialism and yangban culture had on early Korean nationalism. Not only did that 
institution influence a millennia’s worth of peninsular culture, the impact greatly affected 
Park Chung Hee’s tenure. Indeed, Park’s initial tenure was deeply impacted by a 
millennia’s worth of Korean history, so his sense of nationalism was deeply influenced 
by both yangban culture and Japanese imperialism, the latter culture deeply affected by 
Western ideas. 
General Park, therefore, managed to blend components of both systems which 
allowed many Koreans to support him and many others to oppose him. Park’s Korea, 
however, still needed to appear indigenous in the post-World War II era for his agendas 
to survive. Furthermore, Park’s initial tenure came at a time when elites in the polity and 
business – during the Rhee Syngman era – were despised by the citizenry. Therefore, it is 
also important to contrast the impact that early nineteenth century nationalism, along with 
millennium-old yangban culture, had on Park’s early agendas. 
Ultimately, these nationalists played a role in shaping a young Park into what 
some scholars call a “developmental dictator.”8 You (Yu) Jong-Sung befittingly posits 
that the combination of such diverse teachings and histories ultimately culminated into a 
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new “developmental system” invented by Park.9 Subsequently, the second part of this 
chapter delves into the term “developmental dictator.” More specifically, what aspects of 
early nationalism contributed to making this term. 
 
Part I 
Early Korean Nationalism, Part I: The Forefathers 
Sin (pronounced Shin or Sheen) Chaeho (1880-1936) and Choe (pronounced Cheh 
or Ch’weh) Namson (1890-1957) are considered the forefathers of both modern Koreas 
and their respective state nationalism.10 But before Sin and Choe’s works, it is important 
to examine the variables that affected their rhetoric and stances. Chizuko T. Allen and 
Roger Janelli argue that it was a mix of Japanese scholarship and Social Darwinism that 
gave the two Korean intellectuals their philosophical foundations.11 
Social Darwinism had a profound impact for both nationalists as this school was 
largely derived from modern Western teachings. Social Darwinism is defined as “the 
more robust human societies and cultures are the farther they can progress and survive 
into the future.” In other words, a “survival-of-the-fittest” society.12 Likewise, Choe and 
Sin were well-versed with this branch of Western ideology; Choe, however, combined 
elements from Chinese nationalist Liang Qichao (1873-1929). 
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Similar to Korea’s colonial predicament, Liang sought to explain China’s loss of 
prestige in what is otherwise known as the “Century of Humiliation” (1840s-1940s). 
China, for the most part, was in ruin. The Qing recently fell, China fragmented into 
warlord regions, the Western Powers ransacked what little state funds they had, and 
Imperial Japan conquered the northeast territories.13 
As a result, Liang’s teachings shaped the tenets of both the Kuomintang and 
Chinese Communist Party; respectively, these are the future state-parties of the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China.14 During the end of the nineteenth 
century Liang’s version of Social Darwinism took a stranglehold over Asian scholarship, 
and it is safe to say that academia in both Japan and Korea was not immune to this trend. 
Korea’s colonial age was the turning point for all parties involved. Taking cues 
from their Western counterparts, Imperial Japan wasted no time in promoting their 
civilization as the dominant society in Asia. In turn, Japanese imperialists deemed Korean 
culture primitive and forced a pro-Japanese curriculum onto all academic institutions, 
from elementary school to tertiary education.15 
From a foreigner’s perspective, American socialite Isabel Anderson, during a 1910s 
tour of the Orient, recorded her thoughts on the shattering of the status quo: 
The Japanese Governor-General, Count Terauchi, is a very strong and able 
man, and under his administration many improvements have been made in 
Korea. This has not always been done without friction between the natives 
and their conquerors, it must be confessed, but the results are certainly 
astonishing. The government has been reorganized, courts have been 
established, the laws have been revised, trade conditions have been 
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improved and commerce has increased. Agriculture has been encouraged 
by the opening of experiment stations, railroads have been constructed 
from the interior to the sea-coast, and harbors have been dredged and 
lighthouses erected.16 
 
Anderson’s thoughts on “conquerors” (the Japanese) and the conquered “natives” (the 
Koreans) corresponded with what the early twentieth century world knew, Korean society 
– as Liang would say – was made up lesser historical people.”17 Therefore, it was not 
only in Japan’s advantage to rule and exploit the peninsula, but it was in the world’s 
interest. 
Korean responses were similar as well. Choe made numerous references in a 1917 
issue of the Korean newspaper Taehan maeil sinbo. Specifically, he wrote that the world 
is split into “world historical people” – societies that have the capacity to expand outward 
from their homelands – and “lesser historical people” – societies that have little to no 
impact on world history.18 This verified that leading Korean officials knew their culture 
was in a low-standing position.  
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Figure 2.1. Photos of Sin Chaeho (left) and Choe Namson (right). Source: 
Wikimedia Commons. 
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Early Korean Nationalism, Part II: Minjok 
Choe, Sin, and other Korean nationalists, as a way to elevate Koreans into 
“historical people,” responded to Social Darwinism by creating their own version based 
upon ancient historical elements. Korean, Chinese, Western, and even Japanese elements 
converged into the cornerstone of this new national credence. Korean nationalism was 
now known as minjok (pronounced meen-joke), roughly translated to “the people,” “the 
nation,” “the land,” and “the race.”19 Minjok is an all-encompassing tenet – it can cover 
religion, culture, language, art, and history – however, Sin specifically tied minjok to the 
historical lands of Korea.20 
Most notably, this tenet expanded beyond the modern geographic borders of the 
peninsula and into the Manchurian region – otherwise known as the borders of Gojoseon. 
Sin based this claim on Korea’s compelling Three Kingdoms history; particularly, the 
kingdoms of Gogoryeo (37 BCE-668 CE) and Balhae (698-926 CE). These states 
covered the northern peninsula and most of Manchuria at one point.21 This claim was 
revolutionary for East Asian academia. It not only implied that people of the peninsula 
were part of the Korean ethnicity, but that the ancient lands in what would be known as 
Northeastern China were tied to Korean heritage. 
Perhaps minjok’s most profound effect was the emphasis it put on an obscure 
creational myth. Because Korean history is ancient and diverse, especially during the 
Three Kingdoms era, it is entitled to a storied mythos. The Song China-Goryeo 
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anthology, Samguk Sagi (published around 1145 CE) details different creation tales from 
each kingdom. For example, Silla had their own myth, the Pak (Park) Hyeokgeose Tale.22 
The most prominent of the Sagi tales, however, is Tan’gun (Dan’gun). The myth of King 
Tan’gun was relegated into obscurity during the Joseon era as yangban scholars 
dismissed Korea’s shamanistic past for a more Sinocentric narrative.23 Choe, nonetheless, 
took fascination with the tale because the setting for Tan’gun’s kingdom was situated 
along the North Korean-Manchurian border.24 
Choe’s rediscovery of Tan’gun, along with Sin tying land to ethnicity, was the 
one-two punch needed to fuel future nationalists. The combination gave Koreans, as 
James B. Palais posits, a claim to “uniqueness” through the lens of an ancient and 
powerful history.25 Minjok culture was now tied to deep antiquity that not even the 
superior Japanese Empire could lay claim to. To subjugated Koreans, the Imperialist 
efforts to suppress Manchurian-peninsular history, culture, and language was evidence 
that their Japanese overlords felt threatened by minjok. 
As Nadia Y. Kim notes, Sin, Choe, and Tan’gun created the notion of “ethnic 
nationalism,” and that the imperialist’s efforts to suppress this movement may have 
inadvertently fanned the flames for future Korean leaders.26 Consequently, this notion 
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was later tempered and presented as political rhetoric by none other than President Park 
(1963-1979). Minjok’s greatest effect, however, was not politics but instead it instilled 
pride back to a country that was devastated, defeated, and humiliated for over half a 
century. Suitably, a young Park took this message to heart during his brief stint in minjok 
lands. 
 
Park the Young Soldier 
In 1894, Korean reformists fed up with yangban class structure sought to abolish 
it in order to usher in the new Korean Empire (1897-1910). This, of course, was slow and 
met fierce resistance until Japanese takeover in 1910. It was in the efficient and ruthless 
hands of Imperialists that completed what reformists sought to do; however, this came at 
the cost of land and wealth confiscation from yangban elites and peasantry alike.27 
Simply put, the yangban elites were a thing of the past, and so was class structure; in its 
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Map 2.1. From left to right, map of Gojoseon (circa 2000-108 BCE), Buyeo Kingdom (circa 200-494 CE), 
Gogoryeo (37-668 CE), and Silla Kingdom (57-935 CE). Please note the circled areas are Korean-Manchurian 
regions. The square area, now known as Gumi-si, is where Park Chung Hee (1917-1979) was born. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons. 
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place was universal poverty for most Koreans.28 Likewise, this class dissolution 
permanently altered the Korean sociocultural landscape. 
Canadian journalist F.A. McKenzie attested to the inevitable, yet brutally 
efficient, invasion. In February 1910, McKenzie saw the beginnings of Imperial 
annexation on the docks of Incheon. He reported that: 
Those of us who stood on the frozen shores on that cold February night, 
looking at the trim and alert Japanese infantry, their figures revealed by 
the glowing coal and paraffin fires on the landing stage, knew that the 
old history of Korea was over and that a new era had begun.29 
 
While this era was vicious to all Koreans, it did, however present ample opportunities for 
youths willing to flex their muscles and learn the ways of Imperial bushido. Park, 
therefore, would be born into an era of might and viciousness; and likewise, this ideology 
permanently entrenched itself onto the soon-to-be Imperial officer.  
In 1917, Park Chung Hee was born in Kameo, Colonial Korea (now known as 
Gumi-si, South Korea) to a former yangban family.30 At this time, the effects of the 
Korean Empire (1897-1910) had come and gone and with it came the destruction of the 
old Korean social order by none other than his future Japanese idols. Park’s fervent 
Imperial obsessions allowed him to self-learn Japanese language, culture, and etiquette at 
an alarming rate. With those skills, Park was accepted and trained under different 
Imperial institutions and academies. Most prominently, the military academy Rikugun 
                                                 
28 Some royal and yangban elites – through connections, wealth, or famed industrial and 
commerce reputations – were granted land and property by Imperial officials. As such, while the 
yangban structure was dissolved, some former elites still held enormous influence and power. See 
Jinwung Kim, 394; and Jong-Sung You, “The Case of South Korea,” 299. 
29 F.A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969), 107. 
30 Kyung Moon Hwang, A History of Korea (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), PDF e-
book, 229. 
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Shikan Gakko in Tokyo. Included within the curriculum was a strong disdain for Joseon 
elitist history, one that related to the very social order Park’s family was born into.31 
To a young Park, he simply was not going to tolerate any “weak” elements, past 
and future.  According to Carter J. Eckert, former Joseon aristocrats and yangban 
furiously resisted conscription either through sociopolitical connections, bribery, or by 
abandonment.32 Undoubtedly, this played into Imperial propaganda that Joseon and 
yangban elites were “weak and “effeminate.”33 Furthermore, nationalists, such as Sin 
Chaeho, were well-known for their disdain of Joseon elitism as it was the very same 
yangban scholars that relegated Korean-made culture – as in culture unique to Korea with 
no Sino-Japanese elements – such as Tan’gun, in order to appease Ming allies.34 This 
gave Imperialists, nationalists, and emasculated Koreans the sense that yangban were 
corrupt, parasitic, and self-serving; which, in turn, almost resulted in the decimation of 
Korean culture.  
The importance of Park’s Imperial military career and the influence towards his 
future nationalistic stances cannot be overstated. He served during a time when Korea 
was a shell of its former self, and more importantly, during an era where Choe and Sin’s 
teachings were spreading among the peninsula. While Park never met any of his 
nationalist idols, the young lieutenant made many references to them, especially Sin, in 
his journals. As such, it is possible to posit this as a coincidence, however, such accord 
lends credence that Park knew well about early nationalists writing styles. For example, 
                                                 
31 Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea, 18. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Saeyoung Park, “National Heroes and Monuments in South Korea: Patriotism, Modernization 
and Park Chung Hee's Remaking of Yi Sunsin's Shrine,” Asia-Pacific Journal 8, no. 24 (June 2010): 13. 
34 Saeyoung Park, 13. 
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Park wholeheartedly referred to Korean individuals as a smaller portion “i” (lower-case 
“i”) compared to the larger picture “I” or “We” (capital “I” and “We”).35 Moreover, even 
though Park spent his education and military career in a foreign land, it so happened that 
that part of his tenure was situated in the sacred lands – Tan’gun lands – Sin and Choe 
fervently elevated. 
With Park’s Korean nationalism finally taking form, the determined soldier still 
needed to prove his mettle to Japanese officials, and, in 1944, Park abandoned the 
“effeminate” yangban culture and finally became an officer in the Manchukuo Imperial 
Army.36 This was the beginning of Park’s political agendas; so therefore, it is important 
to analyze the principles that influenced his brief Japanese career. 
Shogun Japan, Meiji Japan, and Imperial Japan were eras less than a century 
apart, so suitably, older customs merged into contemporary culture. Nam Chang-hee 
posits that the old shogun era of bushido – a samurai principle emphasizing strength over 
weakness – motivated Japanese servicemen.37 Park was no exception, and as Nam 
examines, Imperial education and military training prepared him for a life of rigid loyalty 
and honor – similar to a samurai – at any means necessary. Additionally, this manifested 
as one of Park’s favorite lines, “We can do anything if we try.”38 
Park’s bushido mindset reverberated in the ideas of the nationalists he found so 
intriguing. Taking a cue from Social Darwinism, Park complemented Sin Chaeho’s 
                                                 
35 Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea, 222. Examples of this type of writing are 
translated as such: “I am Park Chung Hee, and I am Korean. Me and my brethren, We are Korean.” 
36 Ezra F. Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping, 
and Park Chung Hee,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-
Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 515. 
37 Chang-hee Nam, “South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform,” Asian 
Survey 35, no. 4 (April 1995): 357. 
38 Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea, 3. 
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teachings of the “strong over the weak” mentality that many Imperial soldiers 
passionately backed. In a February-March 1910 newspaper interview, Sin noted that: 
Look around at this world! Why were the six great powers able so 
triumphantly and willfully to overrun the heavens and the earth? The 
answer is that their military power was strong.39 
 
Indeed, two different men, from two different regions, with two different upbringings 
were espousing similar bushido-like philosophies; this was no coincidence. Although, it 
is possible to chalk this up to the Social Darwinist sentiments of the time, it is safe to 
assume that during this military-heavy era “might makes right.” Furthermore, Park was 
tasked with suppressing Korean-Chinese guerillas – warfare considered dishonorable by 
Imperial standards – so his first armed foray was suppressing those deemed shameful by 
bushido morals.40 
Long before Park became a strongman, president, economic architect, and 
dictator, a 1917 Taehan maeil sinbo issue – the same one with Choe’s “world historical” 
remarks” – recorded Choe eerily foreshadowing Park’s political agenda: 
The modern age is the age of power in which the powerful survive 
while the weak perish . . . It is a competition of intelligence, physical 
fitness, material, economic, and organizational power.41 
 
Concurrently in Korea, minjok tenets like this were gaining a foothold. By the end of 
Park’s Imperial endeavors, Social Darwinist efforts like minjok took nationalism by 
storm. This undoubtedly influenced, along with Japanese experiences, Park’s future 
policies. As Andre Schmid succinctly puts it, “[Park] was eager to enlist a nationalist 
history for his own political purpose.”42 
                                                 
39 Eckert, 45. 
40 Ibid., 321. 
41 Allen, “Northeast Asia,” 789. 
42 Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea, 41. 
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In 1945, Park returned to Korea at the end of the Colonial Era and World War II. 
With his nationalist agenda cemented, along with the technocratic guidance he received 
in Imperial academies, the oncoming Korean War provided him the ample opportunity to 
display his bushido might on the world stage.  
Figure 2.2. Park Chung Hee dressed in an Imperial Army officer 
uniform. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Park the Strongman 
The Korean War (1950-1953) was a brutal conflict that had no conclusion – the 
Koreas are still in an ongoing war. Just like their colonial past, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) came out of the struggle in a miserable situation. John F. Kennedy, the US 
president during Park’s first years as executive, was quoted in a National Security 
Council about the “hopelessness” in propping up the ROK’s government, military, and 
economy.43 This begs an analysis as to why such a close ally initially looked upon South 
Korea as an incumbrance; and in hindsight, the answer lay in Park’s strengthening of 
American and Japanese relations. 
In 1946, Park returned to the peninsula and attended Korean Military Academy in 
Seoul (Yeokgeun Sagwan Hakkyo). Park’s past military expertise allowed him to raise 
ranks quickly while assembling a devoted following of subordinates. In doing so, Park 
frequently clashed with South Korea’s first president Rhee Syngman (1875-1965). At 
one-point Rhee ordered Park’s execution for the crime of sedition; however, charges 
were dropped due to insufficient evidence and military prestige.44 
Nevertheless, Park’s proficiencies were needed at the outbreak of the Korean 
War, and, in 1950, Park was promoted to ROK lieutenant. Park swiftly rose ranks during 
the three-year conflict and came out as a brigadier general. Within that timeframe, 
however, General Park befriended other bushido-minded military officials. Most 
                                                 
43 John F. Kennedy, “Notes of the 485th Meeting of the National Security Council,” in Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Northeast Asia, (Washington DC: US Department of State, 
1961), government report, 481. 
44 Yong-Sup Kim, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The 
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prominently, Kim Jae-kyu – also Park’s best friend, fellow academy classmate, and 
future KCIA director – and Kim Jong-pil. Taking a cue from the shogun-samurai 
relationship, both individuals played a large role in helping Park consolidate power, and 
they stayed loyal to his regime until Jae-kyu assassinated him in 1979.45 
Between his return from Manchuria in 1946 and the end of the Korean War, the 
General amassed loyal followers and the military credentials needed to oust a frail 
government, whether the nation was ready or not. On May 16, 1961 (“5.16 Incident” in 
Korean), General Park enacted a swift military coup in what was perceived, according to 
Kim Hyung-a, as a “liberation” against “aristocrats and elites.”46 
The reason behind Park’s coup has been analyzed many times; however, a 
commonly agreed scapegoat lay within Rhee’s administration and his bureaucratic elites. 
As seen during Park’s Manchurian stint, former Imperialist propaganda relegated Joseon 
elites and yangban as corrupt and cowardly. Therefore, it was perfect timing that Park’s 
regime cut the cancer where it started. As such, anyone associated with Rhee was the ill 
to South Korea’s pathetic state. 
For context, Rhee’s administration was mired in corruption and accusations of 
pocketing foreign aid were numerous.47 Furthermore, South Korea was one of the poorest 
countries in the world, a lawless “failed” country with a virtually non-existent 
government and economy.48 To put it in a financial perspective, former Philippine 
                                                 
45 Eckert, Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea, 236. 
46 Hyung-A Kim, Korea's Development Under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-
79 (Oxford: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 42. 
47 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 426. 
48 Dae-jung Kim, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, “On Korea,” World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 
(Fall 1983): 221. 
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President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, during a 2005 ASEAN tour, compared the destitute 
past of South Korea to the Philippines’s current situation: 
In 1965, when the per capita income of Philippines was $270, it was 
$102 in South Korea. However, in 2005, when the per capita income of 
the Philippines was $1,030, it was $ 16,500 in South Korea. I admire 
President Park, who established the foundation of modernization, 
beating the other East Asian countries which used to be wealthier than 
South Korea.49 
 
Thus, it was no surprise that within one year the penniless house-of-cards known as the 
First and Second Republics of Korea (1948-1961) fell so fast under Rhee’s tenure. 
The beginning of Park’s ascension was in the morning of May 16. Park made a 
broadcast to a group of anti-elitist soldiers and protestors: 
We have been waiting for the civilian government to bring back order 
to the country. The Prime Minister and Ministers, however, are mired 
in corruption, leading the country to the verge of collapse. We shall 
rise up against the government to save the country. We can accomplish 
our goals without bloodshed. Let us join in this Revolutionary Army to 
save the country.50 
 
A couple hours later, the Park regime effortlessly took control of the government without 
any civilian resistance, and therefore, the General achieved a feat that most strongmen 
yearn for. Surely, Park’s bushido military training prepared him for this moment. 
With the deed done, the triumphant General ended the day with a public speech. 
Taken from a radio transcript, Park tried to reassure the public – and an anxious Kennedy 
Administration – that his actions were justified during an era of extreme Cold War 
volatility: 
What lies behind a coup or revolution? (Rephrasing the translation: Is 
what we did a coup or revolution?) Well, for one thing, people 
                                                 
49 Jin Yong Bae, My Life, For the Country and its People (Seattle: Amazon Publishing, 2016), 
Kindle edition, loc. 4234. 
50 Chung Hee Park, “Emergency Broadcast,” Korean Broadcasting Company, television and 
radio broadcast, Seoul, May 16, 1961.  
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currently can’t eat. Before all things, it is important to “fill the people’s 
belly,” then they can participate in civil rights and democracy. Once 
the people are “half-full,” then we can start thinking clearly about 
democracy. Above all, we strive to develop a revolution that advances 
the nation so that we can take a step forward [into prosperity]. If this 
step fails, then it is a coup.51 
 
Accordingly, onlookers and Koreans alike wondered whether Park’s upheaval was like 
every other coup so common in that era; or, if it was a revolution not only for prosperity 
but for pride, patriotism, and more importantly, democracy. 
* * * 
 The volatility in the Korean peninsula during the twentieth century birthed the 
nationalist teachings of Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson. The two scholars, thereby, 
influenced a new generation of Koreans, with none more evident than a young Korean 
Japanese military officer, Lieutenant Park Chung Hee. Through a series of adept military 
training, power grabs, and maneuvers, Park eventually became a general, at the same 
time amassing a large group of loyal followers. Importantly, the General created a unique 
form of Korean nationalism based on Sin-Choe teachings and Japanese bushido ethics. 
                                                 
51 Chung Hee Park, “Coup or Revolution?” speech, Addressing the Public After 5/16 Coup, 
Seoul, May 16, 1961. 
Figure 2.3. Left picture, General Park (center front) with subordinates shortly after his successful takeover. Right, 
Park (very right) preparing to broadcast his speech in front of a weary public. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Consequently, Park’s coup in 1961 sets the foundation for the next section. Part 
II, therefore, examines the tenure of the “developmental dictator.” The section introduces 
the reader to the peak of Park’s bushido society, and more importantly, the society-
shattering effects it had on South Korean socioeconomics, military, politics, and late 
twentieth century nationalism. 
 
Part II 
 The former general enacted a coup in 1961 and consolidated his authority in one 
of the most efficient power grabs in modern history. Park was a general no more, instead 
he was an executive of a newly formed, corrupt, destitute, and barren republic. Park now 
led a country that was a victim of brutal colonialism, a civil war, and divisive Cold War 
politics. Under those circumstances, the strongman desperately sought to differentiate 
himself from years of ineffective, weak, and criminal leadership. The vehicles employed 
to drive such ambitions, therefore, are crucial variables used to better analyze the hidden 
motives and costs for Park’s radical reforms. 
 Before Park could enact any wide-sweeping reforms, he first needed to get 
everybody on board. With unabated poverty, lawlessness, and starvation, loyalty to the 
state and to one cause was secondary to everyday survival. Furthermore, the newly 
formed republic under the Rhee administration had little to no economic or psychological 
cohesiveness. The only remnants left from Rhee’s tenure were anti-communist agendas 
and civic corruption. In turn, public apathy and government distrust was the norm.52 To 
counter such indifferences, Park looked to age-old philosophies. 
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The Joseon era used Confucianism as the first official state tenet – known as 
Ch’eng-chu – likewise, the new executive sought to use this for his neo-nationalist 
campaigns.53 Park, however, knew this tenet was corrupted and manipulated by Joseon 
officials, especially yangban elites, intent on subjugating lower-classes. Jinwung Kim 
succinctly sums up yangban-led Confucianism as enriching a tiny, powerful, “parasitic, 
privileged class.”54 In order to step away from a tainted Joseon past, Park looked to the 
Neo-Confucian doctrines of Zhu Xi (1130-1200s CE) to guide his agenda.55  
The teachings of Zhu Xi influenced the seventeenth century Korean tenet silhak. 
Silhak was a more “practical” version of the old philosophy. Its main principles 
emphasized social equality acquired through tangible and physical actions. For example, 
silhak promoted Confucian aspects that propagated legal and technological advancements 
along with land reforms; put differently, it promoted reforms that helped the working 
classes. Moreover, silhak negates the “impractical” spiritual aspects that were heavily 
disseminated by the old order.56 Ultimately, silhak was born because of the actions of an 
apathetic and weak yangban elite.57 
For the Park regime, this was the perfect basis to rally up a demoralized nation, 
one that also conveniently agreed with Sin’s minjok philosophy. Simply put, silhak was 
part of the land, the culture, and the people. Thus, the deviation away from Ch’eng-chu 
                                                 
53 An expanded definition of Confucianism is a Chinese social philosophy based on the filial 
and paternalistic teachings of scholar Confucius (551-479 BCE). A major theme is the “natural order of 
things,” or respecting higher authority, like a father or boss. See Patricia Buckley Ebrey, History of 
China, 38. 
54 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 191. 
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and towards silhak is a palpable example that rebellion against an old ineffectual elite 
order – like Rhee’s administration – was meticulously planned by Park.58 
The next problem, however, was propagating this to the masses while at the same 
time sanitizing it of any Joseon elements. Park, therefore, had a predicament: enacting 
such a plan without raising comparisons to old yangban teachings. In addition, Park 
needed to instill one homogenized goal in order for his state-building agendas to come to 
fruition. This was certainly no simply task, and the answer to this complexity was found 
through the regime’s two most “practical” reforms: chaebol and Saemaul Undong 
(pronounced jae-bowl and sae-maw-ool oon-dōng respectively).59 
 
Park the Father, Part I 
Without a doubt the most pressing issue on Park’s mind was economy. From the 
beginning, Park’s administration was obsessed with poverty and prosperity. According to 
a passage from his memoir, To Build a Nation, the moment after the coup Park thought: 
[As soon as] I took over power as the leader of the revolutionary group 
on 16 May 1961, I felt, honestly speaking, as if I had been given a 
pilfered household or a bankrupt firm to manage … But I had to rise 
above this pessimism to rehabilitate the household. I had to break, once 
and for all, the vicious circle of poverty and economic stagnation.60 
 
The words “pilfered household” and “bankrupt firm” were central to Park’s rationale. 
This may suggest that he looked upon the new economy as a Confucian-inspired home; 
and, like any good, strong, and dominate father, a loyal and respectful family was needed 
                                                 
58 Bell, “Cheondogyo and the Donghak Revolution,” 125. 
59 Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and 
Fall of Chaebols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), PDF e-book, 48. 
60 Yong-ho Ch’oe and Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Chapter 36: Korea Since 1945,” in Sources of 
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for a household to prosper. Befittingly, Park’s first reform, and perhaps his most 
signature decree, was restructuring the economy to become business, corporate, and 
export-friendly. 
For Park, chaebol was not only a conglomerate and economic system, it was also 
an institution that espoused his Neo-Confucian ideals. 61 The chaebol scheme did not, 
however, arrive overnight, nor was Park the inventor. Chaebol economics goes back 
farther than his time, and fittingly, the roots of chaebol are reminiscent of their Japanese 
forefather, zaibatsu. 
Zaibatsu translates to “financial clique” and was the economic pillar of nineteenth 
century Meiji Reforms (1868-1912). These elite companies were state-guided and family-
owned mega-corporations.62 They were once-prominent variables for Japan’s 
instantaneous industrialization that eventually became the heart of the World War I and II 
economies.63 Put in another way, zaibatsu were state-sanctioned monopolies whose labor, 
revenue, and profits were all under the discretion of the executive, or emperor.64 
                                                 
61 Chaebol loosely translates to “big conglomerates.” These corporations were initially family-
operated and state-funded. Akin to modern American mega-corporations like Coca-Cola and Apple, 
chaebol may be considered the South Korean equivalent. Globally known chaebol include Samsung, LG 
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Telecom and Lotte Brands. See Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 48. 
62 Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 97. 
63 Gordon, 98. 
64 Meiji officials sought to emulate the monopolies – such as Standard Oil and Carnegie Steel – 
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Park’s Japanese education allowed him to merge old zaibatsu elements with his 
own brand of governance. Under the guidance of bushido ethics combined with silhak 
practicality, Park adapted chaebol to better suit the needs of an expanding economy and a 
restructuring Korean society. As Nam Chang-hee posits, this created an ethic that was 
akin to an “ultranationalistic samurai-military.”65 Nam coins this trend as “clientelistic 
industrial expansion,” somewhat mirroring that of their zaibatsu predecessor.66 Just like 
zaibatsu, Park’s chaebol were under the complete guidance of the state. 
The chaebol system, in its core, was a paternally guided system with “Confucian 
style harmony.”67 This meant that the new corporate economy was based on hierarchy. 
Park, the head of the government, was the highest entity in this pyramid-like structure. In 
turn, he guided and took care of chaebol – just like a father to his children – as long as 
they successfully led economic and labor reforms. Next, chaebol were responsible for the 
well-being, training, and employment of the citizenry – otherwise symbolized as taking 
care of their children. Therefore, it is possible to see the top-down authority within each 
institution. Simply put, each entity played some sort of fatherly role model.68 
Evidently, this was the Confucian aspect of the new chaebol economy: it was the 
physical half of Park’s state-building efforts. The other half laid with bushido 
psychology, or as Nam posits the “patron-client model.” This relationship is defined as 
favorable exchanges between weaker and stronger clients.69 The “weaker client” was the 
entity with less wealth and power while the “stronger” one yielded more. Likewise, 
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chaebol held most of the power and had a commanding grip on the fabric of Korean 
society. Park, of course, was the key exception to this. 
While Park’s wealth paled in comparison to chaebol CEOs, that was irrelevant. 
Park’s net worth was measured in a different iron-fisted currency, one that he had 
limitless access too. Meaning, no entity or institution was higher than his authority, 
chaebol wealth be damned. Chairman Park held the power of purse and authority over his 
chaebol children. Whoever performed the best – measured in export output and revenue – 
were rewarded accordingly with limitless state funding and deregulation.70 These 
resources then trickled-down to employees as incentivized bonuses. 
On the other end, whoever did not perform well, conglomerate, firm, or laborer, 
were left out to rot.71 This meant that underperforming and unmarketable employees – 
such as elderly, disabled, and, for a time, women – were left out of the economy.72 Akin 
to Social Darwinist ethics, Park’s economy was now the “survival-of-the-fittest.” 
Initially, this new economy was well received by the people. Even the most 
unsuspecting workers felt the positive effects of the “patron-client model.” In a journal 
entry dated on January 20, 1976, Park wrote about his encounter with an elevator 
conductor: 
I asked the elevator conductor about her [monthly] salary. She showed 
a happy expression, saying that it was 44,000won (approx. 96USD in 
1976 rates; 1USD = 484KRW) last year, but this year since January, it 
has been about 77,000won (~159USD) and including the monthly 
bonus, it would be, on average, 80,000won (~165USD). I thought that 
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she would be much more satisfied if her pay was doubled based on the 
present price index. I made up my mind to make more effort so that her 
wish could come true within four or five years.73 
 
This was music to Park’s ears because it provided anecdotal proof that – at least to him – 
his Confucian-inspired economy was enriching not only the nation and conglomerates but 
the most menial of workers. In accordance to the “patron-client model,” the unsuspecting 
and joyous conductor benefitted from a weaker Confucian position. 
This rehash of old zaibatsu and bushido ethics was so intriguing that even 
outsiders, such as American Diplomat Richard A. Ericson, Jr., could not help but notice 
Park’s unorthodox governance. In a 1995 interview with the Association for Diplomatic 
Studies and Training (ADST), Ericson responded to a question about Park’s leadership 
during his 1965-1968 tenure in Seoul: 
The American press always portrayed [Park] as an autocratic little 
monster . . . [however], the point with Park was that he also had this 
burning intent to take Korea where he thought it should go and he had 
the conviction that he and he alone was the one who could do it. And 
you know, he may very well have been right.74 
 
Along with the elevator conductor, insights like this proved to Park that bushido’s 
“might-makes-right” ethics were working. Ambitious, strong, loyal – even weak – 
workers were benefitting from the mighty chaebol economy, and befittingly, Park was 
the mightiest of them all, rewarding or severely punishing all of his children. 
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Park the Father, Part II 
 Park’s “might-makes-right” chaebol economy started off with a bang. Once an 
agrarian nation, South Korea was evolving into an urban-centered manufacturing 
behemoth. Young and old Koreans from all over the nation were flocking to cities for 
lucrative factory and chaebol employment.75 Since South Korean metropolises were 
booming due in part to new immigration, conversely, the countryside should be doing 
worse. However, under the new system, this was far from the truth. The countryside, like 
their urban counterparts, experienced tremendous growth due to Park’s second radical 
reform, Samaeul Undong (1970s-1981), also known as the NCM. 
 During the chaebol reforms, rural growth was equitable to urban growth. From 
the same ADST interview, Ericson recollects Park’s countryside experience and 
highlights the former general’s motifs for his rustic agenda: 
Being from rural areas himself, I think he paid more attention to that 
than people might have expected. There wasn't a lot of farm unrest. The 
farm income increased just as rapidly as urban.76 
 
Furthermore, Ericson mentions Park’s philosophical and military background: 
Plus, the fact that he is born a Confucian to start with. He is a rural 
Korean, not a sophisticated city guy, and his life work up until that 
time, after World War II, had been in the Korean army. And here is a 
guy who served, fought and existed all of his life in intensely 
hierarchical situations.77 
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Ericson’s emphasis on Park’s Confucian and hierarchy-centered background is important. 
The chaebol and labor systems relied on these very same ideals. It is therefore safe to 
presume that these variables affected the NCM agenda. 
 Han Seung-Mi posits that the NCM campaigns were essentially “anti-elitist and 
populist ideals” that became Park’s version – and therefore the rural community’s version 
– of “state populism.”78 Yu Jong-Sung’s thesis corroborates Han’s argument. However, 
Yu adds that failed land reform acts that occurred during post-Korean War rebuilding 
(1948-1956) were a factor that affected the NCM.79 
For context, the yangban order virtually owned all property, including all aspects 
of agriculture, in Joseon Korea.80 Likewise, during Japanese occupation, all land was 
confiscated under the Empire; however, some Imperial officials allowed certain yangban 
groups – usually owners who were proficient in industry and trade – to keep their land.81  
Unsurprisingly, these landowners held immense power up until the Korean War. 
When post-war restructuring commenced, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers 
(SCAP) officials – carried out by the Rhee regime – blindly redistributed former Imperial 
stolen and yangban lands. Granted, this was regardless of whether new proprietors were 
experienced and skilled with agriculture or trade. This, of course, was one variable to 
South Korea’s unproductivity before Park took the reins. As such, Park knew this system 
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was inadequate, so implementing the successes of chaebol “clientelism” – inclusive of all 
Confucian elements – was the solution to modernize the backwaters of Korea.82 
Park did exactly that, and according to prior Imperial elements, he pushed 
“Japanese mental training” on an ambitious countryside eager to gain the same riches 
seen in the cities.83 However, the NCM incorporated other Eastern and Western aspects 
as well. These were based on the ideas of eighteenth century Japanese agrarian economist 
Ninoyama Ginjiro (1787-1856) and German sociologist Max Weber.84 Park combined 
Ginjiro’s emphasis on community lending, investing, and frugality – a precursor to 
farming credit unions – with “Weberian mental training.”85 
Plainly put, the rustic and urban chaebol systems had the same homogenized 
goals, modernization and prosperity. The motifs and support behind them, however, were 
completely different. Chaebol lacked the communal elements of NCM. Whereas NCM 
followed Ginjiro’s teachings on collective investments, chaebol did not. For example, 
urban workers, many of them employed by chaebol, were expected to “invest” their labor 
and earnings through conglomerations and spending.86 
 According to Kang Myung-koo, one vehicle used to spur urban investments was 
Western-styled consumerism.87 Since Park’s Korea was now an export-oriented market, 
an overabundance of chaebol goods became available for Koreans to splurge on. In turn, 
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a new urban psyche was born, “Developmentalist Mentalité.”88 This term meant that 
urbanites were now following a hierarchy based on owning the latest and greatest 
consumer products. Granted, this was also mixed with the Confucian hierarchy that Park 
promoted. As Kang posits, the new consumer mindset eventually created a 
“hypercompetitive” and “rugged individualist” attitude that is still prevalent today.89 
In rural communities, chaebol culture was less prominent. The NCM’s goal were 
not centered on exporting, rather it was to rapidly turn the impoverished outskirts into 
productive farmlands. Interestingly, many villages were still stuck with Joseon-styled 
governance. Villages were still led by a form of oligarchy – village elders and leaders 
were put into prominent positions due to family name, ancestry, and Confucian piety.90 
This caused a flock of younger workers to abandon rural life in the pursuit of urban 
wealth. 
To combat this, the NCM enacted reforms were based on meritocracy and self-
reliance. Villagers willing to toil in the fields and rapidly build new infrastructure were 
rewarded by the state with limitless aid. This trait was seen by Park as “strong and self-
sufficient” and was frankly unheard of in Korean history. For most of Korean history, 
farmers and peasants were generally considered powerless second-class citizens. In 
Goryeo and Joseon eras, they were known as sangmin, a social class roughly translated to 
“commoners.”91 In the NCM era, however, Park’s rural schemes bestowed youthful 
laborers with new wealth and power. Concurrently, elder village leaders – many of whom 
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did not possess any practical skills for the NCM – were having their powers slowly 
undermined by a newly empowered and skilled workforce.92 
Oppositely, while urban areas were initially booming, the massive influx of 
migrants eventually created an oversaturated and overcompetitive market. To make 
matters worse, there was rarely any state welfare for hardworking city laborers. In reality, 
that duty was up to their “patrons,” better known as chaebol. Likewise, results were not 
as expected for a new generation of urban laborers as they were not heavily remunerated 
compared to their NCM counterparts.93 
That begs the question, “Did Park favor one constituency over the other?” 
Perhaps. Simply put, the NCM was in the same spirit as the “patron-client model”; but in 
this case, Park and the state was the “patron” and ambitious agrarian workers were highly 
favored “clients.”94 Further evident of Park’s rural bias, the strongman was known to 
build and venerate historical figures who were mistreated by aristocratic elites. It was 
also no coincidence that these figures had a large peasantry support base. 
For example, Park was obsessed with Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545-1598) who – in 
spite of massive achievements – was frequently demoted and humiliated by Joseon 
nobility and yangban. Propaganda related to the great admiral is evident today as 
numerous shrines, such as Hyeongchungsa in Asan-si, South Korea, were built in what 
was once pristine countryside.95 
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Additionally, Park’s impoverished rural upbringing affected his governance. As 
reiterated by Ericson’s ADST comments, “He is a rural Korean, not a sophisticated city 
guy . . . I think he paid more attention to that.”96 Suffice it to say, the executive was 
obsessed with rural prosperity while loathing anything resembling an inch of poverty. To 
Park, national success was shown through the NCM’s efficient dismantling of thatched 
roof, wooden villages – these are now called “traditional Korean villages” (hanok maeul 
and min sok chon); the mass erection of new apateu (apartment) buildings in major cities; 
the creation of the nation’s first freeway (Seoul-Busan Gyeongbu Expressway); and a 
booming consumerist-export economy. These were all affirmations that his “might-
makes-right” campaigns were the new spirit of the young republic.97 
 
The Cost 
 Unquestionably, Park’s radical reforms boosted South Korea into global 
prominence. Poverty – urban and rural – was in the midst of alleviation, Korean brands 
were being bought all over the world, and the South surpassed their Northern brethren as 
the face for all things Korean.98 But what was more of an anomaly was how Park, leader 
of a once destitute nation, raised up enough funds to pursue such sweeping economic and 
nationalist agendas. Just like any developing nation, the road to prosperity and global 
prominence came at a cost. 
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 When Park took over the government in 1961, he knew that past governing 
methods under Rhee was inefficient, easily corruptible, and profitable only to a select 
few.99 However, the Park regime did take notice of Rhee’s emphasis on foreign – 
Japanese, American, and West German – technocrats. Rhee’s administration, however, 
never had the chance to utilize such assistance because of mass protests, corruption 
charges, and embezzlement.100 
Sinophobia 
 On the surface, it is possible to assume that Park was accepting and pragmatic 
towards foreign influence. Park even said in a speech: 
I don’t care [what] the national origin of capital [is]. I welcome capital 
from the United States, West Germany, Italy, and other European 
countries. Even if it is Japanese capital, I don’t care as long as it is used 
for the economic development of our country.101 
 
As such, President Park wanted to normalize Japanese relations, enact training and 
internship programs with allies – primarily the U.S., West Germany, and Japan – and 
create export policies that strengthened numerous international trade treaties.102 However, 
when looking deeper, Park’s agendas were tainted with overt xenophobia against Chinese 
culture. 
 Chinese-Korean relations date back millennia, but Park’s two-decade regime and 
nativist populist campaigns effectively dismantled Sino influences from Korean society. 
For context, Seow Jing Yin posits that pre-Park South Korea (1946-1961) lacked any 
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nationalist and cultural cohesion. It was not common for the international spectators to 
consider North Korea as the true successor to the peninsula as their economy and 
government was, at that time, more stable than the South.103 
Consequently, Park obsessed over glorifying anti-elitist and nationalist icons, 
such as Admiral Yi’s Hyeongchungsa and Tan’gun, in hopes of alleviating South Korea’s 
inferiority complex. This campaign was nothing short of a success. Nadia Y. Kim 
suggests that Park brought back ethnic and national pride by skillfully tying Sin Chaeho’s 
Tan’gun and “homogenized bloodlines” together.104 Park, however, conveniently left out 
Northeastern Manchurian influences – inclusive of Tungusic, Khitan, and Han Chinese – 
that helped solidify the Tan’gun story. 
Consequently, this also led to a campaign to “purify” Korean culture.105 This not 
only meant removing Chinese elements from Korean history – Park even tried to abolish 
hanja from Korean academic program – but this also meant stamping out a tiny Chinese 
minority from the peninsula.106 After a government finance audit led by the KCIA, 
officials found small but affluent Chinese communities. Just as quickly as Park stamped 
out Sino-influenced curriculums, this minority group had all their assets confiscated, and 
then they were deported. According to Kim Hyung-A, the anti-Sino campaigns displayed 
how far Park would go, socioeconomically and ethnically, to rebuild Korea in his 
image.107 
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Japanese Relations and Compensation 
 Park’s regime immediately implemented the foreign advising ideas set forth by 
Rhee. Since there was a familiarity with Imperial institutions, Park’s technocrats used 
that knowledge to normalize relations with Korea’s past adversary, the Japanese. Yi 
Tong-won, former Vice Chairman of the Korean Trade Association turned diplomat to 
Japan, knew the vitalness of securing trade deals and low-interest loans, especially with 
the world’s strongest markets economies. In a government report to Park, Yi wrote: 
What is lacking in natural resources and financial instruments can be 
made up through strategically timed diplomatic maneuvers. Foreign 
policy can either make or break a nation. If [the military junta] can 
concentrate on the strengthening of economic ties with the United 
States as much as the security ties, and on the normalization of relations 
with Japan, South Korea can secure large amounts of economic 
assistance in a timely manner. With the resources secured through 
diplomacy, I believe [the military junta] will have a chance at creating 
an economic miracle.108 
 
In return, Japan’s Hayato Ikeda and Sato Eisaku cabinets (1960-1972) eagerly 
found these requests as an opportunity – as in showering Park with low-interest loans – 
for informal compensations for past atrocities.109 As a gesture of good faith, the Park 
administration quietly swept colonial atrocities – such as maritime border disputes 
(Dokdo Conflict) and wartime sex slavery – under the rug.110 Ultimately, Park’s Korean-
Japanese diplomacy opened the way for these economic alliances.111 
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These stances infuriated the general population and is considered by scholars as 
the start of agitation against Park’s two-decades long rule.112 Also, this began urban and 
university protests – initially small at first – that would engulf Park’s successors. Park, 
likewise, worried somewhat about these sentiments. On a West German tour in 1974, the 
dictator produced a speech on pragmatism while sidestepping motifs for Japanese 
alliances. 
In the hopes of reassuring expatriate Koreans in West Germany about negative 
sentiments at home, he said: 
I do not know if some of the students will complain about the president 
saying this, but I will definitely speak to some of our Korean students 
here today . . .What is the content of the Korea-Japan talks? [Rephrase: 
Why are we bothering to reconcile with Japan?] Well, what is the point 
of continuing to fight? . . . Since you are students, it's because you are 
worried about the future of Korea and for the future of our country.113 
 
Furthermore, Park Tae-jun, another of Park’s technocrats and a diplomat to Japan, wrote 
a public letter defending the administration: 
Domestically, there are a lot of severe criticisms and oppositions saying 
that the government is attempting to get political funds, or the 
normalization between two countries is disgraceful. But we cannot 
always beg the US for wheat flower to barely survive. Is that the way to 
keep us noble? My belief is that there is no other way to build up 
national modernization without money. We might have to live up with 
more shames under the oppression of Japan, considerably long time, if 
we miss this opportunity only thinking about the disgraceful sides 
only.114 
 
Indeed, when Tae-jun said “live up with more shames . . . considerably for a long time,” 
he inadvertently foreshadowed the deep anti-Japanese animosity that still envelops Korea 
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today.115 Simply put, to many Koreans – and even for Park’s strongest supporters – 
Japanese normalizations, whether justified or not, sold out years of suffering and 
atrocities for billions in aid. 
Vietnam War 
 The Vietnam War was a conflict that involved massive American support, 
financially and militarily; but unbeknownst to many, the second largest participant, in 
terms of soldiers and civilian workers, was none other than the newly modernized ROK 
military.116 The Vietnam War greatly affected Park’s early tenure as well. Specifically, 
Park’s regime knew the pitiful state of the outdated armed forces. In fact, the ROK 
military during the Korean War was looked upon as a “burdensome military 
protectorate.” Therefore, the problem and expenses of rapid military modernization 
plagued Park’s tenure.117 The solution, however, was to let another entity, the United 
States, do the modernization for them with the costs including full commitment of forces 
alongside American counterparts. 
According to Kim Se Jin, this plan was such a success that it entitled the ROK 
military to unprecedented amounts of American military advisors, technology, and 
funding.118 Rapid militarization went off without a hitch, but more importantly, Park now 
had a top-tier battle-tested ROK military at his disposal. This meant that domestically, 
Park’s economic and political consolidation was not only complete but internationally 
                                                 
115 Yangmo Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances? Japanese Policy on the Comfort 
Women Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (2015), 243. 
116 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 451. 
117 Se Jin Kim, “South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political 
Impact,” Asian Survey 10, no. 6 (June 1970): 529. 
118 Se Jin Kim, 521. 
98 
 
 
South Korea’s military was a force to be reckoned with. Park showed the world just what 
bushido agendas could achieve. 
At home, however, the cost for this mighty buildup alarmed Park’s opposition. 
His opponents predicted that rapid militarization and involvement “might transform 
South Korea into a garrison state in which the predominant position of the military could 
result in the permanent entrenchment of the military-oriented government of Chung-hee 
Park.”119 In hindsight this was true; Park and his party’s near defeat in the 1971-1972 
elections was the spark for the third and most significant cost. 
Anti-democracy (Yushin) 
 Park’s party, the Democratic Republicans (DRP), secured a tight victory in the 
1971-1972 elections against longtime opposition Kim Dae-jung and the New Democratic 
Party. Nonetheless, this was the catalyst needed to scrap democratic elements from the 
government. In October 1972, the Park regime passed Yushin, an authoritarian 
constitution that translates to “renewal.”120  Along with a strengthened military and police 
force, the dictator enacted martial law and stamped out any democratic elements from the 
government. Legislative and judicial powers were now centralized into the executive 
branch. Elections hereafter were rubberstamps for Park and the DRP.121 
 In October 17, 1972 – dubbed “Siwol Yushin” – Park gave a speech on his plans 
to self-amend the constitution. The sweeping powers he passed were disguised under 
North-South unification goals. In the preamble, Park was clear that his might could not 
be tested: 
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I am urging the unification of the Korean people in order to realize the 
desire of the nation that is the peaceful unification and to prepare the 
great battle for the formation of the forces of the national ethnic group 
that strongly supports today's historical task, I declare to the public an 
emergency action that halts the validity of some provisions of the two-
month constitution. 
 
My first goal is to immediately dismiss the National Assembly by 19:00 
on October 17, 1972. In addition, I plan to suspend all rights and 
provisions of the current Constitution, such as suspension of political 
parties and religious activities.122 
 
The preamble was more than about unification. It meant Park could finally “prepare 
the great battle of the national ethnic group.”123 This marked the culmination of years’ 
worth of bushido ethics, ethnic nationalism, and uniting the historical Tan’gun lands he 
was so familiar with. The “great battle,” however, was not with North Korea or any 
outside agent. In fact, the battle was to be staged at home against opposition, students, 
protestors, and religious leaders.124 
 The worst was yet to come, and soon Park began a trend of silencing opposition 
in morbid ways. To flex his power, the regime regularly jailed, tortured, and executed 
dissidents. One of Park’s most infamous act was ordering KCIA officials to clandestinely 
kidnap opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from his Tokyo hotel.125 In Kim’s 2000 Nobel 
Prize acceptance speech, he recollects the lengths Park and his successors would go to 
silence any dissent: 
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Five times I faced near death at the hands of dictators, six years I spent 
in prison, and forty years I lived under house arrest or in exile and 
under constant surveillance.126 
 
Because Kim faced multiple dictator-led death threats, it was evident that Yushin 
normalized this trend and lived well past the Park regime, lasting until the end of the 
1980s. 
* * * 
Since his youth, Park Chung Hee’s obsession over early nationalism provided him 
the foundations for his eventual rule. However, this groundwork could not be made 
without the distortion of Sin and Choe’s teachings. The Tan’gun story, therefore, is a 
pivotal variable that provided the future strongman the framework to create his own 
unique nationalist state-building program. This agenda entrenched Korea for decades 
beginning in 1961 and culminating in 1972 when Yushin was enacted. 
Even though all looked lost amidst a narrative of distorted Tan’gun 
historiography, neo-Imperial nationalism, and Yushin’s almighty state authority, the 
public nevertheless looked back to history to find a voice. Initially small, students and 
religious leaders found hope in the Neo-Confucian Joseon sects, silhak – a tenet 
originally used by Park – and in an obscure Joseon Neo-Confucian faction known as 
donghak.127 But just as protestors were finding a voice, Park was assassinated in 1979. 
Equally, Park did not see the effects that the hybrid sects brought forth. However, his 
successor, Chun Do-hwan, felt the full consequences of these changes.128 
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 From the mid-1960s to 1972, President Park was at the peak of his tenure. Park’s 
state-building and nationalist agendas were entrenched into all aspects of South Korean 
society. Furthermore, bushido might and Yushin solidified those institutions for the 
unforeseeable future. As such, the strongman was at the very top of the society he built in 
his image; but more importantly, no one was there to challenge his authority. However, in 
retrospect, just as quickly as Park took power, his reign was coming to an abrupt end. 
Unbeknownst to Park and his inner circle, one night would change everything the 
executive meticulously built; and immediately, his legacy and image would be put under 
the test by another strongman looking to further the agenda of the developmental dictator. 
 
Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part I: Internal Reasons 
Park’s death made headlines worldwide and Keesing’s Worldwide was one media 
outlet that documented the internal complications before Park’s assassination.1 The 
article’s timeframe begins in August 1979 when Park “launched an offensive against the 
NDP (New Democratic Party) and Christian dissidents.”2 During that time there was a 
large Christian and labor rights resurgence. Numerous clergymen and religious leaders 
protested alongside workers’ unions. They all opposed the extremely low wages of non-
chaebol related trades – jobs that were not subsidized or owned by chaebol – while 
concurrently promoting the creation of basic labor rights.3 The resurgence was also a 
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thorn in Park’s side as an array of Christian denominations attracted and provided social 
welfare to many disenfranchised people. Many constituents were young, elderly, and 
agrarian outcasts who could not offer any practical skills for the chaebol and Saemaul 
systems.4 
One other prominent group were female workers who were largely employed in 
textile, hospitality, and education services.5 In the textile industry, employees were paid 
so poorly, sometimes pay was withheld, that they joined Christian labor movements as a 
way to voice their struggles. With their support, female protestors staged numerous sit-ins 
in company dormitories and police compounds to show their opposition. 
Things boiled over when seven female teachers from Seoul Christian Academy 
were arrested on charges of “pro-communist” activities. Leading international Christian 
groups, such as the Korean Catholic Church, responded by sponsoring various 
demonstrations around the nation. One notable group was the Catholic Farmers’ 
Movement which Park accused of “creating class consciousness” due to the support they 
provided for textile laborers while they were on strike.6  
The ruckus caused by diverse religious groups finally caught the ear of the NDP’s 
Kim Young-sam (1927-2015), and more importantly, the international news media.7 In 
September 15, 1979, the New York Times caught wind of the events and scheduled an 
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interview with Kim. With a large international media platform, Kim played into the 
sympathetic ears of the Carter Administration. 
Kim stated that “the time has come for the U.S. to make clear a choice between a 
dictatorial regime or the alienated majority who aspire to democracy.”8 Kim then 
skillfully chided Carter by tying the 1978 Iranian Revolution – one that occurred under 
Carter’s watch – to Korea’s situation. Kim pressured that “Iran was America’s supreme 
diplomatic disaster. I want the US embassy to avoid following the same track here.”9 
Carter responded immediately by hitting Park where it hurt the most, the military and the 
economy. The US president threatened to take back military aid and ground troops from 
the peninsula while simultaneously influencing Japan to distance themselves from Park.10 
These sudden turns of events did not bode well Park’s inner circle. Park’s fury 
with the mass protests, and eventually urban riots in Masan and Busan, foreshadowed the 
end for two of his closest confidants, KCIA Director Kim Jae-kyu and Chief Bodyguard 
Cha Ji-chul. In an act of internal betrayal, Cha slyly scapegoated Kim for his opposition 
to urban military crackdowns.11 Although there are other variables that played a hand 
with Park’s loss of demeanor, Kim and Cha’s deadly feud is reputed to be the primary 
motive for Park’s death. Nevertheless, the events that occurred during the last months 
undoubtedly pushed his inner circle to the edge of paranoia and betrayal. 
 
                                                 
8 Keesing's Worldwide, “Assassination of President Park Chung Hee,” 30216. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Min Yong Lee, “The Vietnam War: South Korea’s Search for National Security,” in The Park 
Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 427. 
11 Jong-pil Kim, “Kim Jong-pil Remembers, Series 74: The Inside Story of the Park Chung Hee 
Killing,” by Park Bo-gyoon, Korea Joongang Daily, November 3, 2015, http://bit.ly/2fmhcQM. 
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The Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part II: A First-hand Account 
 The Korea Joong-Ang Daily published an exposé thirty-six years after Park’s 
assassination and interviewed firsthand witness Kim Jong-pil (born 1926). Being part of 
Park’s entourage, Jong-pil fully recollects the night of Park’s assassination.12 The 
interview began with Kim Jong-pil recalling the confrontation he had with an agitated 
Kim Jae-kyu and Chief Presidential Secretary Kim Gye-won.13 
Before the fateful dinner, Gye-won and Jae-kyu chatted in the Blue House 
corridors about Park’s punitive ruling style. The conversation between Jae-kyu and Gye-
won went as forth: “If we’re too harsh in suppressing demonstrators there will be a huge 
backlash from the people. But the ruling Republican Party isn’t giving Park the right 
advice.”14 Jae-kyu alluded that party officials purposely gave Park wrong advice as a 
response to Cha Ji-chul’s fear-mongering tactics. Jae-kyu’s pleas went on deaf ears as 
Gye-won thought Jae-kyu was facetious, partly because of the rivalry Jae-kyu had with 
Cha. Jong-pil commented that “in hindsight, [maybe] Gye-won thought Jae-kyu meant to 
scare Ji-chul” in order to have Ji-chul ease up on protestor clampdowns.15 
However, Jong-pil also mentioned “Park’s disappointment” on Jae-kyu’s recent 
actions. “President Park was mulling sacking Kim Jae-kyu,” Jong-pil said. “[It was 
because] Jae-kyu had failed to control the opposition party and its chief, Kim Young-
sam.”16 Jong-pil also added that because of Ji-chul’s “dirty tricks,” Jae-gyu was “under 
                                                 
12 Kim Jong-pil was a founder, alongside Director Kim Jae-kyu, of the KCIA. He also served as 
prime minister from 1971-1975 and 1998-2000 
13 Jong-pil Kim, “The Inside Story.” 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Kim Young-sam (1927-2015) was the leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), Park’s 
opposition, from 1974-1976 and 1979-1980. Similar to Kim Dae-Jung, he was put under executive-
ordered house arrest in 1980. Kim later became South Korea’s president from 1993-1998. 
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the illusion that he had lost credibility with Park.”17 To add more salt on the wound, Jae-
gyu was Park’s best friend and had been loyal to him since their academy days. It comes 
to no surprise that Jae-gyu sat in depressed silence as Park scolded him about his 
lackluster performance. “I should have arrested Kim Young-sam,” followed by “the 
KCIA needs to be more threatening.” Reminiscing back to all the dirty work the KCIA 
did for Park, especially kidnapping Kim Dae-Jung in Tokyo. Jong-pil recalled that Jae-
gyu left the dinner feeling slighted by Park’s ingratitude. 
Jong-pil remembered the last major lines Cha said before the shootings, “None of 
those fools really meant to give up their seats. I will stop them with tanks if I have to. I 
don’t care if they’re lawmakers.”18 That’s when, as Jong-pil suspects, Jae-gyu left to 
retrieve his Walter PPK – the gun that was used to end Park and Cha’s life.19 Finally, Jae-
kyu arrived back, screamed “Go to hell!” to both Park and Cha, and then shot Park to 
death until his gun jammed.20 Cha then fled to the bathroom where Jae-kyu followed him; 
Cha was immediately killed by him. Both Jong-pil and Gye-won avoided Jae-kyu’s wrath 
by fleeing the premise before Cha was shot down.21 Shortly after, Jae-kyu was arrested 
and put on trial for his execution.22 
                                                 
17 One of Ji-chul Cha’s “dirty tricks” was labelling Kim Jae-kyu as was weak and outdated, 
especially during the last erratic months of Park’s life. See Joo-Hong Kim in The Park Chung Hee Era, 
196. 
18 From 1978-1979, all NDP politicians resigned their legislative seats to protest Park’s rule. 
19 Jong-pil Kim, “The Inside Story.” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kim Jong-pil also recollected the trial scene. He said that Kim Jae-kyu shot Park to stop his 
dictatorial reign, however, Jong-pil thought otherwise. Jong-pil assessed that if Jae-kyu planned to kill 
Park then he would have known how many bullets were in his Walter PPK. Therefore, as the gun 
jammed, Jong-pil indicated that the killing was a crime of “passion.” See Jong-pil Kim, “The Inside 
Story.” 
 
107 
 
 
Jong-pil concludes the interview with his own assessment. He commented that 
“Cha, whose job was to protect the president at all costs, had fled to the restroom,” while 
noticing the irony on how a power-hungry Cha died a coward. Jong-pil then ends on a 
Shakespearean note. He reminisced that eighteen years ago he and Park saw a fortune-
teller who, as Jong-pil speculates, foreshadowed the event. “The fortune-teller told me 
and Park that his revolution would succeed and that his government would last about 
twenty years.”23 Park left the séance happy; however, the mystic signaled Jong-pil to stay 
behind and said “I couldn’t say this to Park directly, but I saw that his end will not be 
good. It will come about in an ugly way.”24 Jong-pil held that prediction close to his heart 
for eighteen years. In retrospect, Jong-pil knew from the start about Park’s “ugly” 
demise. 
 
The Reasons for Park Chung Hee’s Death, Part III: Loss of Prestige 
 Domestic dissent and inner circle conflicts are the two most prominent 
contributors for Park’s death. However, one outside factor suggests an unorthodox, albeit 
very plausible, reason as to why Park’s last days were so volatile. Hong Sung-Gul posits 
an international relations debacle – one that is usually associated with the Pyongyang 
regime – that doomed the last days of Park, the buildup of nuclear arms.25 
Park’s interest in nuclear “super weapons” began in 1971. That same year Oh 
Won-chul, Park’s head developer of defense and chemical industries, began South 
                                                 
23 Jong-pil Kim, “The Inside Story.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Sung-Gul Hong is a Professor of Public Administration in Kookmin University, Seoul. 
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Korea’s foray into nuclear armament.26 Park constantly encouraged a reluctant Oh to 
consider the advantages and necessity of becoming a nuclear state. The background for 
Park’s reasons may be summarized from one quote, “We need to free ourselves from 
dependency on U.S. military protection.  . . . Can we develop nuclear weapons?”27 This 
non-rhetorical question was regularly asked and even more so months before the 
volatility of Park’s last days. 
Park gave orders to Oh to add a nuclear program under the Agency for Defense 
Development. In turn, this created the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), 
the organization intended to recruit top engineers.28 Besides shifting away from US 
military dependency, Hong explains the other motifs that Park had to gain from going 
nuclear. Furthermore, he details the effects that American pressure had on a close Asian 
ally; these factors are, therefore, the basis for his thesis. 
Hong breaks his thesis into two bullet points. First, the American agenda under 
the Nixon Doctrine made Park uneasy. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” contradicted America’s 
“full commitment (containment) policy” needed to keep South Korea safe in a region 
dominated by two communist superpowers – China and the Soviet Union.29 Second, Park 
knew his fortunes were coming to an end since the Vietnam War was dwindling. Fearing 
that the US would renege – as in pulling out troops from the peninsula – on their 
assurance to protect South Korea, Park aggressively and clandestinely pursued nuclear 
                                                 
26 Sung-Gul Hong, “The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option,” in The Park Chung Hee 
Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Ezra F. Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 483. 
27 Hong, 483. 
28 KAERI was also an international-oriented program and recruited advisors and nuclear 
technology from all over the world. 
29 Nixon’s “Vietnamization” campaign assured American voters that most US service members 
would be slowly brought back from Asia. 
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technology. He even went as far as to hire Park Dong-sun, a wealthy Korean lobbyist, to 
bribe members of the US Congress to support his nuclear campaign.30 
 Park’s nuclear ambition came to a swift close after a series of missteps. Park and 
Oh severely underestimated American international intelligence. Most prominently, 
several French and Belgium nuclear scientists employed under Oh were on American 
espionage payrolls, thereby Park’s program had double agents in it from the start.31 This 
not only soured relations with America and other Asian-Pacific allies, but this did more 
harm to Park’s image during his final days. 
Hong posits that the American public’s lack of sympathy and news coverage after 
Park’s death may have been partly due to this. Hong assesses that Park’s covert attempts 
to acquire something as profound as weapons of mass destruction made him look foolish, 
dangerous, and unpredictable in the international community.32 Furthermore, it was 
revealed that Park still had ambitions of restarting the nuclear program a couple months 
before his death.33 
The article ends implying that after these revelations, Park’s death may have been 
a relief for American officials. It comes to no surprise that immediately after Chun Do-
hwan’s coup in 1980, President Chun eagerly exposed Park’s dormant nuclear 
ambitions.34 This was done as a ploy to garner US approval due to the fear of getting 
forced out office by American officials. As such, Chun immediately dismantled the 
nuclear program, thereby resetting relations back to a good tone. 
                                                 
30 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” 485. 
31 Ibid., 484. 
32 Ibid., 486. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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Immediate Aftermath on Nationalism 
Fuji Kamiya’s article was written a couple months after Park’s 1979 death at the 
time of power consolidation enacted by General Chun Doo-hwan (1980).35 Fuji 
highlights the immediate effects that occurred after the assassination. She also 
hypothesizes what the future holds for South Korea and its relationship, both politically 
and economically, within the East Asian region. 
Fuji stresses that Park’s two greatest achievements were “economic success” and 
South Korean regional “legitimacy.”36 Park’s economic campaigns have been covered 
extensively, however, her take on Park’s “national legitimacy” is an overlooked topic. 
The context behind this date to Rhee Syngman’s tenure (1948-1960). Fuji posits that 
Rhee’s vision, and therefore nationalism, was “anti-communism” and “anti-Japanese.”37 
Rhee’s lack of developmental planning was, therefore, the primary variable to the ROK’s 
pathetic and illegitimate global status. International consensus considered North Korea 
(DPRK) as the “legitimate spokesman for Korean nationalism.”38 Hence, the DPRK was 
the de facto successor to be head of the peninsula after the 1953 Korean Armistice 
Agreement. 
The DPRK championed unification and “self-reliance” within the economy, 
military, and polity. The DPRK’s “self-reliance” stance was later dubbed juche. 39 As 
                                                 
35 Kamiya Fuji is a Professor of International Relations at Keio University, Tokyo. 
36 Kamiya Fuji, “The Korean Peninsula after Park Chung Hee,” Asian Survey 20, no. 7 (July 
1980): 744. 
37 Fuji, 744. 
38 Ibid., 745. 
39 Juche is a political ideology influenced by Stalinism. Kim Il-sung emphasized that the state 
should strengthen socialism from within and isolate itself from the pressures of the outside world. 
Juche’s political ideology eventually dispersed onto the economic system. Juche economics emphasizes 
diverting all capital – natural resources and human services – to the state. The purpose is to be as “self-
sufficient” as possible and to minimize outside aid. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 457. 
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such, the ROK was automatically on the “defensive.”40 This was evident as economy, 
infrastructure, and international relations were significantly better than the Rhee Era 
ROK. For example, the DPRK always led UN negotiations and unification plans.41 On 
the opposite side, Rhee snubbed most attempts for discussions as he was only concerned 
with receiving American-backed UN aid. But just as quick as Rhee’s ousting was, Park’s 
swift ascension dramatically changed South Korea’s fortunes. 
During and after Park’s rule, the South grew increasingly confident on the world 
stage. The ROK swiftly overtook the DPRK’s economy while ROK actions in Vietnam 
displayed how far their military progressed since their “burdensome” days.42 Perhaps the 
most significant outcome was that the tables were finally turned. Park was able to shed 
the ROK’s “inferiority complex.” South Korea now led negotiations as they dictated the 
terms of unification. More importantly, the ROK was considered the sole successor of the 
peninsula.43 
On the Northern end, the DPRK suffered massive economic decline while 
tremendous foreign debts were never paid back.44 This era also began the North’s descent 
into international isolation.45 Oppositely, in the South, decisive autocratic leadership 
                                                 
40 Fuji, 745. 
41 Fuji notes that shortly after the Armistice Agreement, the DPRK even proposed unification 
through a federalism-type of system. See Kamiya Fuji, 745. 
42 Se Jin Kim, “South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political Impact,” 
Asian Survey 10, no. 6 (June 1970): 529. 
43 Fuji, “The Korean Peninsula,” 745. 
44 The decline of North Korean economy began during the “First Seven-Year Plan” (1961-
1970). There are two reasons why the decline occurred. First, Soviet aid, under Nikita Khrushchev, 
gradually declined due in part to the chaos under Mao’s 1960s Cultural Revolution. The resulting Sino-
Soviet split (1956-1966) caused tension among the Kremlin, Beijing, and Pyongyang. As a result, Kim 
Il-sung’s teetering support of Mao was one variable that caused a drift between the Soviets and North 
Koreans. The second reason was heavy military expenditures topping up to 30 percent GNP at one point. 
See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 460. 
45 Fuji also notes that the DPRK established trade relations with Japan but failed in expanding 
their economy due to Kim Il-sung’s “inflexibility” and the hinderance of a centralized juche economics. 
See Kamiya Fuji, 747. 
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mixed with free-market mechanics displayed to the world a new type of Korean 
nationalism. Fuji, however, does not mention the name of this “new nationalism” nor 
does she explain it. Nevertheless, in summary, Fuji’s analysis infers that juche 
nationalism was a catastrophic failure. The ROK was now “legit” as all things Korean-
related relayed back to the vibrant southern-tipped nation. 
 
Immediate Aftermath on Politics: Kim Dae-Jung’s Interview, Part I 
 Soon after General Chun’s military consolidation, Kim Dae-Jung (1924-2009) 
moved to the US to get away from Chun’s life-threatening regime. While on the 
international stage, Kim promoted the strengthening of direct democratic institutions. In 
an interview conducted by World Policy Journal, Kim outlined his plans for a more 
politically-open Korea.46 
 The first part gives context behind the 1980 Gwangju Massacre. This event fueled 
Kim and fellow opposition leaders to bring their plight to the world stage. The interview 
is mostly a response for US action in promoting “social democracy” in the Third World.47 
However, Kim also critiques the role that the Reagan and Carter administrations played 
while simultaneously castigating Chun’s repressive policies.48 
 Richard Falk, the interviewer, first acknowledges how Reagan took credit for 
Kim’s extradition to the US and then asks Kim’s opinion why he was released. Kim 
                                                 
46 For context, Kim Dae-jung ran against President Park several times and survived Park’s 
KCIA kidnapping. Kim fled Korea after Chun placed an execution order on him. After Chun’s regime, 
and when Korea was more politically stable, he returned to campaign for the new center-left party Deo 
Minjoo Dang, or Democratic Party. He became the eighth President of South Korea from 1998 to 2003. 
In 2000, he won the Nobel Peace Prize. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 522-525. 
47 “Social democracy” in Kim’s case means democracy with universal participation. 
48 Dae-jung Kim, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, “On Korea,” World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 
(Fall 1983): 218. 
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reasons that it was politically convenient to “separate me physically from the Korean 
people,” so that Chun, supported by American diplomats, could “soothe” the agitated 
Korean public. Moreover, Chun wanted to repair his damaged image abroad in order to 
“secure [more] loans” from Japan.49 
 Kim critiques America’s back-and-forth role upon his release. He acknowledges 
that Carter’s actions led to his release from prison, but only after Carter’s initially passive 
stance was criticized by other democratic nations. Kim claims that the Carter and UN 
administrations knew about the sociopolitical unrest and aggressive militarization during 
a post-Park Korea. Evidently, the two administrations stood silent as Chun carried out 
two coups in 1980. 
Chun, additionally, went as far as to usurp US-backed military commands by 
ordering DMZ stationed ROK troops to combine with Jeolla Province divisions – a 
southern province where Gwangju is located – in order to clampdown on protestors. For a 
visual reference of troop movements please refer to Map 3.1. Kim suggests that this was 
a pivotal point for the American-Korean relations, as the public became “disappointed by 
America” for not intervening on the crackdown. Consequently, a vocal minority, mostly 
the youth, started an “Anti-American” campaign that culminated in 1987 during the 
Reagan Administration.50 
 The next part of the interview notes that the Chun regime held Kim responsible 
for “instigating” the Gwangju Massacre.51 In response, Kim counterclaimed that Chun 
                                                 
49 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, 219. 
50 Ibid., 219. 
51 The Gwangju Massacre occurred in the city of Gwangju on May 1980. What started as a pro-
democracy movement quickly escalated when Chun declared martial law and sent military personnel to 
quell the uprising. The massacre ended with about 3,600 casualties, mostly students, with more than 150 
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often falsely accused many groups that do not fall in line with his agendas, including 
Christians and Buddhists.52 It comes to no surprise that Kim was accused of “inciting 
violence” and sentenced to death by Chun.53 
Finally, Kim ended this portion on a constructive note. He posits that overall the 
event had positive ramifications. Chun’s over-the-top and violent antagonism displayed 
that his regime was threatened by the democratic populist movement. Chun’s democratic 
antagonism only garnered Kim more international admiration, and because of this 
popularity, saved him from instant execution. Moreover, Kim reiterated that Gwangju’s 
greatest achievement was that it gave the alienated and violently oppressed a global 
voice.54  
                                                 
dead. About 300 government authorities were also injured with about 40 dead. However, casualty 
estimates come from Chun’s government, so the accuracy is disputed. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 474, and Myung-Lim Park in The Park Chung Hee Era, 392. 
52 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 220. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 219. 
Map 3.1. The infantry divisions and routes 
used to quell Gwangju protestors. Please 
note that the 20th Infantry Division – under 
the command of US General John A. 
Wickham – was the unit diverted away 
stationed DMZ orders. See John A 
Wickham, “Chapter Seven: The Kwangju 
Tragedy,” 139. Source: Google Maps; 
lines and positioning made by author. 
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Immediate Aftermath on Politics: Kim Dae-Jung’s Interview, Part II 
 During the other half of the interview Falk asks Kim about his thoughts on Park’s 
regime, his death, and how Park compares to Chun. First, Kim recollects the general 
attitude that the public felt for Park. Even though Kim and Park were long-time 
adversaries, Kim does acknowledge, albeit rather faintly, that “Park was responsible to 
some extent for Korean economic development.”55 However, Park was able to do so 
through the “exploitation of the people,” as seen through “inequitable distribution of 
wealth and income.” This was evident as Park’s policies incurred high inflation that 
plagued the early 1980s economy.56 
Falk then asks Kim to compare Park’s public approval with Chun’s. Kim 
acknowledges that although mass dissent plagued the end of Park’s life the public still 
saw him as “legit.” The primary reason was that before the May 1961 coup South Korea 
was essentially a failed state. State failure was apocalyptic in proportion as law, order, 
and basic necessities were, for the most part, absent. When Park took charge, there was 
little to no opposition from the public. Kim reasons that Koreans “were sick and tired of 
disorder.”57 
In comparison, Kim suggests that Chun was “illegitimate” in the eyes of the 
public. Even though Park initially forced his ascendance to the presidency, Park did win 
three elections, albeit with allegations of tampering.58 Nonetheless, even with 
                                                 
55 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 222. 
56 Inflation fluctuated between 9 and 15 percent in the early 1980s. Chun and technocratic 
lawmakers enacted harsh austerity to combat this. Seoul even froze budgets and withheld salaries and 
funds for public services. See Se-Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 45-47. 
57 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 221. 
58 Park won the elections of 1963, 1967, and 1971. Afterwards, Yushin was enacted and 
presidential elections were only rubberstamps. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 468-471. 
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questionable elections, Park gave Koreans a little taste of democracy. The flirtation with 
direct elections only whetted the public’s political appetite and was evident as opposition 
constantly protested Park’s iron-gripped Yushin rule.59 
Nonetheless, a large proportion of the public “legitimized” Park as he brought 
order, economic growth, military strength, and cultural pride back to the South. On the 
other end, Chun brought none of those accomplishments to the table. Kim suggests that 
Chun never won any election and that he was riding off Park’s legacy. Ironically, Chun 
also inherited Park’s inflation problem, and that in turn, was one variable that 
overwhelmed his tenure.60 
 Additionally, Kim hypothesizes the primary variable that caused the public’s 
disdain for Chun was right after Park’s assassination. Choi Kyu-hah immediately became 
acting president right after the Park’s death.61 According to Kim, Choi proposed the idea 
of enacting open elections to help quell urban uprisings. Unfortunately, this was not 
meant to be as Chun took control through military force – mirroring Park’s 1961 takeover 
– and thwarted all notions of free elections. This variable, according to Kim, trumped all 
the dramas that occurred to him and other opposition leaders. 
Finally, Kim concludes the interview by summing up the two strongmen’s 
legacies. Park’s clash with the opposition was systematic as he methodically silenced 
prominent dissidents; simultaneously, Park raised the country’s standard of living and 
                                                 
59 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 222. 
60 Ibid. 
61 For context, Choi Kyu-hah (1999-2006) was Park’s foreign minister from 1964-1971 and 
prime minister from 1975-1979. Soon after Park’s death, an electoral college election was held in 
December 6, 1979. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 474. Choi unanimously won, however, he was 
soon replaced by General Chun in the December 12 Coup. See Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun in 
The Park Chung Hee Era, 137. 
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installed law and order. On the other end, Chun was blunter, ineffective, and more 
personal when it came to dissent. He took away the one thing that affected all 
socioeconomic classes, an individual voice. When compared to Park, Chun only offered 
nothing but inflation and disorder.62 
 
Origins of Minjung, Part I: The Colonial Era 
The ideas for minjung originated during Korea’s colonial age. Minjung is a 
Korean word that means “mass of the people,” and therefore, is a term that has been 
reinterpreted many times by scholars and politicians. Likewise, many movements 
sprouted because of it, thereby adding more complexity and confusion when defining the 
term.63 A History of Korea, however, proposes a brief definition of the movement, 
“Minjung represents a majority of people who are presumably exploited by the 
numerically smaller ruling elite, particularly, the urban proletariat.”64 Basically, a mantra 
of the disenfranchised versus the well-off. 
  On the other hand, the monograph South Korea’s Minjung Movement provides 
countless essays that explain other distinct characteristics. Kang Man’gil proposes an 
unorthodox definition that encompasses historical progression.65 Kang proposes that 
minjung means a national movement stretched out into a three-period timeline. “[First], to 
maintain sovereignty in the face of the aggression of capitalistic powers; [second], to gain 
                                                 
62 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 223. 
63 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements and the Minjung,” in South Korea's 
Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence, ed., Kenneth M. Wells (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), PDF e-book, 31. 
64 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 495. 
65 Man’gil Kang is a professor of history at Koryo (Korea) University, Seoul. 
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liberation from colonial rule; and [third], to overcome division and reunify the nation.”66 
Essentially, this is a Marxist take on minjung. 
Kang’s supports his thesis in chronological order. The first period began during 
Japanese occupation. He posits that the first mention of minjung was in 1919 when a 
national independence movement, dubbed “The Declaration of the Korean Revolution” 
(Choson hyungmyung sununso), erupted. The declaration was officially written in 1923 
by nationalist Sin Chaeho. Sin wrote the declaration as a response to the actions 
committed by the extremist liberation group The Righteous Brotherhood (Ui ryol dan). 
The Brotherhood, although violent in their means, were “revolutionary” according to 
Sin.67 
Sin noted that the Brotherhood’s goal was “To preserve the existence of the 
Korean people, the Japanese robbers must be expelled; the only way to expel the 
Japanese is through revolution.”68 Whether the revolution was violent or peaceful was 
never expanded on; nonetheless, Sin dubbed these axioms into larger themes called the 
“Minjung Revolution” and the “Direct Revolution.”69 
Kang emphasizes the effects that Sin had on the minjung movement. While not 
literally stated, it is implied that Sin was the grandfather of the movement because he 
incorporated many populist trends – such as national identity tied to ethnicity and land – 
with colonial independence. In Sin’s own words, “minjung are those who can neither live 
nor die according to their own will since they are . . . restricted in their liberty of 
                                                 
66 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 31. 
67 Ibid., 33. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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action.”70 Therefore, it is possible to see Marxist class struggles mixed with Sin’s 
teachings and early Korean democracy. 
While Sin’s definition draws comparisons to other independence movements from 
other Imperial-ruled Asian countries, he distinguishes this movement to pertain only to 
ethnic Koreans on peninsula soil.71 Sin wrote that minjung participants are those “who 
continuously progress in order to fulfill their goal with the intention of not living . . . if 
they cannot expel the Japanese from [Korean land].”72 Mirroring the violence of The 
Righteous Brotherhood, Sin’s minjung meant a fight to the death in order to expel 
Japanese elements from Korea. 
To sum it up, the origins of minjung are heavily tied to Sin Chaeho’s work and is 
even implied that he was the founder of the movement. The initial intent was to deny 
Japanese, and foreigner, rule on the Korean people, land, and culture. Therefore, minjung 
was an ethnic ideology that bordered on extremities, and therefore, corroborates with 
Professor Andre Schmid’s analysis on Sin’s ethnonationalism. Meaning, minjung went as 
far as to advocate a struggle to the death if Imperial Japan continued their rule on the 
peninsula.73 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 34. 
71 The Treaty of 1905 (Treaty of Portsmouth) laid the foundation for Japan’s imperial ambition. 
Japan’s main colonies were in Korea, Manchuria (Manchukuo), and the Russian Far East. Imperial Japan 
would later expand onto the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 
314. 
72 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 34. 
73 Andre Schmid, “Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'aeho and the Politics of Territorial History 
in Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 1 (February 1997): 27. 
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Origins of Minjung, Part II: Post-World War II and National Division 
During the colonial age, minjung was an umbrella tenet focused on anyone who 
opposed Japanese rule. The people included in the movement were “intellectuals, 
workers, and petite bourgeoisies.”74 Principally, the socioeconomic and political status of 
Koreans were secondary. The movement, therefore, squarely focused on Sin-inspired 
nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments. 
The division of Korea in 1945 inadvertently split the minjung ideology. 
Originally, the movement meant liberation from Imperial overlords, but, after the 
division, minjung changed to incorporate a wide array of meanings many of which 
contradicted one another.75 Consequently, North and South Korea had their own distinct 
connotations. Moreover, the Japanese invasion of China (early 1930s to 1946) also 
coincided with minjung. Due to the proximity and similar anti-Imperial themes, Chinese 
nationalist movements – both Kuomintang (KMT) and Communists (CPC) – influenced 
it.76 As such, North Korea centered minjung around “workers and farmers,” similar to the 
CPC.77 While in the South, it focused on “minor landowners and national capitalists,” 
similar to the KMT.78 
Sin voiced his observations by comparing that the national movement was 
emphasizing “European-style bourgeoisie.” This meant that European-parliamentary 
                                                 
74 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 35. 
75 Ibid., 36. 
76 Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) was a prominent Chinese nationalist and the grandfather of both 
KMT and CCP movements. See Patricia Ebrey, Illustrated History of China, 265-267. As such, Sin 
Chaeho and other nationalists were exiled around the Manchurian and Chinese borders and may have 
been influenced by the writings of Sun and other Chinese nationalists. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 354. 
77 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 35. 
78 Ibid. 
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representation mixed with a modern industrialized market was an element of minjung.79 
On the other end of the political spectrum, the rise of bourgeois rule affected Korean 
laborers and communists. The concerns for the new communists were the unchecked 
powers that Japanese colonists and wealthy elites had.80 Due to rising industrialization, 
powerful capitalist magnates – both Japanese and Korean in origins – exploited most 
laborers. Simply put, minjung, alongside its “European-style bourgeoisie” tenets, had 
both capitalist and Marxist aspects. 
Even though minjung had right and left political components, the core of the 
movement focused on a people’s revolution against colonial struggle. More specifically, 
it meant that the Korean people, no matter political and socioeconomic affiliation, must 
fight to maintain their heritage, land, and culture against “foreigner thieves.”81 
 
The Challenge in Defining Minjung, Part I 
 Since the days of its colonial conception, minjung incorporated many supporters 
from a diverse socioeconomic spectrum but took a dramatic shift in meaning during the 
turbulent Chun-ruled 1980s. Kim Hyung-A elaborates more on Kang Man’gil’s minjung 
analysis. Both authors agree that it is essentially a form of struggle for the oppressed; 
however, Kim notes the difficulty that researchers have in conceptualizing minjung.82 In 
                                                 
79 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 36. 
80 Korea, during World Wars I and II, was used as a staging ground for Imperial forces to launch 
their attacks on the Chinese mainland. Therefore, industries, such as rail, mining and timber, were 
rapidly built and exploited. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 349. 
81 Man’gil Kang, “Contemporary Nationalist Movements,” 35. 
82 Hyung-A Kim, “Minjung Socioeconomic Responses to State-led Industrialization,” in South 
Korea's Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 1995), 39. 
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other words, the challenge of defining minjung can be summed up by identifying what 
the key concepts of minjung are and examining who the people that make it were. 
 Kim’s essay ascribes two South Korean intellects, economist Park Hyon-chae and 
sociologist Han Wansang, as the leading experts on minjung analysis. The first part is 
dedicated to Hyon-chae’s theories. Hyon-chae’s thesis centers on the keyword, 
“proletarianization.” This term is defined as “an increase in the number of people who 
lack control over the means of production and survive by selling their labor power.”83 His 
analysis, therefore, takes on Marxist themes, and as such, is rooted in the 1970s when 
Park Chung Hee heavily industrialized the nation. In turn, Hyon-chae attributes South 
Korea’ dramatic s post-1960s development as a shift into modern capitalism, and, hence, 
the beginnings of “proletarianization.”84 
 Before Hyon-chae contextualizes “proletarianization,” or contemporary minjung, 
as the three main players to the movement: farmers, laborers, and the urban poor.85 Due 
to the desperation of finding new economic opportunities in a new capitalist society, 
Hyon-chae’s thesis is essentially a reinterpretation of Korea’s socioeconomic ladder. The 
ladder begins with farmers, then devolves into laborers, and then into the urban poor who 
are considered the lowest of the economic classes. 
Referring to Han Seung-mi’s Saemaul Undong analysis, Hyon-chae expands on 
Han’s work by implementing that the mass urban migration of poor farmers is a primary 
                                                 
83 Hyung-A Kim, “Minjung Socioeconomic Responses,” 42. 
84 Ibid., 45. 
85 Park also notes that progressive intellectuals, specifically the ones who were prosecuted 
during Chun’s crackdowns, were also part of minjung. However, intellectuals were a small proportion 
compared to other players. Therefore, his analysis focuses squarely on the other three. See Hyung-A 
Kim, 42. 
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variable.86 While Han denotes that most of these farmers were elderly, Hyon-chae gives 
no reference to age.87 However, he designates that most of the migrants only had an 
agrarian skillset, and, therefore, could not adjust themselves to an urban work setting. 
Accordingly, farmers became poorer and fell down the socioeconomic ladder, 
thereby becoming urban laborers. The term “laborers” is also synonymous with low-
waged – both blue and white-collar – menial workers.88 Due to bare-bone labor laws and 
the dominant chaebol system, work exploitation was endemic. As a result, laborers 
disintegrated into the bottom of the stratum and became a new social class, the “urban 
poor.”89 
The urban poor takes up most of Hyon-chae’s theory. He expands on this class by 
redefining it into three categories. First were urban tradesman, many of whom were 
independent laborers scrounging for low-paid work. This is corroborated by economist 
Chang Se-jin as he notes that work contracts were outsourced by chaebol companies. 90 
Second were industrial and small business workers many of whom were temporary and 
worked in hazardous fields such as the steel and chemical industries. Finally, the 
unemployed were the lowest of the classes and constituted the largest percentage of the 
urban poor. This group also came into prominence during the high-inflationary years of 
the Chun regime.91 
                                                 
86 Seung-Mi Han, “The New Community Movement: Park Chung Hee and the Making of State 
Populism,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 80. 
87 Hyung-A Kim, “Minjung Socioeconomic Responses,” 42. 
88 Hyon-chae defines white-collar workers as small shop-keepers. Also included are low-paid, 
mostly female, clerical workers, teachers, and nurses. See Hyung-A Kim, 42. 
89 Hyung-A Kim, “Minjung Socioeconomic Responses,” 43. 
90 Chang, Financial Crisis, 48. 
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Hyon-chae concludes that the consequences of Korea’s rapid industrialization 
culminated in the 1980s. In doing so, this decade was characterized as the “era of 
proletarianization.” More specifically, the era was when both government and capitalist 
enterprises – mostly the chaebol system – severely exploited an already-downtrodden 
population. Due to the near-invincibility of the government, chaebol companies, and the 
military, most of the oppressed rallied to the only tool powerful enough to enact civil 
change, Western supported democracy.92 
 
Minjung as a Form of Popular Culture, Part I: The Origins 
Minjung is an ideology that encompasses a wide range of beliefs. While political 
and social tenets are commonly discussed, an overlooked area centers around popular 
culture themes. Choi Chungmoo uses this as a tool to help define minjung.93 
Choi begins by agreeing with other researchers that minjung is a form of anti-
imperialist nationalism. However, Choi’s stance differ because minjung is further 
symbolized as a contemporary “struggle against a capitalistic world order.”94 She 
assesses that minjung was an effect of Third World struggles.95 Choi does not mention 
Soviet influence, rather, she places the skirmish as a sole byproduct of “[European] 
                                                 
92 Hyung-A Kim, “Minjung Socioeconomic Responses,” 46. 
93 Chungmoon Choi is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, 
Irvine. 
94 Chungmoon Choi, “The Minjung Culture Movement and the Construction of Popular Culture 
in Korea,” in South Korea's Minjung Movement: The Culture and Politics of Dissidence, ed., Kenneth M. 
Wells (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), PDF e-book, 106. 
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See Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik in The Park Chung Hee Era, 60. 
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imperialistic nationalism and capitalism.”96 In other words, South Korea’s newly 
industrialized capitalist society, and to an extent East Asian capitalism, is Western in 
origin. 
Choi backs this claim by referring to Song Konho’s thesis, post-Korean War 
nationalism was distorted by “Western bourgeoisies.”97 Song argued that Rhee 
Syngman’s regime (1948-1960) warped Korean nationalism to fit a Western image; it 
manifested into a “distorted bourgeois nationalism.”98 This meant that Rhee’s goal for 
Korean society was to achieve a Western and American-like middle-class status. Simply 
put, Choi’s definition of minjung is an antithesis to Rhee’s version because it uses 
Marxist scholarly analysis. 
Choi ties this as part of the “minjung culture movement” that erupted after the 
Korean War.99 This theme gained prominence as Korean society was influenced by 
“[Western] market-oriented foreign culture.”100 As a result, the new market-economy 
alienated people who did not have the resources to afford American-modeled education 
and lifestyles. Consequently, the estranged used media as a referendum against prevalent 
Western bourgeois themes; and eventually, the sentiments manifested in the form of 
theater. 
During the chaotic years of Park Chung Hee’s death and Chun Doo-hwan’s rule 
(1979-1988), many forms of media – including staged dramas – were considered dissent 
                                                 
96 Choi, “The Minjung Culture Movement,” 106. 
97 Konho Song (Song Geon-ho) along with Man’gil Kang are prominent minjung historians who 
formed the revisionist publishing house, The Historical Research Institute (HRI), in 1984. They also 
published the journal Critique of History (Yoksa beepyong) in the 1980s and the two-volume monograph 
Korean Minjung History. 
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and were therefore banned. Likewise, protestors, many of whom were young university 
students, voiced their oppression through underground theater ensembles. This form of 
demonstration caught on with the poor and rich alike as they could relate to strong anti-
establishment themes.101 Due to a surge in popularity, many plays dispersed onto other 
forms of media outlets, such as poetry, novels, and comics (manhwa). 
 
Minjung as a Form of Popular Culture, Part II: The Malttugi Skits and Ojeok 
Choi highlights one area of theater that transcended socioeconomic statuses. The 
play Malttugi is part of a theatrical genre that gained prominence in the 1960s. The skits 
were aimed at critically representing the sacrosanct, yet ironically corrupt, yangban 
upper-class. The art employs the use of shaman-inspired masks and dances to portray 
lower-class skirmishes with corrupt-ruling elites.102 The plays are based upon an antihero 
slave, also named Malttugi, who ridicules the yangban elites through bawdy puns and 
obscenities.103 
 During an age of heavy censorship, the main theme of Malttugi was ridiculing 
the corrupt and privileged through as much bombast and vulgarities as possible. 
However, by the 1970s, minjung theatrics took on a whole different meaning. The 
changes can be attributed to anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist playwright Kim Chiha 
                                                 
101 Choi, “The Minjung Culture Movement,” 109. 
102 Malttugi is a play within the tal’chum (masked dance) genre. Tal’chum is one of many forms 
of Korean folk-inspired dances. See Thomas Kern, “Cultural Performance and Political Regime 
Change,” Sociological Theory 27, no. 3 (September 2009): 302. Furthermore, tal’chum’s origins are 
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(born 1941). Kim’s 1970 magnum opus Ojeok (“The Five Bandits”) is a pansori-styled 
play largely influenced by Malttugi themes.104 
Ojeok is a production that uses an eighteenth-century Joseon backdrop, and on the 
surface, Kim’s play looks like a Joseon satire; however, it has little to do with any period 
piece. Instead, Ojeok is a contemporary piece that criticizes Korea’s military-backed 
chaebol culture. Kim symbolizes the “Five Bandits” as the president (Park Chung Hee 
and Chun), the military, chaebol conglomerates, and corrupt politicians. Likewise, all 
entities signed a deal with foreigners to industrialize and bring wealth to Korea. This was 
done, however, at the cost of the poor, elderly, and agrarian.105 Fundamentally, Ojeok is a 
harsh critique of the state’s military backed capitalism. Kim says, “ruling bourgeoisies – 
[Park, state authorities, and chaebol] – having exclusive access to wealth [and power]” 
signified the era that minjung artists represented.106 
Finally, malttugi and pansori performances were considered low culture art 
during the Joseon era but artists like Kim Chiha introduced the old form to a new 
generation. Instantaneously, Joseon theatrics caught the attention of the youth and, as a 
result, became synonymous with culture native to the peninsula. It is therefore common 
to see malttugi and pansori performed side-by-side with ancient Korean performances 
                                                 
104 For context, the history of pansori starts with the translated term, “excess of sounds.” It is a 
play on words that involves a variety of sounds clashing together. On the surface it is a musical 
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many yangban historians recorded their enjoyment of certain pansori plays, such as Chunhyangga. 
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Musical Drama: P'ansori and the Making of Tradition in Modernity (London: Routledge, 2013), PDF e-
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such as shamanistic (sin’gyo) dances.107 Furthermore, pansori has become such an 
integral part of contemporary high culture that it has taken on a simpler and more 
operatic theme. It is common to see pansori plays inclusive of only a female opera singer 
and a man playing a drum (soribuk). Therefore, the bombast and vulgarities are replaced 
with a female performer singing a tale for the audience.108 
In summary, the mask-dance drama became an icon of the people’s resistance and 
a new part of the minjung identity. This began in the 1960s when Malttugi plays critiqued 
upper-class elites; however, during the 1970s, Korean theater took on a whole new level 
of depth with Kim Chiha’s Ojeok play. Kim’s piece was one factor that helped change the 
minjung ideology into one that critiqued the state while simultaneously alluding to anti-
imperialist (anti-foreigner) themes. Inadvertently, it also created a contemporary form of 
high culture for a newer generation. 
                                                 
107 Choi, 110. 
108 Ibid., 112. 
Figure 3.1. Picture 1 and 2 are from the annual Mask Dance Festival in Andong, South Korea. Taken from the Korean 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism Department. Picture 3 is a mix of malttugi and sin’gyo (shaman) dances. Please note 
the person to the left is performing a malttugi dance similar to Picture 2. The person on the right is performing a 
shamanistic ritual. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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The Religious and Spiritual Tenets of 1980s Minjung 
 Minjung is more than a political ideology as it is also a principle that encompasses 
religious and spiritual teachings. Two major religious orders, Buddhism and Christianity, 
while immensely different from each other, all fall within minjung’s umbrella. Scholars 
Mun Chanju and Donald N. Clark highlight the contributions – in respective order – that 
Buddhism and Christianity had upon the movement.109 
 Mun Chanju gives a brief history on concurrent Buddhist movements that 
happened during the 1980s minjung demonstrations.110 Likewise, Mun aptly names the 
movement “Minjung Buddhism” and sets its origins during the colonial era. He credits 
the Jogye Buddhist-monk Han Youngun (1879-1944) as the grandfather of the 
movement.111 Han tied independence with Buddhist teachings and taught that “Buddhism 
                                                 
109 Chanju Mun is a Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies in Coastal Carolina 
University; Donald N. Clark is a Professor of East Asian and Religious History in Trinity University in 
San Antonio, Texas. 
110 Chanju Mun, “A Historical Introduction to Minjung (Liberation) Buddhism: A South Korean 
Version of Radical Buddhism in the 1980s,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 15, no. 2 (April 2014): 265. 
111 Youngun Han also goes by his birth name, Han Yu-cheon, and also the pen name of 
 
Figure 3.2. Picture 4 is a Joseon painting of pansori performers presenting in front of a chungin (middle class) 
audience. Picture 5 is a modern pansori play. Pansori usually consisted of only two performers, a singer (sorikkun) 
and a drummer (gosu). Note the differences in physical makeup. Joseon era performances stayed mostly true to the 
original form of two commoners – usually men – screaming and singing obscenities in front of an all-male audience. 
Contemporary performances have become more theatric in appearance and presentation. Modern pansori plays 
usually consist of a male drummer and female singer. As such, pansori has become more operatic in style – a female 
lead singing and acting a story – compared to their Joseon counterparts. Source: Wikimedia Commons.  
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should no longer serve the oppressors but rather the oppressed.”112 Han’s teachings 
alluded to the many Japanese soldiers who claimed they were Buddhists but were also 
incongruously staunch supporters of violent imperialism.113 
Mun concludes that the violent imperial mindset carried over into contemporary 
times. Specifically, the aggressive state-sponsored crackdowns fueled Minjung Buddhists 
to be part of the urban dissent. This played a variable in Kim Jae-kyu’s decision to 
assassinate Park in 1979 – towards the end of Park’s tenure Kim became a staunch 
opponent against reckless suppression – while also contributing to the mass protests that 
toppled Chun’s presidency.114 
 Donald N. Clark’s analysis is like Mun’s essay as both deal with minjung’s 
religious themes. Instead of Buddhism, however, Clark focuses on the Christian aspects 
of the ideology, thereby also aptly naming the movement “Minjung Christianity.” The 
movement occurred during the 1960s Yushin era. The main players were the Vatican-
supported Korean Catholic Association and the Protestant – comprised mostly of 
Presbyterians and Methodists – National Christian Council. While both sects have far-
                                                 
“Manhae.” Han was part of the Jogye Order. This order traces its roots back to Unified Silla (668-
935CE) and is part of the Mahayana Buddhist branch. 
112 Mun, “A Historical Introduction to Minjung,” 267. 
113 It is noteworthy that Buddhism’s dispersion onto the Japanese islands at around the sixth 
century CE. Baekjae monks were tasked with spreading sutras to their trading partners. In that sense, 
Japanese “Classical Buddhism” has similarities to Korean Buddhism, which in turn, are all part of 
Mahayana Buddhism. Furthermore, “Classical Buddhism” branched off into Zen (Pinyin: chan, Korean: 
seon) Buddhism during the twelfth century. Zen focuses on “inner-enlightenment,” or that it is possible 
to achieve enlightenment through the individual’s self-actions. This form of Buddhism was widely 
adopted by samurai elite as it complemented personal bushido ethics. See Conrad D. Totman, Japan 
Before Perry: A Short History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), PDF e-book, 94-96. 
Eventually, this sect, along with bushido, influenced many Imperial military personnel, concurrently 
conflicting with Han-inspired Korean Buddhism. See Chanju Mun, 109. 
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ranging theological differences, Clark contends that they came together as a response to 
Park’s and Chun’s elimination of suspected communists.115 
 One reason that both regimes scapegoated religious followers was due to the 
political events of the 1960s and 1970s. This was an era when Marxist independence 
movements commonly occurred in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Due to 
Christian groups’ strong emphasis on social welfare, Clark postulates that Park and Chun 
associated Christians, and to an extent Buddhists, with supporting global socialist 
movements.116 
 A second intriguing, albeit very unorthodox, reason was that a diverse range of 
Christians sought to join minjung protestors because of Biblical history. Many Christian’s 
denoted minjung with the words suffer and struggle. Minjung Christians, therefore, 
likened their liberation efforts against Imperial Japan and the Park-Chun regimes to that 
of “Israelite minjung” people.117 Otherwise put, many Korean Christians equated Imperial 
Japan and South Korea’s authoritarian era as the Biblical Egypt. 
Clark analogizes this through Hebrew history: “the liberation of the Israelites 
(oppressed Koreans) from captivity in Egypt (Korea during the colonial age and during 
the Park-Chun era), their suffering during forty years of wandering in the desert (decades 
of political oppression and protesting), and their deliverance into the Promised Land (the 
future of living in an independent, democratic, and united Korea)” was all part of God’s 
plan. To put it in another way, “God permitted the Hebrews (Koreans) to be oppressed, 
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(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), PDF e-book, 87. 
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but when they finally took action (grueling life and death protesting), He delivered them 
to salvation (independence, democracy, and national unification).”118 Indeed, Minjung 
Christians had a cause to fight for similar to that of Moses. 
 Clark concludes that the actions of Korean Christian played a tantamount role in 
getting the protestors’ voices heard within the global Christian community. The needed 
attention and sympathy from Christian-majority nations – they were also conveniently 
pro-democratic – helped popularize minjung. Granted this was during a time when Cold 
War politics dominated world news. Finally, Clark notes that Minjung Christians lived to 
realize that two of their three goals were achieved: South Korean independence from 
authoritarianism and the establishment of a modern republican system; however, national 
unification is still yet to be seen.119 
* * * 
 Even with Park Chung Hee’s death in 1979, the former strongman’s vision lived 
on. South Koreans, however, saw this an opportunity – through Choi Kyu-hah’s 
capitulation and promise of democratic elections – to resurrect republican representation. 
In hindsight, this was not meant to be. General Chun Doo-hwan enacted an instantaneous 
and unforeseen coup, similar to Park’s. Obsessed with Park’s bushido society, the newly-
titled President Chun continued Park-policies backed by deadly violence and armed 
force. Thereby, the new dictator strengthened Park’s chaebol and Neo-Confucian 
institutions. The next chapter, therefore, seeks to analyze the background that Chun’s 
autocracy produced and the socioeconomic consequences that led to the prominence of 
the minjung movement.  
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Saemaul undong, the export-chaebol economies, Yushin, and bushido-based Neo-
Confucianism were heavily entrenched in 1970s South Korea. Poverty was rapidly 
alleviated due in part to these heavy-handed policies.1 Chairman Park did the 
unconceivable and turned his “bankrupt firm” into a prosperous corporation.2 But just as 
suddenly as Park ascended in 1961, his reign abruptly ended when he was assassinated on 
October 26, 1979. The shooter was his best friend and KCIA director Kim Jae-kyu.3 
While scholars debate the motives surrounding Kim’s unexpected slaying, it is possible 
to ascertain that domestic dissent during the late 1970s and inner circle conflicts were the 
two most prominent factors leading up to the killing. 
Inner circle quarrels within regimes are nothing new, the events surrounding the 
assassination, however, beg an analysis. Kim Jong-pil (born 1926), and one of the 
founding members of the KCIA, was a firsthand witness and recalled Jae-kyu saying: 
If we’re too harsh in suppressing the demonstrators in Busan and 
Masan [calling for democracy], there will be a huge backlash from the 
people down there. But the ruling Republican Party isn’t giving 
President Park the right advice because it fears Cha Ji-cheol (Park’s 
chief bodyguard). I am going to get rid of him today.4 
 
The demonstrations in Busan and Masan, two major port cities in the southern regions, 
were just the beginning of what would become frequent, almost daily, protests and 
marked the 1980s as an era of extreme societal changes. This chapter accordingly seeks 
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to explain the most prominent transformations of the post-Park 1980s, specifically, the 
causes behind them, how his successors handled such alterations, and which agendas 
from Park’s era changed. 
 
Major Players: Chun Doo-hwan and Kim Dae-jung 
Koreans lived a decade under the anti-democratic Yushin government, and Park’s 
death immediately created turmoil for politicians and citizens alike. Prime Minister Choi 
Kyu-ha (1919-2006) became acting president, but in October 1979, was later elected and 
served until August 1980.5 On the civilian side, Choi set plans to allow future presidential 
elections as a response to urban and student protests. 
In a 1983 interview, longtime opposition leader Kim Dae-jung (1924-2009) noted 
the significance of these elections, “After Park’s assassination in 1979, the Korean people 
entertained the dream of democratizing the nation.”6 Granted, under Park the public did 
flirt with three direct democratic presidential elections – the 1963, 1967, and 1971 
presidential elections – albeit with allegations of vote tampering.7 Nonetheless, according 
to Kim, these initial flirtations “legitimized” Park’s government, at least until the 1972 
Yushin decree.8 
On the other end, however, politicians, military, and business elites, many of 
whom prospered under the Yushin government, felt threatened by direct elections. Due to 
this, Choi’s presidency was short lived and was spent trying to quell vacuums among 
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government and business elites. The pivotal figure among them though was Major 
General Chun Doo-hwan (born 1931; presidency 1980-1988).9 
 General Chun knew the vulnerabilities that Park left behind, and, like any 
scheming tactician, he took advantage of those weaknesses. On December 12, 1979, 
Chun – taking a cue from Park’s 1961 coup – consolidated his power among military, 
business, and political power brokers. Chun enacted a coup and took over the 
government, dissolving the presidency and National Assembly in the process.10 Taken 
from a US Embassy report shortly after, Chun defended his actions as “a reply to the 
12/12 incident was an accidental outgrowth of a legitimate effort to carry out his 
investigation of the assassination of President Park.”11 Accordingly, this was just the first 
step in the lack of American oversight during Chun’s tenure. 
Even the most powerful politicians and organizations were caught off guard by 
the coup. Major Park Jun-kwang, Chun’s subordinate during the coup, attested that: 
In front of the most powerful organizations under the Park Chung-hee 
presidency, it surprised me how easily Chun gained control over them 
and how skillfully he took advantage of the circumstances. In an instant 
he seemed to have grown into a giant.12 
 
The December Coup went off without a hitch and Chun emulated Park-like efficiency 
throughout the takeover. Bushido tactics, simply put, worked with Park’s coup and now 
with Chun’s. 
                                                 
9 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 476. 
10 Ibid. 
11 US, Department of State, Seoul Embassy, United States Government Statement on the Events 
in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980, (Seoul: United States Information Service (USIS), 1989), 
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12 Gab-je Cho, “Excerpt from ‘The Birth of a Monster,’” Cho Gab-Je The Investigative 
Reporter’s World, accessed September 13, 2018, 
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Moreover, the international motives from both strongmen were uncanny. In a 
1983 interview, Park and Chun’s longtime opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung, suggested 
that: 
The US government played some role in [creating both].  . . . In neither 
of the two coups that helped solidify [Park and Chun’s] rule did the 
United States do anything to discourage the lawless actions of [both 
men].13 
 
Because Park and Chun got away with such transgressions – without the reprimand from 
their closest geopolitical ally, the United States – Chun’s regime was poised to copy 
Park’s successes. 
In hindsight however, this was where the similarities ended. The most glaring 
differences between the two strongmen was the public’s preliminary passive emotional 
state. After Park’s coup, a weary and apathetic Korean public did not possess the will to 
protest such sociopolitical volatilities. In the same interview, Kim Dae-jung, summed up 
that Park’s initial support was due to “[Koreans] just being sick and tired of disorder.”14  
Kim’s statement somewhat corresponds with Park’s radio transcripts about first “filling 
the people’s belly.”15 This meant that both Kim and Park knew bringing basic societal 
necessities – law, order, and food – was tantamount in shaping a leader’s agendas. 
General Chun’s regime, nevertheless, did not see any of Park’s initial successes. 
Since the beginning of his forceful takeover, Chun’s government was built on shaky 
foundations. First, South Korea was on the verge of achieving affluency. The country 
was modernizing at a rapid rate, thereby fulfilling the needs for basic necessities; 
                                                 
13 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 219. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Chung Hee Park, “Coup or Revolution?” Speech, Addressing the Public After 5.16 Coup, 
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whereas, Park heavily capitalized on South Korean poverty. This was evident in the 
actions of a booming and educated middle class who now had the luxury of leisure 
activities, such as tourism, consumer shopping, and entertainment.16 
Secondly, even though Korea was still a militarized state, law and order was 
achieved, and petty and financial crimes were rapidly diminishing. The average Korean 
could now walk to newly-built supermarkets and shopping malls without the fear of theft 
and assault. Furthermore, Koreans could now invest their growing wealth – earned 
through chaebol jobs and soldiers’ “Vietnam Income” remittances – without the worry of 
confiscation. In fact, state officials encouraged savings and investments through chaebol-
owned banks.17 
American expatriate worker and Seoul investment banker Scott E. Kalb testified 
to the changes that the average Korean was undergoing in the late 1980s: 
It's no accident that everyone came out into the streets just as Korea 
had its biggest economic boom in five years. The more the standard of 
living improves, the more sophisticated the populace becomes, the 
more they demand a political system that matches their economic 
status. This was not a revolution so much as a realization of their 
status.18 
 
Whether Park knew this “realization” and whether he accounted for it is speculation; 
however, Chun willfully and forcefully ignored the idea that affluency needs a more 
“advanced political system.” Indeed, the Korean public outgrew the need for strongmen – 
                                                 
16 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 181. 
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Fall of Chaebols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), PDF e-book, 59. 
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inclusive of their nationalist vehicles – to guide them. In short, South Korean society, 
according to Kim Dae-jung, was now self-sufficient economically and psychologically.19 
Chun’s ignorance was none more evident than in the consequences of the Busan-
Masan (“Bu-Ma” for short) Democratic Protests (October 16-20, 1979). This occurred 
during the last month of Park’s life, so the late dictator never lived to see the 
consequences; that experience, however, was fully felt by Chun’s regimes.20 Bu-Ma was 
simply the precursor to intense daily protesting. These actions were some of the catalysts 
that warned Chun of his demise; a response to three-decades worth of autocratic 
governance; and more importantly, the spark that shot minjung to prominence. 
 
Minjung, Part I: Origins 
Minjok was defined by Sin Chaeho as “the people.” Park took these tenets and 
effectively shaped them to build South Korea in his image. Minjok is essentially an all-
encompassing principle created specifically for the Korean people; therefore, all Koreans 
are entitled to use it no matter their socioeconomic and political status.21 During the last 
days of the Park era and throughout Chun’s reign, Koreans took Sin’s minjok and created 
a new movement that served the public’s interests. The name of the movement is minjung 
(pronounced meen-joong) and is synonymous with the word democracy.22 
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It is possible to see the similarities with Park’s minjok agendas and how that 
inadvertently influenced minjung movements. Nadia Y. Kim posits that Park’s minjok 
used the idea of a homogenized and hardworking ancestry to instill a common goal 
among a low-morale constituency.23 Kim Jinwung‘s definition by comparison is a 
movement for the “common people, as opposed to a ruling elite . . . minjung represents a 
majority of people who are presumably exploited by the numerically smaller ruling 
elite.”24 Kang Man’gil proposes a more unorthodox meaning to the 1980s movement. 
Kang posits that minjung began well before the 1980s, that it was developed in three 
periods, and had its origins in the short-lived Korean Empire era. Kang defined it as: 
[First], to maintain sovereignty in the face of the aggression of 
capitalistic powers; [second], to gain liberation from colonial rule; and 
[third], to overcome division and reunify the nation.25 
 
When all definitions are combined then it is reasonable to look at minjung and minjok as 
one entity; it is a yin to a yang meant to restore sovereignty from “foreign powers” and 
give that power back to the “low-morale” public. 
Park, however, altered Sin’s minjok ideologies so that he could restore his version 
of sovereignty back to the Korean people. For example, during the late 1970s, Park was 
slowly alienating himself from American allies due to Yushin-influenced crackdowns and 
ambitions for nuclear armament.26 Furthermore, President Carter’s soft-power approach 
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24 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 495. 
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also meant withdrawing most US troops and aid to an already industrialized and 
modernized South Korea – at least in the standards of Third World development. In 
comparison, protestors during the Chun era sought their own sovereignty from what they 
perceived as foreign interference, particularly from American Cold War politics. This, of 
course, did not sit well with the new dictator.27 
Chun was no stranger to appeasing Western allies. His regime sought to better 
relations with the US by pandering to the demands of the Reagan Administration. 
According to Kim Jinwung, the 1980s were a “return to the honeymoon period” for 
American-Korean relations.28 Likewise, Chun showed adept statesmanship, and as a 
result, Reagan officials overlooked Korean sociopolitical issues.29 
While lauded by the Reagan administration and Cold War analysts, Chun's 
appeasement strategy was not received well in the peninsula.30 As taken from Chun’s 
1981 visit to the White House: 
I am happy to say that President Reagan gave me firm assurances that 
the United States has no intention of withdrawing the American forces 
in Korea. I am pleased that the present level of United States military 
presence in Korea will be maintained.31 
 
Along with Chun’s willingness to dismantle Park’s nuclear programs, this pro-military 
position cooled tensions with the ROK’s Pacific allies. The Korean public, however, was 
already exhausted from an overmilitarized state. The fact that a foreign military power 
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28 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 498. 
29 Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 291. 
30 Hong, “The Search for Deterrence,” 486. 
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House, Washington DC, February 2, 1981. 
 
142 
 
 
supported this, even though it promised to reduce troops, was cause for concern.32 It is 
therefore possible to deduce that the new “foreign elements” minjung was concerned 
about – in this case American armed forces – showed similarities to Park’s anti-foreigner 
campaigns. However, instead of expelling those elements, like how Park enacted 
Sinophobic campaigns, Chun’s Korea embraced and entrenched themselves in it. 
Framed differently, after the use of military force in the Bu-Ma Protests, Koreans 
were rightfully weary of the deadly precedent set by Park. In retrospect, Chun’s regime 
was not scared to regularly employ these same tactics. Simply put, American military 
support and foreign aid antagonized minjung protestors because it amplified and 
encouraged the atrocities committed by Chun.33 
Ultimately, the initial phase of minjung can be defined in one sentence: It was a 
counter-ideology to decades worth of Park-led bushido and Neo-Confucian governance 
and, more importantly, to Chun’s abuse of foreign powers. The reason why it took off 
during the 1970s and 1980s was, as Kim Dae-jung puts it, Chun was not as “calculated 
and systemic” as Park.34 Chun was reckless with Park-styled bushido power and his 
frequent brutality showed it. No one – least of all the US – was there to stop him. He was 
a powerful schoolyard bully with no authorities to admonish him. 
 
Minjung, Part II: The Gwangju Massacre and Beyond 
  Bu-Ma was still fresh in the minds of Koreans, and concurrently, minjung was in 
the midst of an identity crisis. Out of necessity, minjung had to look back to the same 
                                                 
32 Troop reduction began during President Nixon’s “Vietnamization” campaign and was further 
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minjok creeds that Park once used for his benefit, but this time it was to serve the public. 
Protestors were now espousing minjung tenets in support of democratic elections. 
Importantly, these protestors initially came from a diverse constituency derived from 
university students, urban blue-collar laborers, Buddhists, and Christians. They were later 
joined by the elderly, women, and white-collar workers.35 Therefore, it is important to 
examine the first major consequence from Chun’s clash with minjung diversity. 
As with most demonstrations, violence and volatility is a real possibility; minjung 
was no exception. The Gwangju Massacre (also known as the Gwangju Uprising and 
Democratization Movement) began on May 18, 1980 and lasted about nine to ten days. 
University students from around the nation gathered to protest Chun’s December 1979 
coup. As such, once Chun consolidated his power, he enacted martial law. Just as quickly 
as protesters gathered around city halls and university campuses, so did armed 
government forces. This was none more evident than in Chonnam University in Gwangju 
City. 
What began with local authorities trying to disperse campus protestors, escalated 
when authorities started arresting and beating student dissenters. Everything culminated 
when ROK soldiers clubbed a deaf bystander, Kim Gyeon-cheol, to death. News of the 
death quickly spread around the country and mass protest tens of thousands of 
participants erupted as a result. Similarly, Chun ordered more ROK forces to deal with 
the matter. In the end, an estimated – there are no official records as Chun destroyed 
them all – 3,000 casualties befell the small city with at least 150 to 500 students and 40 
government authorities dead.36 
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Minjung started in the most tragic way possible. Blood was shed; de facto 
minjung leader Kim Dae-jung was imprisoned and charged for inciting the crime; 
protestors were immediately incarcerated, tortured, and executed; and Chun’s regime 
continued the deadly antagonism for eight more years. Compared to Park’s minjok-
bushido ethics – known to onlookers as the foundations for South Korea’s prosperity – 
minjung’s democratic nationalism looked like a failed experiment.37 Bluntly put, minjung 
looked like a pathetic counterpart for Park’s Social Darwinist society. 
For the Korean public, however, this was far from a weakness. The ferocity and 
brutality of Chun’s repressive tactics verified one thing, if minjung was weak and a 
failure then the almighty Chun and his upper echelons should not be bothered by it. Kim 
Dae-jung reiterated this as his role as minjung leader. Kim’s main goal was to voice the 
will of the people, and therefore: 
The regime is afraid of any remark I may make . . . the fact that the 
Korean media are prohibited from reporting my name, is clear evidence 
that the government knows the great majority no longer believe its 
fabrication.38 
 
So, in the physical sense, minjung failed miserably; there was no way to match the 
authoritative powers of the armed forces. Nevertheless, this new type of nationalism was 
winning over the hearts and minds of the people, and more importantly, it was winning a 
war for Korea’s spirit and culture. 
Minjung Spirituality 
 While Kim was detained, Chun – just like Park – ordered an execution. However, 
Gwangju’s tragedy propelled Kim and the dissenting public into international 
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prominence, and as a result, Chun instead put Kim under indefinite house arrest. 
Interestingly, one overlooked factor for sentence leniency was Kim’s religion. 
During the 1980s, Christianity was gaining a foothold and it so happened that Kim 
was a Roman Catholic – as with thousands of other dissenters – protesting alongside 
Korean Protestants.39 Kim tied minjung to the new spiritual movements taking over the 
peninsula, in spite of Chun’s efforts to repress them: 
Christianity, as an influential spiritual force, has taken root in Korea and 
has strengthened the democratic movement. Of particular value are the 
Christian beliefs that all people, men and women, have rights and that the 
dignity of all, regardless of wealth or educational status, is sacrosanct.40 
 
This verified that Christian and minjung polemics fit together side-by-side. The 
“universal sacrosanct” that Kim posited was a stark contrast to the bushido Neo-
Confucianism promoted by Park and Chun. The disparity of the ideologies was so bipolar 
and extreme that it was no coincidence global Christian and Catholic organizations, such 
as the World Council of Churches and the Vatican, pressured Western leaders to pay 
attention to the plight of the few.41 
 Minjung Culture 
 While minjung was making waves in the spiritual community, culturally it was 
shifting literature, art, and media away from decades of Park-Chun suppression. This was 
no more evident than in pop culture. Choi Chungmoo posits that minjung’s contribution 
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2000s. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 283; and Donald N. Clark, “Growth and Limitations of 
Minjung Christianity,” 87. 
40 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 232. 
41 Ibid., 233. 
 
146 
 
 
to Korean culture – and therefore her definition – was a “struggle against a capitalistic 
world order,” one that was created by Park and spearheaded by Chun.42 The sufferers, 
accordingly, used pop culture as a form of dissent and to help spread their message far 
and wide. 
 Choi’s thesis is unique because she combines elements from Kang Man’gil thesis 
along with Song Konho, both of whom are prominent minjung historians. Choi posits that 
Korean nationalism in its rawest form – as in Sin and Choe’s original teachings – is all 
about the exploited Korean masses. However, Rhee and Park “twisted and distorted” it to 
fit a Western image. In other words, Korean nationalism became a “distorted bourgeois 
nationalism” that dictators, from Rhee to Park to Chun, used to effectively manipulate 
and exploit their Korean brethren.43 Minjung pop culture was, therefore, a response to 
what Korean nationalism had become. 
 Minjung’s pop culture presence was most tangible in theater form. Minjung artists 
and protestors, such as playwright Kim Chiha, cleverly looked back into Joseon past to 
make a statement against ruling elites. Granted, Joseon history was demonized as weak 
and “parasitic” by Imperial academics and Park.44 Suffice it to say, this art form did not 
sit well with Chun’s mighty dictatorship. 
Now the tables were turned, minjung artists labeled former Park elites, along with 
Chun’s regime, as part of the weak and parasitic yangban class. For example, Kim 
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Chiha’s Ojeok (“The Five Bandits”) play used pansori and malttugi theatrics – these were 
prominent art styles in the Joseon era – in an effort to criticize Park-Chun’s military state, 
the chaebol oligarchy, and corrupt politicians.45 But perhaps the most prominent subject 
matter from minjung art was its anti-Japanese themes. 
It was a known fact that Park was an admirer of Imperial Japanese institutions and 
heavily relied on Japanese aid; in addition, Chun continued a lot of Park’s pro-Nippon 
policies. Minjung anti-Japanese themes, therefore, quickly became popular with the 
masses. Underground artists took the repressed and pent up rage from decades of past 
Imperial atrocities – Park and Chun suppressed these concerns through state-owned 
media – and created themes of “Japanophiles” selling out Koreans for wealth.46 In the 
end, this created a narrative that implied that there was a Japanese elitist culture 
entrenched in the polity and that minjung was the antithesis to this. 
 
                                                 
45 Choi, “The Minjung Culture Movement,” 110. 
46 Choi, 112. Please note that many of the past Imperial atrocities were committed during the 
late 1890s to the end of World of War II. Examples of these crimes include forced sexual slavery, 
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Figure 4.1. Left, ROK special forces heading towards Busan during the Bu-Ma Protests. Right, a 
memorial from Gwangju Memorial Park reenacting students carrying a protestor to safety during the 
Gwangju Uprising. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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* * * 
Before Chun’s reign, various minjung definitions developed that were a result 
from the chaos of the 1979 Bu-Ma Protests. At first, minjung was a disorganized 
movement devoid of a solid meaning. However, the pandemonium from Chun’s 1980 
coup and his deadly actions in Gwangju during the same year tempered minjung. The 
new movement showed signs of solidifying the basis of minjung nationalism. More 
importantly, this was nationalism catered for a newer affluent and more educated 
generation. 
In the end, minjung protests coalesced into one major theme: dissent against an 
entrenched elite who were likened to neo-yangban exploiting the masses. The only way 
for minjung to combat elitism was to use a tool so heavily repressed by elitists: 
democracy. Subsequently, Chapter Six details these collisions and how it played into 
Chun’s demise. More specifically, it examines external variables, such as socioeconomics 
and international pressure, that affected minjung. Lastly, the chronology shifts into more 
contemporary times (1990s-2016) as it examines the legacy minjung had on Park’s 
legacy and what nationalism means in the 2000s and beyond. 
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 Park’s sudden death in 1979 signified one thing, the 1980s was up for grabs for 
anyone willing to flex their bushido strength, and from that power vacuum arose General 
Chun Doo-hwan. As such, the new strongman showed no signs of changing the status 
quo Park meticulously built. However, in the early 1980s and born through the ashes of 
Chun’s chaos, a new type of Korean nationalism – dubbed minjung – arose. This 
ideology was a sharp antithesis to Chun’s regime and Park’s bushido-chaebol society; 
and, while originally weak, minjung would take about a decade to gain the needed power 
to topple bushido nationalism once and for all. 
 
The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part I: Inspiration and Timing 
Many scholars agree that the 1980 Gwangju Massacre (The Gwangju Uprising) 
was the catalyst that began President Chun’s long descent; however, it would take almost 
a decade (1980-1988) before he resigned. This era was known for frequent university and 
urban protests, but the 1987 June Uprising (June Struggle) stands out as the final 
facilitator that marked the end of Chun’s regime.1 The event was so pivotal that it 
resulted in South Korea finally stepping away from decades-long autocracies.2 
George Katsiaficas’s monograph details the last days of Chun’s tenure. 
Katsiaficas begins by emphasizing the size of the June protests compared to its Gwangju 
counterpart. 3 The Gwangju Massacre, although large due to causalities, was 
                                                 
1 George Katsiaficas, Asia's Unknown Uprisings, South Korean Social Movements in the 20th 
Century, Volume 1 (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), PDF e-book, 278. 
2 Autocracy began in 1971 after Park Chung Hee enacted Yushin, thereby effectively ending all 
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decentralized in leadership, and therefore, an accurate estimate of participants is difficult 
to assess.4 However, the leadership in the June Uprising was more concrete and data 
collection was more effective. The total tally within a three-week span, according to 
Historian Kang Man’gil, was close to five million protestors.5 
South Koreans are no strangers to mass protests and the population size was only 
the tip of the iceberg. What made this protest different though, and more conclusive in 
results, was the leadership, organization, and the time of occurrence. The uprising even 
crossed international boundaries as it was strongly influenced by Korea’s Southeast 
Asian neighbors, the Filipinos. The toppling of the Ferdinand Marcos regime (1965-
1986) was a large inspiration for iconic protest leaders, such as Kim Dae-Jung, that it 
aided them in enacting similar revolts.6 
Furthermore, the waning Cold War era gave Koreans an opportune moment to 
cause an international uproar. 7 Anti-autocratic and pro-democratic proponents came from 
both left and right of the political spectrum. These organizations were also spiritually 
diverse and included a coalition of secular and religious unions, and, moreover, 
participants came from all socioeconomic backgrounds. Due to such diverse 
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5 Ibid., 279. 
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elected in 1965. Martial law, suspension of habeus corpus, overborrowing of foreign capital, reckless 
spending on incomplete state projects, and massive funneling of public funds to party allies and families 
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representation, South Korea’s plight finally caught the attention of America and the 
Western World.8 
 
The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part II: The Beginnings 
Decades of Western indifference towards Korean politics culminated when Kim 
Dae-Jung called out the back-and-forth policies of both the Carter and Reagan 
administrations.9 Kim’s wakeup call to South Korea’s allies was in response to numerous 
protestor causalities, many of whom were students and religious pacifists from the 
Buddhist community. But perhaps what caught the full attention of the Reagan 
Administration were the deaths of university students Park Jong-chol and Lee Han-yol.10 
The death of Park Jong-chol (1964-1987) caught the attention of many influential 
news outlets including the New York Times. Jong-chol was one of many dissenters, since 
Park Chung Hee’s tenure, who was imprisoned and tortured to death. However, what 
made his death significant was the carelessness in which Chun operated.11 Chun’s violent 
and carefree attitude with handling dissent caught up with him when security forces could 
not subdue the millions of protestors inquiring about Jong-chol’s fate. 
                                                 
8 Katsiaficas, 283. 
9 Dae-jung Kim, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, “On Korea,” World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 
(Fall 1983): 218. 
10 An issue of the New York Times printed on January 31, 1987, reported that Jong-chol Park was 
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Jong-chol’s death was also a wakeup call to the public. Protestors finally knew of 
the brutal and secretive measures Chun was willing to undergo to silence them. While 
this type of cruelty brought millions into the cities to protest, it also brought many 
different, often clashing, objectives. This fracture was detrimental in achieving pro-
democratic goals, and therefore, after Chun’s brutal suppression, a sense of unity was 
crucial for survival. 
Evangelical Reverend Oh Choong-il (born 1940) knew of this predicament and 
became one of the lead promoters for a unified body. Oh was familiar with the problems 
that disunity – as in protesting without a single concrete goal – caused during the 
Gwangju Massacre; and in turn, the Reverend was quick to act. In May 27, 1987, Oh and 
leading representatives created the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution 
(NCDC or Kukbon).12 This was the primary organization that united leaders from all 
factions into one common cause.13 
Just as swiftly as they were made, Kukbon planned simultaneous national protests, 
mostly occurring in major urban areas, on June 10. Kukbon’s primary goal was to end 
autocracy and enact immediate, legitimate, and universal suffrage. The organization also 
incorporated the “guarantee of the basic rights of workers, farmers, and urban poor” as 
well as the “rectification” of the chaebol economy in order to better serve the people. 
                                                 
12 Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 282. 
13 Katsiaficas notes that the coalition included representatives from “Christians, Buddhists, blue-
collar workers, farmers, urban poor, women, youth, artists, writers, professors, lawyers, families of 
arrested activist groups, politicians, regional movements, Chaeya (antigovernment activists), and 
reunification supporters.” Katsiaficas mentions that many leaders, protestors, and politicians were pro-
American, however, radical anti-American units did make their way into Kukbon. Most of the radicals 
were university students and communist advocates; this resulted in many extreme requests, such as 
severing ties with the Western World. Consequently, in-organization clashes erupted which caused many 
Kukbon leaders to dismiss and drown their pleas. See George Katsiaficas, 283-284 and 301. 
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This ideology was enough to integrate a majority of the Korean public.14 Unfortunately, 
Oh and Kukbon leaders underestimated the volatility that would occur when they left out 
the demands of radical university students. 
 
The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part III: The Death of Lee Han-yol 
State authorities found out the days wherein Kukbon was set to enact mass 
protests plans and quickly moved to stop all participants. In turn, student protestors lost 
patience with Kukbon-methods. On June 2, most university campuses took matters into 
their own hands, and the results were premeditated police clashes. Most notably, Korea 
University student and lead activist Lee In-young was arrested. 
This was an initial blow to the youth movements – a coalition Kukbon fought hard 
to unite – and resulted in enraging most campuses. Police proceeded to universities with 
hopes of quelling protestors by using beatings and tear gas. To the surprise of state 
authorities and Kukbon activists alike, hundreds of thousands of students were willing to 
risk serious injuries, life imprisonment, torture, and death.15 
On June 8, student protests culminated when Yonsei University student Lee Han-
yol was struck on the head with a tear-gas cannister; he ended up in a coma and died 
shortly thereafter. The efforts at which Chun silenced media and domestic travel were 
astounding; nonetheless, news of Lee’s death traveled like wildfire. Not only were urban 
Koreans informed, those in towns and even villages knew of the death.16 It was only a 
matter of time before international audiences took notice. 
                                                 
14 Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 284. 
15 Ibid., 285. 
16 Ibid., 283. 
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The Fall of Chun Doo Hwan, Part IV: The Final Straw 
State officials placed the sole blame on Kukbon. On June 10, and fearing for their 
lives, Kukbon leaders congregated at an Anglican church located in the heart of the Seoul 
protests. If they were going to die, then their deaths had to be heard by the millions 
surrounding them. Soon afterwards, police barricaded and enclosed the leaders in, it 
appeared as if Kukbon’s time was up. Miraculously, local travelers spotted the 
organization’s dire predicament, and just like Lee’s death, the news spread nonstop. 17 
Additionally, on the same day a multitude of protests were to take place, Kukbon, 
students, international observers, and state authorities had no idea what was going to 
happen. 
Open-ended questions arose from everyone involved: Were the protests still 
happening? Was this the final straw that held Korea together? Will the army and the 
millions of protestors engulf the country in flames? More importantly, were Chun and the 
protestors willing to destroy a country Koreans sacrificed so much for? Dubbed “D-Day,” 
and with embassies on high alert, Reverend Oh and Kukbon leaders decided that this was 
Korea’s only chance for real democratic change. Kukbon rang the church’s bell forty-nine 
times signaling to all of Seoul that the plan was on; shortly afterwards, police stormed the 
church and arrested all members.18 
The immediate effects were earth-shattering. State authorities could not contain 
the millions of protestors in Korea’s largest metropolises. White-collar workers, who 
were once on the sidelines, joined the protests. This group – garbed in expensive suits – 
                                                 
17 Katsiaficas, 287. 
18 Katsiaficas notes that forty-nine rings were the signal for death and to start protests with or 
without them. This number is a reference to Korean Buddhist burial rituals where bells would ring forty-
nine times during the closing of the funeral. See George Katsiaficas, 287. 
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fought with as much viciousness as the rest of the crowd. Witnesses even recounted this 
group throwing office supplies, along with Molotov cocktails and flaming toilet paper, at 
authorities. Thus, spectators took notice of this unorthodoxy and aptly dubbed them the 
“the necktie brigade.”19 Finally, everything concluded when Seoul protestors coalesced 
around Myeongdong Cathedral. The once peaceful church was now a symbol of 
ferociousness. 
On June 16, pro-American protestors pleaded to U.S. officials for help but were 
immediately snubbed by the Reagan Administration. Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage said “Frankly, we’re really busy,” referring to America’s simultaneous 
endeavors in Kuwait and the Iran-Contra Affair blowback.20 Consequently, and with the 
attention of the New York Times, burning effigies in the likeness of President Reagan 
erupted in Myeongdong. 
Alongside the effigies, police finally ran out of riot suppressing gear. Protestors 
disarmed depleted authorities, stripped them of their vestments, and released the 
humiliated police force back into the public. The goal of the dissent was not to kill fellow 
Koreans – no matter the affiliation – but to give Chun an ultimatum that the public is 
stronger than any state power.21 In short, anti-Americanism was at an all-time high while 
US interventionism was nowhere to be found. 
Chun took this as a sign for unabashed executive power and planned to divert 
ROK military to aid police. Many things can be said about American inaction, but 
military indecisiveness is not one of them; ROK forces were under strict US orders not to 
                                                 
19 Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 290. 
20 Ibid., 291. 
21 Ibid. 
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engage or leave any posts.22 Chun easily disobeyed and mobilized forces on June 18, and 
with that, the last straw for American officials. On June 20, Secretary of State George P. 
Schultz arrived in Seoul to demand an instant resolution. At the same time, the 
Department of Defense threatened all ROK forces with imprisonment if they usurped US 
orders.23 
The clashes with state officials lasted until June 26 and was dubbed the 
“Showdown.” Once thought of as impossible, the Korean public finally saw Chun in an 
aura of impotency. With the end of American indecisiveness, state authority was finally 
exhausted. As a last-ditch effort, Chun ordered the use of live ammunition; however, 
police officials finally had enough of the chaos. With stations burning around the nation, 
authorities gave up fighting with their Korean brethren. In the end, thousands of security 
personnel joined the protests and called on Chun to step down.24 
On June 29, after a decade of executive abuses, the rule of President Chun was no 
more. Under the extreme pressure of the U.S. and an inevitable coup d’état, Chun 
capitulated to Kukbon demands. The Reagan Administration, shocked by a close ally’s 
strong anti-American sentiment and the destruction that occurred under their watch, 
called for the guidance of leaders, such as Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-sam, to help 
repair the nation.25 
 
 
                                                 
22 Dae-jung Kim, Tanter, and Falk, “On Korea,” 236. 
23 Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings, 294. 
24 Ibid., 297. 
25 Ibid., 298. 
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A Comparative View, Part I: The Four Leaders 
General Park Chung Hee “inherited” a country that was in calamity economically, 
politically, and socially.26 But before Park’s legacy can be analyzed it is important to 
analyze how his tenure and the circumstances surrounding it compares to other dictatorial 
leaders. Correspondingly, many academics address three other Asian leaders in the same 
limelight as Park. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) of Turkey, Lee Kuan Yew (1923-
2015) of Singapore, and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) were all autocratic leaders who, just like Park, ruled during times of extreme 
crises. Ezra F. Vogel, therefore, compares Park’s career and legacy with these three 
counterparts.27 
 Vogel describes the history behind each leader’s inherited crisis beginning with 
Ataturk. Ataturk was notable for taking the reins of a beaten down post-Ottoman Empire 
Turkey (1922) and propelling it into modernization. Ataturk accomplished this by 
adopting institutions from the Great Western Powers – the very same powers that 
defeated the once-powerful Ottomans. 
On the Malaysian Peninsula, Lee Kuan Yew took the helm of an ethnically tense 
former colonial nation.28 Before the birth of the Republic of Singapore (1965), Malaysian 
Singapore (1963-1965) was a desolate city-state devoid of any functioning logistics, 
                                                 
26 Ezra F. Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping, 
and Park Chung Hee,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-
Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 513. 
27 Ezra F. Vogel is a Professor Emeritus of the Social Sciences at Harvard University. 
28 Initially, Singapore was a maritime dock in the Johor Sultanate (1528-1819). From 1819-
1963, Singapore was under British colonial control. However, in 1942-1945 Imperial Japan briefly 
occupied the harbor city. In 1963, Britain granted the Federation of Malaya (1948-1963) complete 
administration over the city. In 1964, a race riot occurred in Singapore, then part of the Federation of 
Malaysia. The riot was caused by socioeconomic and religious hostilities between ethnic Chinese, 
Malaysians, and Indonesians. Consequently, the Malayan legislature voted Singapore out. See Ezra F. 
Vogel, 516, 524-526, and 529. 
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security, economy, and infrastructure. Just like Park, Lee turned that around in a lifetime, 
and as a result, became one of the most highly developed (HDI) nations in the world. 
Likewise, in 1978, Deng Xiaoping took a “failed state” – one that was devastated 
by the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) – and 
enacted economic liberalizations that resulted in state-guided capitalism. This is also 
famously known as Deng’s version of “socialism (or capitalism) with Chinese 
attributes.”29 Taking cues from Park’s chaebol project, this economic system projected 
the PRC into a global powerhouse. 
Although these four leaders had some socioeconomic similarities, in the political 
realm, all had mirror-like governance. Each leader had long uninterrupted tenures where 
democracy was secondary to economic and industrial reforms. Plausibly, this means that 
each leader preferred autocratic governance to quickly consolidate power, pass 
uninterrupted legislation, and to entrench their respective nations with single goals. 
More importantly, the greatest binding variable was a deep history of suffering 
endured through imperialism and Western interference.30 Nevertheless, while all four 
leaders denounced foreign influences and colonization, they were perceptive enough to 
predict that the modern world was one dominated by Western institutions – and 
additionally, in Park’s case, Japanese institutions.31 
 
                                                 
29 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York: Basic 
Books, 2015), Kindle Edition, 333. 
30 Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 515. 
31 Vogel’s explains that robust Western institutions originated from imperialism; meaning, these 
institutions were created through a long, arduous, and brutal exploitation of weaker countries. Since 
Western and Japanese powers went through these phases, it was in each leader’s best interest to copy 
them, through technology, industry, and economy, instead of playing catch-up. All four leaders had no 
economic and business experience; however, they were keen to hire technocrats – many of them 
foreigners – to assist and directly lead them into rapid modernization. See Ezra F. Vogel, 515. 
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A Comparative View, Part II: Background and Careers 
 Historical experiences are a crucial factor in shaping a leader’s motifs, and one 
factor that affects governance is conflict. Park, Ataturk, Deng, and Lee lived through 
their fair share of political and social skirmishes. Except for Lee, all leaders had some 
form of military background. 
Ataturk and Park were both officers who had prestigious military educations.32 In 
1905, Ataturk graduated from the Ottoman Military Staff College in Constantinople. In 
1942, Park graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan 
Gakko) in Tokyo.33 In addition to military higher education, both men fought in wartime 
environments. Ataturk saw frequent combat in wars leading to World War I and the 
Turkish Independence War. Park fought under the Japanese banner suppressing guerilla 
activities near the Korean border. Most notably, however, both men were well-versed 
with governing styles used by Imperialists and the Great Powers. 
Deng had no formal military education; however, he was initially trained in 
guerilla tactics by Soviet advisors (late 1920s) and in 1934 by Mao Zedong and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).34 Most remarkably, Deng survived Mao’s infamous 
                                                 
32 Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 522. 
33 Shortly after attaining higher educations, Ataturk fought in numerous early-twentieth century 
warfare. Most notable are the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), and the 
World War I Middle Eastern Theater (1914-1918). Ataturk rose into prominence as he led independence 
movements that resulted in the Turkish Independence War (1911-1922). Accordingly, he also become 
one of the main founders of the Republic of Turkey. As for Park, he briefly fought in the Imperial 
Manchukuo campaigns, from 1944 to 1946, against Chinese and Korean saboteurs. Afterwards, Park 
returned to Korea in 1946 to attend Korea Military Academy (Hwarangdae) in Seoul. During the Korean 
War (1950-1953), Park started as an officer and swiftly rose ranks to brigadier general. See Ezra F. 
Vogel, 515, 518, and 522.  
34 Deng, alongside Mao and early CCP officials, endured the Long March (1934-1936) against 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Nationalists (KMT). The Long March was the closest the KMT got to 
exterminating the CCP. The CCP evaded Chiang’s forces by retreating to the outskirts of Northern China. 
During World War II, the CCP and KMT temporarily joined forces to fight Imperial Japan (1937-1945). 
After the war, the second phase of the Chinese Civil War escalated (1945-1949) where Deng was Red 
 
161 
 
 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and in-party purges. Due to the extremities of the Mao 
Era, Deng knew first-hand that not adapting to a rapidly changing world and shunning 
foreign innovation was detrimental to Chinese development.35 
Lee Kuan Yew, the most scholarly of the other three, had no military training or 
combatant experience. Instead, Lee studied law and politics in world-renowned 
universities including Cambridge.36 He was well-versed in British common law and was 
adept at stirring effective dissent through legal and civil means. Lee was also no stranger 
to violent sociopolitical conflicts; he survived numerous riots from all sides of the 
political spheres.37 Similar to all three, Lee was thrust into an executive position during a 
time of extreme vulnerability. 
                                                 
Army vice-chairman and propaganda chief. He was noted for playing a large role in securing peasantry 
support towards communist causes. In turn, the KMT lost Chinese public backing and were routed to 
Taiwan in 1949. See Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York: 
Basic Books, 2015), 254-255; and Patricia Buckley Ebrey, History of China, 263 and 287-289. 
35 China during the Mao Era (1950s-1976) was a “failed state.” During the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1962), Chinese industry focused solely on making steel through questionable methods. A large 
portion of the agrarian population was diverted to small community-ran steel mills, and consequently, 
grain and consumable industry was diverted. Also known as “collectivization,” this was the main 
variable for the Great Chinese Famine (1959-1961) and resulted in the deaths of 15 to 30 million people. 
Mao lost prestige and party-power after this catastrophe while Deng started to rise ranks bolstered by his 
radical reforms. Such reforms included commerce and economic decentralization and emergency foreign 
aid assistance. Mao’s influence among the polity faded but his support with the youth was high, thereby 
resulting in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The movement was known for the creation of the Red 
Guards, consisted mostly of high school and university students, many of whom purged and killed Mao’s 
dissidents; this included top military and political officials. Deng was one of many Party elites who were 
purged; however, his public persona was strong enough to avoid death, instead he was put under house 
arrest. See Westad, 333-341 and 353-361; and Ebrey, 308-310 and 314-319. 
36 Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 523. 
37 The first riot Lee experienced was the May 1954 Riots caused by the British enactment of 
colonial conscription laws. Lee and other intellectuals created the People’s Action Party (PAP) as a 
response. Initially, the party aligned itself with Marxist independence ideologies but gradually shifted 
away as Lee promoted the use of Western institutions – mainly commerce and trade – for development. 
Singapore’s vulnerability came when Malaysian Prime Minster Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903-1990), 
expelled them in 1965. Consequently, Singapore’s initial years were mired by the activities of extremist 
factions. Threats from in-party communists, Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic radicals, and anarchists 
were numerous. In addition, the lack of material resources – ranging from food, potable water, and 
commodities – and human capital, such as skilled and educated workers, threatened to topple the infant 
city-state. See Ezra F. Vogel in The Park Chung Hee Era, 516, 524-526, and 529. 
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Vogel thoroughly details all four leaders’ backgrounds, however, his main 
emphasis, and therefore conclusion, is comparing their strikingly volatile nationalist 
origins.38 Each leader’s respective nation was in their infancy before they were thrust into 
prominence. In summary, Park’s Korea was born through a military coup based on the 
rejection of ineffective leadership; Deng’s China was born through the turmoil of the 
Mao Era; Ataturk’s Turkey was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire; and finally, 
Lee’s Singapore was born through Malaysian eviction. 
 
A Comparative View, Part III: Distinguishing Park’s Korea 
 Vogel assesses that the initial leadership of Park differed greatly from the others. 
One aspect Park did not have in common was that he was neither elected nor was he ever 
known for his deep-seated patriotism. Starting with Ataturk, he was a hero of the Turkish 
Independence War, and likewise, was the head of the dominant independence-nationalist 
party, the Republican People’s Party. In turn, he had major backing from both party 
officials and the public which resulted in his swift 1938 election as the first president of 
the Republic of Turkey.39 
 Lee was a major figure of the People’s Action Party during and after Singapore’s 
brief stint in the Malaya Federation (1963-1965). Similar to Ataturk, Lee had the backing 
of his party and became the party’s prime minister in 1959. His leadership was also 
extended and solidified shortly after Malaysian expulsion in 1965. Lee stands out as 
being the only executive to see the full extent of his nation’s progress as he lived well 
into the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
38 Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 534. 
39 Ibid., 523. 
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Deng, however, did not go through initial democratic-like elections. Instead, Deng 
was a prominent figure in the CCP with a long and storied history of survival alongside 
Mao. In 1978, Deng was released from confinement and repeated another quick rise 
within CCP ranks. During his ascension, he cleverly, and clandestinely, consolidated 
party power under his faction. Concurrently, Deng managed to oust major figures with 
close ties to Mao’s disastrous socioeconomic policies.40 After the power struggle, Deng 
promptly replaced Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, in 1982, thereby becoming the CCP’s 
premier leader.41 
 Vogel grounds his analysis on the term “legitimacy.” Essentially, Ataturk, Lee, 
and Deng were “legit” among their respective constituencies. Whether it be through 
elections or party support, the three leaders systematically used the political system to 
climb their way into leadership. Park, on the other end, inverted their methodologies. 
Instead, Park took control of Korea through force, a force that was eerily similar to many 
strongmen of that era.42 
                                                 
40 “Gang of Four” was Deng’s most dangerous opposition. The Gang was a political faction 
composed of former elite-CCP officials, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, and Mao’s 
widow – Jiang Qing. They were created during the Cultural Revolution with Jiang Qing leading the 
faction. After consolidating enormous power using the Red Guards – the Guards systematically purged 
the Gang’s in-party opposition – Mao unexpectedly died in 1976. The Gang saw this as an opportunity to 
seize the government. However, a power struggle between Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng (1921-2008), 
resulted in Hua and a Deng-led CCP arresting them. In 1981, all four were convicted of usurping power 
during the Revolution, along with the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of innocents. This resulted in 
lifetime imprisonment for all members. See Westad, 294-296; and Ebrey, 333-334. 
41 Mao had a tenuous relationship with Hua. Mao was quoted saying that Hua’s only attractive 
quality was his “oafish loyalty.” While Hua was initially praised for his quick expulsion of hardliners, 
such as the Gang of Four, CCP elites became distressed over Hua’s lack of developmental planning. 
Fearing a return to revolutionary days, party and military officials quickly disposed of Hua through 
nonviolent means. See Westad, 371-372. 
42 Other comparable prominent strongmen are Chile’s Augusto Pinochet (coup enacted in 1973) 
and Mexico’s Porfirio Diaz to Cardenas Calles (1910-1936). See The Park Chung Hee Era, 582. 
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 Furthermore, Vogel labels Park’s rise to power and his legacy as the “most 
controversial” out of the three.43 The forceful takeover of the government only scratches 
the surface of controversy. During a time of intense Korean-Japanese animosity, Park’s 
career and upbringing left a disdain for him in modern Korean historiography.44 Park’s 
“Japanophile” background is substantiated through his Imperial tenure as an officer and 
pro-Nippon reform policies. Furthermore, Park’s relegation of Imperial World War II 
atrocities in favor of economic policies bestows him a mixed legacy, one of grand 
adoration or bitter scorn with little-to-no middle ground.45  
  
                                                 
43 Vogel, “Nation Rebuilders,” 541. 
44 Ibid., 538. 
45 Imperial Japanese atrocities included sexual slavery (also known as the “comfort women 
issue”), human experimentation, and forced relocation into Manchurian concentration camps. 
Additionally, the recollection of Meiji-era infractions, such as the assassination of Empress 
Myeongseong (1851-1895) and maritime (Dokdo) border disputes, also strained contemporary Korean-
Japanese relations. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 308 and 349. 
Figure 5.1. From left to right, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1919, Deng Xiaoping in 1979, and Lee Kuan Yew in 
2002. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Park’s Economic Legacy, Part I 
 Park Chung Hee’s achievements are a contentious theme for modern Korean 
scholars. The debate about Park’s over-excessive use and abuse of executive power and 
whether it was worth the result – a highly developed South Korea – is an eternally 
debated topic. The keyword among academics, however, is the word “excess,” and 
therefore, Professor Kang Myung-koo and Economist Chang Se-jin analyze and 
breakdown this term through the perspective of the average South Korean.46 
Kang’s research involves Park’s economic system and the larger picture of what it 
all meant. To put it in his own words, Kang’s thesis explores, “how a developmentalist 
mentalité formed in the family system, during the Park Era” and “how this is related to 
the formation of individual and collective identities.”47 On the other end, Chang’s 
research is a quantitative supplement to Kang’s analysis and involves the dissection of 
industrial growth and the effects it had on the standard of living. 
Noting the importance of Parks Five-Year Plans (1962-1986), Kang splits up 
Korean economic growth into five-year intervals. He quantifies the total GNP averages 
for each period and concludes that total GNP growth amplified at 200-fold. Numerically, 
GNP grew from $2.3 billion in 1962 to $458 billion in 1995. While total tally is 
important, Kang emphasizes that per capita growth is more significant due to the wealth 
achieved by the average household. Per capita GNP sat at $87 and exploded to $10,076 
                                                 
46 Myung-koo Kang is a Professor of Political Science in City University of New York (CUNY). 
47 Myung-koo Kang, “Compressed Modernization and the Formation of a Developmentalist 
Mentalité,” in Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought, 
Democracy, & Cultural Influence, ed., Clark W. Sorensen and Hyung-A Kim (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 167. 
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over the same period. On average, growth achieved an annual rate of 8.38 percent within 
three decades.48 
Kang uses plenty of line graphs to visually represent an upward trajectory of this 
data. This skyward trend symbolizes the instantaneous wealth achieved by the average 
household. Kang accentuates that this growth was never seen in modern economic 
history. While Korea’s East Asian neighbors – Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore – achieved 
similar spurts, the magnitude of GNP progress and the rapid alleviation of decades-long 
poverty was unheard of at the time.49 
Kang’s research, moreover, breaks this affluent trend into two tiers. The first 
category explains the “collective identities” of Korea’s business mindset; and the second 
analyzes those same identities in a familial and individual setting. In other words, it 
explores the sudden prosperity that affected Korea’s cultural, fiscal, and national psyche. 
Additionally, Graphs 5.1 to 5.3 are presented to better situate Kang and Chang’s data.50 
                                                 
48 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 168. 
49 Ibid., 172. 
50 Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and 
Fall of Chaebols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), PDF e-book, 310. 
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Graph 5.1. The graph plots yearly growth from 1963-97. Please note the dotted lines are estimated figures taken from 
the Bank of Korea (BOK) while the rest are taken from the World Bank. Source: Se Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 309-
310; the World Bank archives; and the Bank of Korea archives. 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
A
N
N
U
A
L 
%
 G
R
O
W
TH
YEARS
Annual GDP % Growth from 1963 to 1997
Disclaimer: The graphs shown are replicated by the author to depict a summarized view of Kang’s data. Please note 
that Kang uses official World Bank data; however, data only goes back to 1968. Data from 1961 to 1967 were not 
officially recorded but the Bank of Korea (BOK) recently provided rough estimates. All data was combined to show 
a larger and more complete representation. 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
A
N
N
U
A
L 
%
 G
R
O
W
TH
YEARS
Bar Graph: Annual GDP % Growth and 5-Year Plan Averages
Year-by-year Growth Average 5-year (Five-year plan) Growth
Graph 5.2. The same data was used from Graph 5.1 but in a bar graph form; in addition, Five-year Plan averages are 
visualized alongside “Year-by-year” data. Please note that the serrated bars from 1963-67 are estimated data taken 
from the BOK while the rest are from the World Bank. Se Jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 309-310; the World Bank 
archives; and the Bank of Korea archives. 
168 
 
 
  
G
rap
h
 5
.3
. S
h
o
w
n
 is a p
er cap
ita G
N
P
 lin
e g
rap
h
. P
lease n
o
te th
at d
ata fro
m
 1
9
6
0
 to
 1
9
9
7
 w
as o
fficially
 reco
rd
ed
 b
y
 th
e W
o
rld
 B
an
k
, w
h
ereas G
rap
h
s 5
.1
 an
d
 5
.2
 
u
se B
O
K
 d
ata fro
m
 1
9
6
3
 to
 1
9
6
7
. S
e Jin
 C
h
an
g
, F
in
a
n
cia
l C
risis, 3
0
9
-3
1
0
; th
e W
o
rld
 B
an
k
 arch
iv
es; an
d
 th
e B
an
k
 o
f K
o
rea arch
iv
es. 
 
169 
 
 
Park’s Economic Legacy, Part II – Park’s Chaebol Legacy 
 Instantaneous growth plays a huge role on legacies and nationalist trends. On the 
surface, Park’s heavy support for chaebol policies are credited for the boom that ushered 
South Korean prosperity. However, deep within that system lies a hidden enterprise, one 
that helped chaebol succeed worldwide. Kang surmises that the “state-mobilized 
developmental model” – the core of the chaebol system – was a fervent bid to flood the 
markets domestically, and more importantly, globally, with “quantity rather than quality” 
made products.51 
The “quantity-over-quality” model emphasized sheer volume of sales rather than 
long term appreciation. Getting Korean-made products into international households was 
more important than gaining prestige in the market place. This is further corroborated by 
Chang’s research in The Rise and Fall of Chaebols. According to both Chang and Kang, 
South Korea’s full entrance into the market, around the 1970s, occurred during an era 
when Japanese and German products dominated global trade.52 
In a bid to emulate these exporting powerhouses, chaebol companies fervently 
followed them into the same saturated industries. Specifically, rising prices for Japanese-
German automobiles, electronics, and appliances left cash-strapped consumers priced out 
of the market. Accordingly, chaebol found these gaps as an opportunity; and 
consequently, a new business model was quickly adapted and implemented. However, 
those ambitions were not without its shortcomings.53 
                                                 
51 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 168. 
52 Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 34. 
53 Chang and Kang note that chaebol ventures emphasized trade diversity in a bid to see which 
endeavors could survive or fail. Along with well-known automotive (Hyundai and Kia) and electronic-
appliance (Samsung and LG) industries, chaebol undertook lesser-known fields such as semiconductors 
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Korean industries were still in their infancy upon entrance, and likewise, 
inexperience is detrimental to the quality and integrity of a product.54 Initially, rapid 
adoption of Korean goods in North American markets was a positive sign that the new 
chaebol scheme worked. The cheap price-tag and abundancy of diverse products 
challenged foreign competitor rates. This came at a cost, however, as many consumer 
complaints arose – criticisms about product lifespan and defectiveness were common. 
Multinational business watchdogs, such as the Better Business Bureau, sharply criticized 
the integrity, in labor and quality, that chaebol promoted. In turn, analysts were quick to 
label the flooding of the market akin to an inverse “pump-and-dump” scheme.55 
 Due to these “pump-and-dump” tactics, Korean products were known to be of 
cheap and subpar quality when compared to Japanese and German products. Nonetheless, 
Chang accentuates that chaebol motives were to frantically gain a foothold in global 
markets no matter the ramifications.56 Additionally, an unintended side-effect also 
occurred, one that chaebol CEO’s could not have predicted. 
                                                 
(SK Hynix) and steel production (POSCO). Chang also mentions that Taiwanese and Singaporean 
companies concurrently competed with similar industries, mainly in semiconductors and transistor chips. 
This led to even more diversification as chaebol entered more specialized and less saturated fields. Such 
industries include organic chemicals (Hanwha Chemicals), tire production (Hankook Tires), and offshore 
rigging (STX Offshore and Shipbuilding). See Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 85-88 and 114-116. 
54 Yu C. Huang and Yao J. Cheng, “Stock Manipulation and Its Effects: Pump and Dump versus 
Stabilization,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 44, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 792. 
55 According to Chinese economists Yu Huang and Yao Cheng, a “pump-and-dump” is an illegal 
equity scheme where a company artificially raises their stock price in a bid to entice unbeknownst 
outside investors. The sudden initial rise triggers mass buying, and the result is an exorbitant price tag 
enacted through the illusion of hot-buying trends. Once the stock price is high enough, company insiders 
then “dump,” or sell-off, all their positions, thereby securing profits and flooding the market with now-
worthless equities. In the chaebol case, instead of artificially raising product prices, chaebol flooded the 
market to drastically depreciate prices. Thereby, “pumping” means filling the market with an 
overabundance of cheap goods until overall prices lower. However, “dumping” – or leaving the market 
after profits – does not occur, instead Korean companies doubled down on exports. This caused many 
international and domestic competitors to shut down due to the futility in competing with such low 
prices. See Yu C. Huang and Yao J. Cheng, “Stock Manipulation,” 795-797. 
56 Chang, Financial Crisis, 84. 
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Chaebol mass exporting strategies undoubtedly succeeded in bolstering their 
presence around the world, but there was an ironic and unintended twist – mediocre 
product quality inadvertently strengthened the image of other competitors’ products.57 
While more expensive, consumer confidence towards non-Korean products – particularly 
Japanese – rose as they felt their price-to-quality ratio was substantially better than 
chaebol quality. Essentially, early chaebol undercutting schemes accidentally labeled 
Japanese merchandise as a “better bang for the buck.”58 
Nevertheless, chaebol tactics were heavily used during the latter half of Park’s 
tenure (1975-1979) and well until the end of President Chun’s regime (1980-1988). 
Perhaps the greatest consequence of these heavy-handed practices was the influence it 
garnered in future exporting methods. The effects that chaebol had on a newly market-
liberalized China was enormous.59 Similarly, China took this design and amplified it on a 
mammoth scale – one that affects markets today.60 
 
Park’s Economic Legacy, Part II – The Chaebol’s Effects on the Average Korean 
 Chaebol legacy was for the most part innovative as a developing model. 
However, many overlooked the impact it had on the Korean psyche. Kang analyzes these 
effects in what he coins as “developmentalist mentalité.” He defines this term as “a state 
                                                 
57 Chang, 84. 
58 Ibid., 86. 
59 Chang mentions Chinese business practices being similar to Korean, Taiwanese, and 
Singaporean models. State-owned (state-guided) companies, like chaebol, were entities that enacted 
these exporting tactics. These companies initially used cheap labor, well below market value, to flood the 
market. Additionally, the Chinese combined long-term, low-floating currencies to help depress labor 
prices, and thereby enticed foreign companies to use them as a cheap manufacturing base. Oversight 
committees, such as the World Trade Organization, accuse China of purposely keeping currency low and 
blocking labor (capital) inflation in order to undercut world markets. See Se-jin Chang, 47 and 76-77. 
60 Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 261. 
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of mind, behavioral style, and a structure of feeling that infatuates most South 
Koreans.”61 Kang designates this term as all-encompassing, pertaining to business, 
political, familial, and individual ethics. 
 Business and political psyches are evident through the term “infatuation.” 
“Infatuation” in this case means an obsession on “administrative efficiencies” – in both 
companies and the polity – that bolsters “rapid economic development.” Simply put, 
wealth accumulation was, and still is, the name of the game; meanwhile administering 
growth initiatives is the only goal of bureaucracy.62 
Development is also linked to Korea’s Confucian roots that consequently merged 
politics, chaebol, and individual ranks as inseparable entities.63 Kang postulates that this 
relationship created a “vertical loyalty” mobilization.64 Contextually, this meant that 
companies that performed well were rewarded with more state funds and contract 
prioritization. This is very similar to a kind of “Confucian favoritism.”65 
 All players in the system were affected by this “favoritism,” however the average 
Korean worker and consumer felt the shocks more deeply than the ruling elites. Kang 
suggests that the “individual identities” of this group were modeled after the business-
polity psyche. Paraphrasing sociologist Yim Huisop (Im Hee-seop), Kang sums up the 
newly inherited psyche as “South Koreans having a strong class consciousness because 
                                                 
61 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 167. 
62 Ibid., 176. 
63 Seung-Mi Han, “The New Community Movement: Park Chung Hee and the Making of State 
Populism,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 80. 
64 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 176. 
65 Since Confucianism is patriarchal, this scenario would be similar to a father (Park, Chun, and 
the polity) favoring exceptional children (chaebol that performed financially well and exceeded export 
quotas) by rewarding them with praise and gifts (state funds, long term labor contracts, and 
deregulation). 
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they understand and organize human relations and social ethics in order of rank.”66 In 
other words, the bureaucratic chaebol culture dispersed onto the citizenry’s professional 
and societal ranks; “Confucian favoritism” and the public were indivisible. Suitably, this 
begs an analysis on how the average citizen can climb the new Confucian socioeconomic 
ladder.67 
 Kang identifies materialism and consumerism as the tools of achievement.68 The 
new consumerist culture was a byproduct of the frantic production quotas levied onto the 
export economy. This new culture mirrored the worldviews of Korea’s Western allies, 
specifically American consumerism. Not only was Korea producing en masse for 
international markets, but domestically, never-before-seen surpluses of food, electronics, 
automobiles, and fashion were readily available to the public. Once foreign to Korean 
society, supermarkets, department stores, shopping malls, and tourist hotels sprouted all 
over the nation.69 
                                                 
66 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 180. 
67 To give a historical comparison, since the introduction of the market economy, modernization, 
and chaebol reforms Korean lifestyle underwent a momentous transformation. Drawing comparisons to 
Japan’s post-World War II construction, Andrew Gordon mentions danchi, or public housing initiatives, 
enacted shortly after the war. See Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 257. Similarly, the days 
of living among immediate, extended, and in-law families within a communal village-town (hanok maeul 
and min sok chon) and under a thatched-roof house were a distant memory. Park’s many Five-Year Plans 
(1962-1976) incentivized rapid urban migration through the creation of public housing policies. See 
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 444. In 1962, Park created the Korea National Housing Corporation 
(Hanguk toji jutaeg gongsa), better known as KNHC or LH. See Hye-hoon Lee and ROK National 
Assembly, Korea Land & Housing Act. Since many rural workers flocked to urban areas in hope of 
securing lucrative industrial jobs, the KNHC was responsible – through the mass construction of 
apartment towns – for finding affordable and government-subsidized housing. Interestingly, this new 
trend had no Korean language origin, so new “Konglish” – a portmanteau of Korean and English – 
words were created. Terms such as apateu (apartments) and opiseutel (office-studio rooms) coined these 
trends and are now real estate vernacular. 
68 Shortly after Park’s death (1979), a change in demographics was evident. The 1980 Census 
Bureau recorded a prevalence of a large middle and upper-class populations; affluency was now 
commonplace. See Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis, 310. 
69 Myung-Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 181. 
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 Analogous to winning the lottery, an over-excess of spending was commonplace. 
This new arrangement was in part a variable that propelled the market economy to new 
heights. The biggest consequence, however, was that it also instilled an “excessive, 
rugged individualism.”70 Yim Huisop suggests that this mentality took over the “self-
reliant” and “strong self-defensive” lifestyle of the olden days.71 Kang concludes that this 
individualist mindset was the core of the “developmentalist mentalité,” and for better or 
worse, resulted in the hypercompetitive “achievement-centered behaviors” that are 
prevalent today.72 
 
The New Korean Generation, Part I: Chaebol Reforms 
 Chaebol reforms were one of the most defining features of the 1980s to 2000s; 
this era was synonymous with “Korean market liberalization.” According to Economist 
Chang Se-jin, chaebol liberalization in Korean economic terms meant the full 
privatization of state-guided conglomerates.73 Liberalization slowly began under 
President Chun’s far-right political party, Minju jeonguidang (DJP); revised during Roh 
Tae-woo’s non-affiliated independent party (term: 1988-1993); and then further 
                                                 
70 Myung-koo Kang, 181. 
71 Yim posits that during the chaos of the Imperial and Korean War eras (1910-1953) a 
communal attitude of self-defense and reliance defined the Korean psyche. Due to the constant threat of 
death and enslavement, Koreans had no choice but to band together in order to survive. However, as 
affluency was achieved, that conviction slowly gave way to a materialistic individual mindset. See 
Myung-koo Kang, 180. 
72 “Hypercompetitive” in this sense is all encompassing. It refers to modern South Korean over-
competition in the job market, higher education, student endeavors, business ranks, and owning the latest 
market trends. Moreover, this extends to “national competition,” or competing with Asian counterparts 
on global education, healthcare, standards of living, and ease-of-doing business ranks. 
73 Chang, Financial Crisis, 58. 
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accelerated under Kim Dae-jung (term: 1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun’s (term: 2003-
2008) center-left Minju dang (commonly known in English as “Minjoo”).74 
 Before liberalization, Chang paraphrased the booming economy as “Korea being 
a victim of their own success.” Initially, the DJP’s platform heavily supported Park-
inspired chaebol economics. However, Korea’s swift GNP rise, along with large looming 
international loans, created a severe inflationary problem. This discrepancy led America, 
one of Korea’s largest creditors, to take notice and instigated that chaebol success came 
at the expense of US manufacturing. After Park’s nuclear program fiasco, Chun and the 
DJP were quick to appease American officials.75 The pressure amidst a threatened trade 
war and forced loan repayments resulted in the easing of two-decades worth of 
protectionist policies.76 
Since state, labor, and chaebol were highly dependent on another – arguably one 
entity – any changes on a macro level severely affected the micro level, and vice versa. 
Coupled with easing foreign trade policies and more aggressive militant-like protests, 
labor unions experienced renewed vigor. After the success of the 1987 democracy 
                                                 
74 From the 1980s to 2010s Korean political parties often changed and merged with one another. 
The start of a major conservative party began in 1963 when Park Chung-hee created Minju 
gonghwadang (Democratic Republican Party, or DRP). But, when Chun took office in 1980 he dissolved 
DRP and merged prominent DRP technocrats into his own party, the Democrat Justice Party (DJP). Roh 
Tae-woo was originally in the DJP but after the 1987 presidential elections Roh opted to be an 
independent president. However, DJP merged with other prominent pro-business factions. They later 
called themselves Jayuhan gukdang (Liberty Korea Party, or LKP). LKP then changed their name to the 
more current and commonly known Saenuri, or Grand National Party. See Jinwung Kim, A History of 
Korea, 435, 469-479, 485, and 521-538. 
75 Chang, Financial Crisis, 57. 
76 Chang also notes that “liberalization” and anti-protectionist policies meant that the state could 
not fund chaebol and make direct business decisions anymore. The result was many chaebol “going 
public” by opening shares in the Korean stock exchange (KOSPI and KOSDAQ). Chang’s monograph 
defines macroeconomics as the changes – through legislation or external factors – affecting the polity 
and nation. Microeconomics mean changes that affect the individual, local business, and chaebol. See 
Se-jin Chang, 169, 189, and 236. 
 
176 
 
 
movements, the newly-elected Roh Tae-woo ran on a platform that gave into union-labor 
demands that resulted in instantaneous conglomerate regulations.77 The immediate rise of 
factory and service wages was an initial success for left-wing movements and was partly 
a factor that eased public tension after the 1987 June Uprising. 
The consequence of higher wages, both in blue and white-collar sectors, 
correlated to higher priced end-products. The end of the 1980s and the early 1990s saw 
Park’s cheap export schemes implode from within; and just as rapidly as it was enacted in 
the 1960s, two decades later saw the sudden collapse of the model. Lackluster chaebol 
products lost their low-priced competitive edge. They now faced top-tier foreign products 
competing on the same price platform. Nonetheless, chaebol’s “cheap exporting 
innovations” lived on as the forthcoming Chinese economic boom easily took over the 
vacuum left behind.78 
 
The New Korean Generation, Part II: A New Economic Shift 
 Historian Jinwung Kim, Sociologists John Lie, and Park Myoung-kyu analyze the 
contemporary Korean generation.79 Even though their research was written in the mid-
                                                 
77 Chang, Financial Crisis, 62. 
78 Chang and Jinwung Kim detail the political consequences of high labor costs. Chinese mass 
exports and higher Korean wages amplified the effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The result was 
devastating for Korean employment. An abnormally high unemployment rate and a slow recovery 
plagued the end of the 1990s. This partly contributed to the rise of a new right wing, pro-business (pro-
chaebol) party, Saenuri. Much of Saenuri legislation focused on abolishing Minjoo-implemented 
chaebol reforms. The results were deregulated hiring standards, especially with wages and overtime. 
This meant that chaebol were now empowered again to hire a new generation of laborers for lower 
capital. Saenuri prominence peaked in the late-2000s when former chaebol (Hyundai Construction) CEO 
Lee Myung-bak (term: 2008-2013) was elected president. Furthermore, Saenuri gained international 
fame among Asia when Park Chung-hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye (term: 2013-2017), won the 2012 
presidential election. See Se-jin Chang, 101 and 190; and Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 522-524, 
527, and 528. 
79 John Lie is a professor of sociology at University of California, Berkeley. Myoung-kyu Park 
is a professor of sociology at Seoul National University. 
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2000s, much of it still holds up. 80 Kim’s last chapter in his monograph expands on the 
achievements and challenges that both Korean states are still undergoing with Lie and 
Park concurring on a similar basis.81 Lie and Park, however, emphasize more on the 
effects that post-Cold War culture and the 1997 Asian Crisis had on today’s South 
Korean youths. 
Lie and Park use the consequences from Dr. Hwang Woo Suk’s work as an 
introduction.82 Even though Dr. Hwang’s work was a scandal – dubbed by Western 
media as “The Dr. Hwang Scandal” – the authors posit that this was still a major event as 
it signaled Korea’s instantaneous entrance into biotechnology research. This exhibited 
that within three decades a country that once relied on horses for plowing and oil lamps 
for lighting now had the resources to try and compete for groundbreaking future 
innovation. They further suggest that the entry into the Tech Age, while mired by a 
scandal, cemented Korea’s place as an “emerging soft power.”83 
These achievements set the context of Lie and Park’s thesis. The authors 
accentuate that Korea’s entrance into advanced technology research – not only in biotech 
but also in telecommunications, medical technology, and robotics – and the export of 
                                                 
80 John Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005: Economic Dynamism, Generational 
Conflict, and Social Transformations,” Asian Survey 46, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 56. 
81 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From “Land of the Morning Calm” to States in Conflict 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 519. 
82 Dr. Hwang was a biotechnology and veterinarian researcher for Seoul National University 
(SNU). Hwang and his research lab shot into prominence in 2004 when his team claimed that they 
successfully cloned human embryonic stem cells. Hwang became an overnight celebrity and was praised 
by Korean media as the “Pride of Korea.” However, in 2005 the academic journal Nature, investigated 
his claims and found out the contrary. Nature accused Hwang of ethically violating research laws – 
Hwang stole and obtained embryonic eggs from the black market – while creating fraudulent data. 
Hwang initially denied the allegations, but further government investigations proved Nature right. 
Hwang was dismissed from SNU, charged with embezzlement and ethics law violation, and served a 
two-year prison sentence. See John Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 56-58; and 
Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 549-551. 
83 Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 56. 
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Korean popular culture, also known as hallyu are telltale signs that a country has 
achieved highly developed status. 84 For context, Lie and Park base their definitions of 
“soft power” on prior American and British achievements.85 
Korea’s ascension into affluency reinforced their global influence, however, Lie 
and Park posit that this achievement came at a price for the younger generations.86 The 
authors mention the effects that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had on the peninsula.87 
This was a significant event as it signaled to Korean lawmakers and entrepreneurs that 
there was an overreliance on a manufacturing economy. As a remedy, government and 
                                                 
84 Hallyu roughly translates to “Korean Wave.” Hallyu is a term used to coin the Korean popular 
culture phenomena; it is also a blanket word to include all forms of media and fashion trends. Hallyu 
includes K-pop music, TV soap operas, movies, and novels. In more recent years, internet comics 
(manhwa, or better known in Konglish as webtun), and competitive online gaming (e-sports) are now a 
staple of hallyu. The authors posit that Korea was “long an importer of Western popular culture, 
especially American popular culture,” but now hallyu is part of “New Nationalism.” As hallyu media 
became more prominent with the youth, young Koreans viewed this as a form of national pride. While 
American media still has a large presence in South Korean culture, mainly in movies, hallyu media has 
consistently topped sales charts in the tiny peninsula, easily eclipsing their Western counterparts. 
Furthermore, hallyu’s international success – also topping Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asian media 
charts – is a sign of a successful “soft” approach. See Jinwung Kim, 553-554; and John Lie and Myung-
kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 61. 
85 In this context, “Soft Power” means the use of cultural and economic institutions to influence 
global decisions. “Hard Power” is the use of coercive institutions, such as military action, to influence 
decision-making. 
86 The generations that Lie and Park analyze are post-baby boomers, or Generation X and Y. 
Specifically, Generation X (born from early 1970s to the early 1980s) who experienced the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and, thereafter, the current millennial Generation Y (born from the mid-1980s to late 
1990s). 
87 The effects that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had on Korea was nearly-catastrophic. The 
crisis began in Thailand and was an effect of risky credit-swapping. Thailand was known at the time for 
having an economic boom fueled by a mass influx of Asian capital. Many ASEAN and Asian Tiger 
members (Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea) participated in 
such exchanges. Much of the new foreign capital was converted into Thai Baht and used to fund many 
ambitious projects that were often unregulated and had little leverage. Shortly after, a perfect storm of 
worldwide market changes occurred. The Crisis was a result from US Dollar and Japanese Yen 
depreciation (known as “quantitative easing”); followed by US Federal Reserve rate inflation; emerging-
markets currency overvaluation; and the sharp decline of technology sector commodities – such as 
semiconductors and microchips. As such, ambitious projects fell through on the lack of credit, and 
likewise, many investors lost all capital. The result was a deep recession felt by all international 
economies invested within Southeast Asia. More importantly, the crisis displayed the cracks of the state-
chaebol system. Since both entities were synonymous with each other, the bankruptcy of one company, 
such as Daewoo, had tremendous impact on government revenue and public welfare. See Se-jin Chang, 
Financial Crisis, 3-9; and Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 523-524. 
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business leaders stressed the importance of shifting to a service-oriented economy. In 
other words, Korean economists insisted that “innovation through leading-edge 
telecommunications and information technology” was the future, and not 
manufacturing.88 
The new economic changes had the most impact on the labor level. Since the 
heydays of the chaebol export boom (1970s to 1988), Korea’s global competitiveness 
was rapidly vanishing. Newly-liberalized Chinese markets were taking the export world 
by storm. Taking a cue from their Korean neighbors, China now held the premier 
advantage with cheap labor, worker surplus, and new factory infrastructure. China was 
now set to bestow the world an even more glut of cheap goods.89 
Lie and Park conclude that this predicament had enormous ramifications on the 
Korean psyche. Once a national pride for Korean laborers and leaders, the manufacturing 
economy was bleeding money. To further salt the wound, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
threatened the prosperity that Koreans worked so hard for. Appropriately, this begs an 
analysis as to how a nation can survive crises after crises and come out stronger. That 
answer was taken to heart by President Roh Moo-hyun (1946-2009) and his support for a 
newer tech-driven generation. 
 
The New Korean Generation, Part III – Generation X 
The parents of Generation X contributed to Korea’s accumulation of wealth, but it 
was their children that experienced a Korea in a near-depression-like collapse. 
Politicians, laborers, business leaders, and innovators were forced to adapt to a new 
                                                 
88 Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 57. 
89 Ibid., 58. 
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globalized market. The result was a technology-driven campaign that focused on the 
quality of infrastructure, logistics, communication, and product superiority. 
 The Asian Crisis largely impacted chaebol exporting tactics. While exporting was 
still important to the conglomerates, the fanaticism of Park’s “export-dumping” schemes 
did not hold up in a more connected market.90 The advent of dirt-cheap Chinese exports 
caused politicians and business leaders to work around that. Once a laughing stock due to 
lackluster quality, Korean leaders quickly passed chaebol quality-control regulations. 
Now that chaebol brands were known throughout the world, albeit with a bad reputation, 
it was up to conglomerates to combine product quality and affordability, a tactic that their 
Japanese counterparts perfected.91 
 A new technology-driven government – enacted during the end of Kim Dae-
jung’s administration (term: 1998-2003) – was one of President Roh’s top priorities. The 
blueprints were laid for the next generation to follow; and this was the next phase of the 
economy.92 Because of this, Korea became the most “wired country” in the world and 
one of the most invested research and development markets.93 Internationally, the most 
                                                 
90 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 544. 
91 Ibid., 546. 
92 Ibid., 528. 
93 In 1999, Korea’s Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology created the Korean 
Education and Research Information Service (Hanguk kyo yeuk hakseul bowun, or KERIS). One of 
KERIS’s objectives was to enact Bill #3848. The purpose of the legislation was to rapidly install and 
update national communication infrastructure. Initially, telecommunications such as landlines and phone 
towers were prioritized but in the mid-2000s; however, broadband became the focus later on. In turn, 
government-subsidized “internet highways” were built throughout the tiny nation. KERIS then “loaned” 
out broadband access to prominent telecom chaebol (SK Telecom, KT Olleh, LG U+). The result was 
near-universal access, fast reliable speeds, and the world’s most competitive rates. Korea’s investment in 
telecom technology was so successful that IT thinktanks, such as the United Nation’s IT Union, 
consistently rank Korean internet as the fastest in the world. Additionally, the price-to-speed ratio fare 
even better with monthly prices being a fraction the cost compared to other highly-developed peers 
(USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan). See Kilnam Chon et 
al., Brief History of the Internet, 4-6, and 9; and Jinwung Kim, 545 and 549. 
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noticeable effect was the astounding rise of chaebol product quality. Once playing catch-
up to Japanese companies, quality-control and technology initiatives eventually propelled 
Korean goods above the sales of their staunchest top-tier competitors, such as Sony and 
Apple.94 
 In conclusion, Korea’s technological ambitions shifted the outdated export culture 
into an “R&D culture,” colloquially known as “the faster, the better culture.”95 The shift 
was due in part to China’s preeminence as the world’s exporting giant coupled with the 
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Korean leaders decided that instead of 
competing in a losing game, it was better to challenge the quality-to-price market as seen 
with Japanese counterparts. This was accomplished by heavily investing in technology, 
research, and innovation. In essence, Korea never lost their trading culture but rather 
research and innovation were exported instead of cheap overproduced goods. 
 
The New Korean Generation, Part IV: A Shift in Generations 
 Park Myung-kyu and John Lie finish their research with an analysis on South 
Korean “New Nationalism” and “Post-Traditional Society.”96 These terms are set post-
Cold War (1991 to present) and are used to examine the sentiments of Generations X and 
Y. Park and Lie give a brief historical explanation on the nationalist sentiments of past 
generations. The authors posit that before this era Cold War paranoia against North 
Korean conspirators and saboteurs was a prominent theme.97 
                                                 
94 Mario Glowik, Market Entry Strategies: Internationalization Theories, Network Concepts and 
Cases of Asian firms: LG Electronics, Panasonic, Samsung, Sharp, Sony and TCL China (Berlin: De 
Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016), PDF e-book, section 2.6.1.3.4. 
95 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 549. 
96 Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 61. 
97 Ibid., 58. 
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 South Korean Cold War nationalism incorporated a wide-array of ideologies. This 
meant that Park Chung Hee’s generation were generally pro-big business, pro-American, 
anti-North Korean, anti-communist, and, to an extent, pro-Japanese. Park and technocrats 
promoted and relied on these ideologies to garner support for South Korea’s 
development.98 The older generations, who were mostly agricultural and urban factory 
workers, strongly supported Park. Likewise, Lie and Park compare this generation to 
their children and grandchildren. In other words, the last part of the authors’ analysis 
examines the large generational gap among these three groups.99 
 While Park’s generation contributed to Korea’s rapid development, they are 
gradually fading away as most of them are retirees. Many are well past their sixties with a 
good portion situated in the eighties onward.100 Furthermore, there is a change in 
demographics and composure of the Korea’s legislative branch, the National Assembly 
(NA). In 2004, a momentous replacement occurred, 63 percent of NA members were 
composed of new first-time elected politicians while 43 percent of them were aged in 
their thirties to forties.101 
Lie and Park correlate that a younger voter demographic was wholly responsible 
for the shift in sociopolitical views, thereby resulting in newer politicians mirroring 
ideologies of their younger constituency. These new sociopolitical sentiments are coined 
                                                 
98 These sentiments are in reference to American support through military and economic aid. 
Japanese support refers to low interest loans and emulation of exporting tactics. 
99 Lie and Myung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 61. 
100 According to reports conducted by the EU’s Europarl, Yonhap news, and Gallup Korea, the 
2012 Presidential Election conducted a voter demographic survey. They concluded a large turnout of 
elderly voters overwhelmingly voted for Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye. Ages ranged from 
50 to 90 years of age. See Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 174 - August 4-6, 2015 (Week 
1), (Seoul: Gallup Publishing, 2015); and European Parliament, Lukas Gajdos, and Roberto 
Bendini, Quick Policy Insight. 
101 Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 60. 
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“New Nationalism” and include national pride in the recent hallyu phenomena and a 
warming of relations towards their Northern brethren.102 Equally, younger Koreans view 
anti-communist sentiments as largely a vestige of a bygone Cold War era. Expectedly, 
the youth also strongly support more progressive Minjoo politicians, such as Presidents 
Kim Dae-jung (1924-2009) and Roh Moo-hyun (1945-2009), who are arguably 
forefathers of “New Nationalism.”103 
 To show how much newer political establishments inversed Park and Chun era 
politics, Lie, Park Myung-kyu, and Historian Jinwung Kim underlined one of Minjoo’s 
trademark policies, the “Sunshine Policy.”104 Policies such as these and Korea’s 
endeavors into R&D and popular culture, are all aspects of a maturing highly developed 
nation, and more importantly, a “softer” approach to global influence. 
In retrospect, the authors associate Park era nationalism as more in line to a “hard 
power” stance. The current generation, however, relegates that stance as a remnant of 
Korea’s turbulent past, a past that caused tremendous growth and prosperity alongside 
immense suffering. Moreover, South Korean power now lies in its “soft” approach to 
international influence as easing of Northern relations, the exporting of quality products, 
and hallyu are key to growing South Korea’s global prestige. 
 
 
                                                 
102 Lie and Myoung-kyu Park, “South Korea in 2005,” 61. 
103 Ibid. 
104 The Sunshine Policy, implemented in 2000, is a warming of North and South Korean 
relations. As a result, Kaesung Industrial Complex – located on the DMZ border – was created to engage 
in trade and relief efforts with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung won a Nobel Peace Prize the same year for 
his efforts in passing the policy. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 577-580. 
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The New Korean Generation, Part V: Transition to an Open Access Order (OAO) 
 You (Yu) Jong-Sung implements economist Douglass North’s Access Order (AO) 
theory to explain the rapid rise of South Korean development.105 Yu posits that Korea’s 
rise to an Open Access Order (OAO) occurred after Chun’s ousting in 1987.106 More 
importantly, Yu emphasizes that the 1980s democracy movements, chaebol reforms, and 
Korea’s “survival” of two profound recessions – the 1997 Asian Crisis and the 2008 
Financial Crisis – are OAO trademarks that prove an ongoing robustness in South Korean 
society.107 
 The bulk of Yu’s research is set in the early 1980s to early 2000s; however, the 
most important period is 1997 to the present. Yu labels this timeframe as the “Transition 
to OAO” era.108 He signifies this period as an effect of the “Korean democratic 
renaissance” that was largely a result from the successful 1987 protests. From 1988 to 
1997, Koreans saw center-left opposition dominate the legislative and executive branches 
of the government. Alongside political change, Koreans saw rapid chaebol dismantling 
                                                 
105 Jong-Sung You is a Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Australia National 
University. 
106 The AO framework is a groundbreaking theory used to explain how certain countries grow 
into highly developed nations while others falter. The theory suggests that Limited Access Order 
societies (LAOs) are synonymous with developing countries while Open Access Orders (OAOs) equate 
to highly developed countries; therefore, OAO status is the end goal for all LAOs. OAO nations are 
largely Western in origin and all have characteristics of British-inspired institutions. For example, “role 
model” nations are exemplified through the U.S., U.K, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. OAO 
characteristics include stable property and human rights, a strong market economy, a large middle class 
inclusive of high GNP capital, frequent and fair elections, open access to public education, bureaucratic 
powers split between executives and legislators, and a polity consisting of competing parties. NWWW 
includes South Korea in their monograph since it is one of the few OAO nations outside the Western 
sphere. Other non-Western OAOs include Japan and Taiwan. See Barry R. Weingast et al, In the Shadow 
of Violence, 3-10. 
107 Jong-Sung You, “Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access Order: The 
Case of South Korea,” in In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of 
Development, ed., Barry R. Weingast et al, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), PDF e-book, 
293. 
108 You, 308. 
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and regulation coinciding with steady economic growth. The 1997 Asian Crisis, however, 
tested the resolve of those gains.109 
The election of Kim Dae-jung in 1998 proved a turning point. Although, Kim was 
elected in what should have been a clear-cut victory for the “Asian Nelson Mandela,” it 
was instead a closely contested race largely affected by the pessimism surrounding the 
financial crisis.110 While Kim and his Minjoo Party still had a strong voice in the 
government, a span of ten years saw the new center-right Saenuri Party gradually gain a 
foothold in the NA. In 2008, former Hyundai Construction CEO and Saenuri leader, Lee 
Myung-bak (born 1941), was elected president. Yu further accentuates this decade as the 
moment Korea cemented their OAO status. 
The significance of this bureaucratic change was that Korea underwent “two 
changes of government, from conservative to liberal (1998) and from liberal to 
conservative (2008), thereby satisfying the so-called two turn over test for democratic 
consolidation.”111 In contrast, the era from 1960s to the 1980s were known for violent 
consolidation – Park and Chun’s coup and electoral dissolution – through executive-led 
military intimidation. Yu adds that Korean societal robustness underwent “military 
restraint in both elections” and came out even stronger.112 He concludes that Korea’s 
near-miraculous democratic emergence promptly completed NWWW’s “three doorstep 
conditions.”113 
                                                 
109 You, 308. 
110 Ibid., 310. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Expanding on NWWW’s theory, developing countries need to undergo a LAO to OAO 
process but within that process are subsets of requirements. Going in order, a country begins as a Fragile 
LAO and evolves into a Basic LAO, then finally into a Mature LAO. A Mature LAO needs to undergo 
“three doorstep conditions” to advance to an OAO. First, a “rule of law for elites” needs to be present to 
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In summary, key democratic events were a gateway to Korea’s entrance into 
highly developed territory.114 The 1980s protests, the 1990s executive and legislative 
transitions, and the 1997 and 2008 Financial Crises were testing grounds to see whether 
Koreans had what it takes to join the few select nations representing affluency, stability, 
and global prestige. 
 
The New Korean Generation, Part VI: Korean Educational Culture 
 Korea entered OAO status during the late 1990s. Yu Jong-Sung analyzes this 
achievement from a sociopolitical viewpoint; however, Yoon Bang-Soon highlights the 
consequences that Park Chung Hee’s technocratic culture had on modern Korean 
education.115 Specifically, Yoon’s thesis addresses the effects that Park-led (state-led) 
overeducation initiatives had during the period of 1966 to the 1990s. She coins this 
cultural phenomenon as a “Reverse Brain Drain (RBD).”116 
 Yoon’s research begins with a brief history of Korean “brain drain.”117 Shortly 
after the Korean War (1953) and until the mid-1960s, an influx of Korean refugees from 
                                                 
keep unchecked powers in line. Second, “perpetual lived forms of elite organizations” pertains to both 
government and private organizations. This step means societal organizations live well-passed a 
founder’s, or leader’s, lifespan. These are usually elite organizations, such as prominent political parties 
and business entities, that keep legislative and economic order intact. Third, “consolidated control of the 
organizations with violence capacity (VC)” means public representation of state authorities. In other 
words, democratic representation controls armed actions. “Violence capable” entities include the military 
and police forces. See Barry R. Weingast et al, 17-19. 
114 You fails to expand on the crucial peripheral role the US had in keeping Chun and ROK 
troops in line. The Reagan Administration, consisting of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, 
were a large reason Chun could not use the military to quell dissent. If occurred, Korea would regress 
back into LAO status as “doorstep one and three” warns against autocrats gaining a monopoly on 
“violence capable” entities. See Jong-Sung You, 297 and 307-310. 
115 Bang-Soon Yoon is a Professor of Political Science at Central Washington University. 
116 Bang-Song Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain in South Korea: State-led Model,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 27, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 5. 
117 NWWW defines “brain drain,” also known as “human flight capital,” is an emigration 
problem commonly found in unstable developing countries. Unstable in this context means societies 
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war-torn country sides and razed cities emigrated all over the world, most notably to the 
US.118 Beginning under President Rhee, a large portion of tertiary students were sent to 
pursue overseas training in science and engineering.119 The 1964 census taken by the 
Korean Ministry of Education reported that 91.4 percent of those students had chosen the 
US for their studies abroad. Many would later claim residency and permanently stayed in 
America.120 
 Park took swift notice of the discrepancy and in 1966 began Korea’s first attempt 
of “systematic repatriation”; the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was 
created as a result.121 KIST began recruiting top academics from the US and West 
Germany to help lead heavy multidisciplinary R&D agendas. Due to Park’s close 
relationship with the two countries, KIST created joint exchange ventures with them. 
This endeavor was successful due to all three participant countries’ strict contractual 
limits on work-student visas. Once a student or professional was finished training in the 
                                                 
plagued by massive corruption and crime that results in stagnant and regressing economies. Due to this, 
mass refugee emigration to more stable and developed countries commonly occur. Within the migration 
trend is an influx of highly skilled laborers and academics. Also known as “intellectual refugees,” these 
individuals post a “net benefit” usually through fulfilling skilled labor shortages, training, and innovation 
for their host countries. “Brain drain” individuals usually do not immigrate back to their home country, 
thus causing the former country to regress even further. See Barry R. Weingast et al, 1 and 224; and 
Bang-Song Yoon, 5-6. 
118 The U.S. has the second-most Korean immigrants next to China, thereby making it the 
largest Korean population outside Asia. See Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jaeoe Dongpo 
Hyeonhwang [Overseas Korean Diaspora], 14. 
119 President Rhee and Park instituted Korean emigration initiatives to the US and other Western 
countries in the late 1950s to early 1960s. They hoped that training many prominent students would later 
lead to fulfilling shortages in skilled and technical positions. Such shortages included healthcare, finance, 
engineering, sciences, trade skills, and foreign language educators. However, Yoon mentions that this 
backfired on Rhee and initially with Park as many Korean students requested, and were commonly 
granted, an indefinite length of stay in the US. Many would later become American scientists and PhD 
candidates for prominent universities, such as the University of California campuses. See Jinwung Kim, 
A History of Korea, 438; and Jong-Sung You in In the Shadow of Violence, 299-300; and Ivan Hubert 
Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965-1982 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), PDF e-book, 105-106. 
120 Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain,” 6. 
121 Ibid. 
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host country, American, West German, and South Korean immigration departments kept 
a close tab on them until eventual repatriation.122 
 Historians Moon Chung-in and Byung-joon Jun quote Park’s pragmatic stance on 
immigration, “I don’t care [what] the national origin of capital [is]. I welcome capital 
from the United States, West Germany, Italy, and other European countries. Even if it is 
Japanese capital, I don’t care as long as it is used for the economic development of our 
country.”123 To obtain this needed capital, a “carrot-and-stick” tactic was used to entice a 
hungry goal-driven citizenry. Park correlated and fervently promoted patriotism, prestige, 
and lucrative job opportunities, mostly within government and chaebol careers; and this 
in turn, bolstered already successful KIST initiatives.124 
Expatriate Koreans were now eager to bring foreign-learned skills back to the 
motherland, and accordingly, this resulted in the RBD phenomena. The chance to obtain 
these once abundant positions profoundly altered the educational culture of future 
Koreans. Simply put, frequent and efficient repatriation, along with domestic emphasis 
on higher education, bestowed Korea with an overabundance of advanced degree holders 
and, for better and worse, altered future career aspects for Korean youths. Due to this 
abundance, an old joke among Korean academia was created, “PhD holders are a ‘dime a 
dozen.’”125 
 
                                                 
122 Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain,” 8. 
123 Chung-in Moon, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in The Park Chung Hee 
Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 127. 
124 Yoon, “Reverse Brain Drain in South Korea,” 9. 
125 Ibid., 7. 
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The Candlelight Revolution 
The Candlelight Revolution (Chotbul hangjaeng), also known as the 2016-2017 
South Korean Protests, was one of the most significant events in modern Korean 
history.126 Beginning from October 2016 to March 2017, the South Korean government 
underwent a society-shattering scandal perpetrated by President Park Geun-hye (born 
1952), daughter of Park Chung Hee, and her closest confidants.127 John Delury and 
Alexis Dudden’s articles, both written within a month of each other and published in the 
same academic journal, detail the context leading up to the scandal and the consequences 
that it had on modern Korean politics.128 
Delury’s thesis is told in question form, “What does it take to peacefully remove a 
democratically elected president from power?” Delury credits “idealistic students, 
intrepid journalists, invigorated parliamentarians, and outraged urbanites.” He also labels 
them as “traditional forces of dissent.”129 On the other end, Dudden’s thesis is similar to 
Delury’s. However, instead of focusing on the agents of dissent – Dudden also credits 
                                                 
126 The name “Candlelight” comes from the theme of protestors bringing candles or small bulbs 
to the demonstrations. Candles are symbolic for transparency or shining a light on the secrecy of Park 
Geun-hye’s corruption. 
127 A brief bio on Park Geun-hye is given for context. Geun-hye was born in 1952 and was the 
first female president of South Korea from 2012 until her impeachment in 2016. She ran as a candidate 
under the center-right Saenuri Party in the 2007 Presidential Election. However, Park lost the primaries 
to former member Lee Myung Bak. In 2011, Geun-hye rose to prominence as she was elected into the 
National Assembly while concurrently rising to a Saenuri leader. A year later, Park won the 2012 election 
against center-left Minjoo candidate Moon Jae-in – Moon, however, is now the current president since 
2017 – but not without controversy. Evidence of election tampering mounted as Minjoo and Seoul Metro 
authorities found intervention conducted by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), a successor to Park 
Chung Hee’s KCIA. Nonetheless, insufficient evidence resulted in the case being dropped. See Jinwung 
Kim, A History of Korea, 534-535; and Barbara Demick and Jung-yoon Choi, “South Korea Elects First 
Female President,” Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/19/world/la-fg-south-korea-park-20121220.  
128 John Delury is an Associate Professor of Chinese Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul. Alexis 
Dudden is a Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. 
129 John Delury, “The Candlelight Revolution,” Dissent 64, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 98. 
 
190 
 
 
“traditional forces” for toppling Park Geun-hye – she focuses on the major players behind 
the scandal and how they affected current Korean society.130 
Both authors begin on the same note, Park Geun-hye’s close friend, Choi Soon-sil 
(born 1956), was the person who ignited the investigations behind the scandal.131 Delury 
reports how fast investigative journalism and a digitally connected population were 
inquiring about any “backchannel” and illegal dealings.132 He further adds that initially 
there was a slow response from bureaucrats and authorities. 
Specifically, some Minjoo and Saenuri politicians were reluctant to pursue 
allegations due to party and business ties with the implicated suspects. This was also 
compounded by the near-impossible impeachment process.133 However, after deliberation 
                                                 
130 Alexis Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight: How South Koreans Toppled a 
Government,” Dissent 64, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 86. 
131 Choi Soon-sil is the daughter of Korean cult leader Choi Tae-min (1912-1994). Tae-min 
created a religious cult, Yongsae gyo, that incorporated elements from Shaminism (Sin gyo), Buddhism 
(Bul gyo), and Christianity (Kidok gyo). In 1974, Tae-min’s cult gained fame for claims of supernatural 
psychic communication. The same year a North Korean sympathizer attempted to assassinate Park 
Chung Hee while he gave a speech out in the open. The assassin failed, however Park’s wife, Yuk 
Young-soo, was accidentally killed during the fallout. Immediately, Tae-min’s “psychic ability” to speak 
with the dead caught Park’s attention and a friendship was born. Equally, Geun-hye and Soon-sil became 
close friends – even attending college together at one point – as Soon-sil took the motherly gap that Yuk 
once filled. In 2016, Soon-sil became a prime suspect when she and her business firm cleaned up and 
moved to new offices. Samsung tablets were recklessly thrown away and journalists found caches of 
incriminating evidence that pointed her and Geun-hye in approving secret backdoor deals. Immediate 
public backlash occurred as journalists spread the news internationally. Dudden coined this scandal 
“Choi-Soon-sil-gate” while Western media outlets, like the UK’s Telegraph, labeled it “The Korean 
Rasputin Scandal” and “The Korean Shaman Scandal.” See John Delury, 98-99; Alexis Dudden, 86-88; 
and Seok Hwai Lee, “The Most Powerful Person in South Korea,” Straits Times. 
132 Furthermore, Choi Soon-sil had a real estate business firm before and during Park Geun-
hye’s presidency. The tablets revealed Park funneling public funds to not only Choi’s firm but to other 
prominent business magnates. Bookkeeping data revealed bribes traced back to prominent chaebol 
magnate and Samsung Vice CEO Lee Jae-yong. Jae-yong is the eldest son of CEO Lee Gun-hee, aptly 
coined “The Prince of Samsung.” Furthermore, Choi also bribed Park officials to influence Seoul’s Ewha 
Women’s University admissions – one of the world’s largest and most prestigious all-women universities 
– to accept her daughter and inflate her grades. In February 2018, Choi was found guilty for abuse of 
power and bribery. She was fined 16 million USD and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In February 
2017, Lee Jae-yong was sentenced five years in prison for bribery. However, in February 2018 he was 
released due to a successful suspension request. See John Delury, 98-99; Dudden, 86-88; and Seok Hwai 
Lee, " Most Powerful Person in South Korea," Straits Times. 
133 The South Korean impeachment process needs a two-thirds majority vote from the three 
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and pressure from outside variables – the public and international media – politicians 
chose to do an internal investigation, albeit at a slow pace. 
Dudden’s article accentuates the crucial initial actions that university students 
played. Specifically, during the timeframe of bureaucratic apathy, student protests were 
fueled by the transgressions committed by Choi. While there was a myriad of other 
reasons for massive student agitation, Dudden alludes that Park and Choi’s misdeeds 
conflicted with Korea’s fervent education and work cultures; this amplified the 
resentment of millions of hardworking students and white-collar workers.134 Students felt 
                                                 
hundred-member National Assembly (NA). Afterwards, the nine-member Constitutional Court (Supreme 
Court of Korea) needs over a simple majority – minimum six members in support of impeachment – to 
uphold the impeachment as legitimate. See Article 111.1 in the ROK Constitution. At the time of the 
scandal Saenuri and right-leaning factions composed over 50 percent of the NA. The Supreme Court was 
split evenly with left, right, and independent-leaning judges. Politicians initially rebuffed protests as they 
thought this task was impossible. However, a year of protests resulted in overwhelming bipartisan 
support. A 234 out of 300 NA vote passed followed by a unanimous 9-0 Supreme Court decision in favor 
of upholding impeachment.  
134 For context, Korean public schooling begins from elementary (kindergarten to sixth grade), 
to middle school (grades first to third; otherwise known as seventh to ninth grade in America), and 
finishes in high school (grades first to third; otherwise known as tenth to twelfth grade). While the in-
school hours are similar to American schooling – about five to six hours daily attendance – the after-
school curriculum adds an additional three to seven hours. Most students attend after-school academies 
(hagwon), or in a more denigrating term “cram schools,” that cater to suneung (colloquially known as the 
“Korean SATs”) subjects (math, reading, science, and English). According to a 2009 statistics research 
by University of Illinois, 87.4 percent of elementary students attend hagwon; followed by 74.3 percent of 
middle schoolers; and 53.8 percent of high schoolers. Post-university hagwon attendance is an 
exceptional case as most participants attend campuses catered to tier-based chaebol and civil service 
exams. Reminiscent of Goryeo-Joseon (918-1897 CE) government exams (gwageo), civil service testing 
pertains to all state-funded jobs, such as military officers, educators, first-responders, and administrators. 
Chaebol testing pertains to entry-level jobs, such as paid interns who have the potential to rise into 
management positions. Both exams are called Kodeung gosi (“fifth to seventh -- the highest levels -- tier 
exams”) and consist of advanced math, science, reading, English, and other career-related subjects. Due 
to the hypercompetition for these jobs, entire city districts, such as Seoul’s Noryangjin, have economies 
centered on educating, feeding, and housing gosi students (gosi hakseng). Likewise, this was unique to 
Korean society so “Konglish” terms arose from it. For example, gositel are dorm-guesthouses meant to 
shelter exam students. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 551-553; Jin-lee Jung, “Supplemental 
Education in Korea,” 1-2; and Bo-eun Kim, “Jobseekers Drawn to Civil Servant Exams,” Korea Times. 
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a resurgence of “cronyism” reminiscent of Park Chung Hee’s and Chun’s chaebol 
state.135 Delury aptly concurs and labels this resurgence as an “imperial presidency.”136 
Delury and Dudden also suggest that bureaucrats’ preliminary indifferences were 
superseded by the fear of repeating the 1980s democracy movements, one where students 
from the same campuses enacted nationwide revolts and riots. Equally, both authors 
concur that the Candlelight Protests were situated in a perfect time just like their 1980s 
brethren. Akin to the global popularity of the 1980s protests, factors such as the 2015-
2016 US Presidential Campaigns and the Brexit vote satiated the Western world’s 
appetite towards the election process. Therefore, it struck a strong interest when Western 
media found that a tiny country known for technology, orderly conduct, and a strong 
Pacific alliance could amass millions of demonstrators while enduring year-long civil 
protests.137 
Both articles conclude on the international community’s praise for the 
demonstration’s nonviolent and efficient nature; however, both stop short of mentioning 
the future challenges of the Korean sociopolitical sphere. Dudden, however, gives a brief 
projection on Korea’s 2018 direction. Dudden’s conclusion is highly critical of the 
Trump administration due to the antagonistic “fire and fury” stance towards North 
Korea.138 She suggests that this is an antithesis to South Korea’s peaceful rhetoric. 
Additionally, Dudden casts the recently-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in as a 
disciplined but cooperative leader in contrast to Trump’s “reckless” diplomacy.139 
                                                 
135 Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight,” 89. 
136 Delury, “The Candlelight Revolution,” 97. 
137 Delury and Dudden label the Candlelight Revolutions “peaceful.” Peaceful in this context 
means virtually no property damages and no reported injuries and deaths. See Dudden, 89; and Delury, 
96-97. 
138 Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight,” 91. 
139 Ibid., 92. 
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In short, the protests were a success and arguably surpassed the 1980s movements 
in efficiency and international adulation. The level of swift organization, mass 
participation, and peacefulness cemented Korea as a role model for twenty-first century 
civil dissent. 
 
Park Chung Hee’s Approval 
 A Korean Gallup poll conducted in August 2015 followed by a September 2015 
Diplomat article highlights sentiments harbored for past South Korean presidents since 
Rhee Syngman’s (Lee Seung-man) election in 1948 and until Lee Myung-bak’s final year 
in 2012.140 The polls include a total of eight presidential choices, thereby comprising 
executives who were directly voted on while disregarding any “acting presidents.”141 The 
presidents included in the survey are, in no specific order, Roh Moo-hyun, Roh Tae-woo, 
Park Chung Hee, Kim Dae-jung, Rhee Syngman, Chun Doo-hwan, Kim Young-sam, and 
Lee Myung-bak.142 
Gallup’s methodology includes a sample population of two-thousand anonymous 
voters aged nineteen to over sixty.143 The response method was conducted through 
                                                 
140 Gallup Korea is an extension of Gallup Analytics (Gallup, Inc.). Gallup, Inc. is a premier 
international polling thinktank. Their main objective is to quantitatively analyze sociopolitical trends. 
They are noted for their extensive research on vote polling and leadership approval ratings. Furthermore, 
Gallup Korea’s research mixes Korean and English together, therefore translation may be needed in some 
areas. 
141 Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 174 - August 4-6, 2015 (Week 1), (Seoul: 
Gallup Publishing, 2015), PDF report, 9. 
142 Article 71 in the Republic of Korea Constitution states that the “Prime Minister or the 
members of the State Council in the order of priority . . . shall act as president in case of vacancy or 
incapacitation of duties.” Article 2 states “The first presidential election shall be held not later than forty 
days before the Constitution enters force.” Therefore, when a president is incapacitated due to death, 
resignation, or court proceedings – such as Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Park Geun-hye – the 
PM becomes “acting president” for no more than forty days. Within that timeframe snap elections are 
held to allow citizens to directly vote for the next successor. 
143 In Chapter II, Article 15 of South Korea’s “Public Official Election Act,” the minimum age 
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telephone, MMS texting, and paper ballots. The survey questions included presidential 
job performance evaluation, reasons for positivity/negativity, and the voter’s party 
affiliation. Gallup concluded that Park Chung Hee – with 44 percent of the votes – did 
the “best job leading the country after liberation.” Roh Moo-hyun followed with 24 
percent, then Kim Dae-jung with 14 percent. The rest had an irrelevant 3 to 0.1 percent 
positive response rate.144 
In context to presidential policies, 67 percent responded that Park “did many good 
things.” This is compared to the next two highly rated presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun, both scoring 50 to 54 percent respectively. Within that question were also 
subsets of policies that responders marked as “good things.” Park received an enormous 
52 percent for “economic development” – alluding to chaebol and industrialization 
reforms – followed by the “New Village Movement (Saemaul undong), and 12 percent 
for “improving the general public’s standard of living.”145 
Inversely, Gallup also asked “which presidential acts were the wrong things.” 
Park overwhelmingly received 84 percent of the votes, with 74 percent towards Yushin 
constitutional laws and 10 percent for the 1961 coup. These transgressions easily eclipsed 
Chun’s democracy crackdowns, which hovered around 7 percent. However, if 
considering the Gwangju Crackdowns as democratic oppression – these were categorized 
separately – then the number rises to 20 percent.146 
                                                 
to vote for all public officials is nineteen. It is also worth noting that Korean ages are based on the lunar 
calendar along with counting womb development as one age year. Meaning, there is a discrepancy of 
about one age-year compared to Western age-dating. Therefore, the minimum voting, conscription, and 
legal age of nineteen is equivalent to eighteen in America. 
144 Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 174, 9. 
145 Ibid., 12. 
146 Ibid., 13. 
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As this was strictly a statistical survey, Gallop did not include a conclusion. 
Steven Denney, however, analyzed the Gallop results and compared it to other past 
polls.147 Denney’s conclusion concurs with other academics in regard to Park’s legacy, it 
is highly divisive and “mixed” at best.148 He compares Park’s legacy to Taiwan’s Chiang 
Kai-shek and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew. Along with mixed feelings, Denney denotes 
that Park, Chiang, and Lee are highly successful “non-benevolent developmental 
dictators.”149 Successful in this context means raising the standard of living. 
In the same year, Denny analyzes a Seoul University poll, in conjunction with the 
Korean newspaper Joongang Ilbo. The poll concluded on a similar basis, Park’s 
“economic growth” positively overwhelmed his “questionable” political actions. 
Unfortunately, the weaknesses of both polls come from the lack of linking demographics. 
For example, the presidential “good/bad policies” survey lacked characteristics, such as 
age, household income, and region.150 
In other words, presidential legacies and public policy sentiments are evaluated as 
independent and wholly separate entities, thereby missing any linking features, like what 
age groups and income brackets support Park and which ones do not. Graphs 5.4 to 5.8, 
furthermore, help visualize Gallup’s analysis with data taken and translated from the 
Korean Gallup survey. 
                                                 
147 Steven Denney is a Professor of Global Affairs in the University of Toronto. 
148 Steven Denney, “The Mixed Legacy of a South Korean Dictator,” Diplomat, September 17, 
2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-mixed-legacy-of-a-south-korean-dictator/. 
149 Denny, “Mixed Legacy,” Diplomat. 
150 The 2015 Gallup poll also had an independent survey to complement “the best South Korean 
leader since 1945” poll. This poll was in relation to Park Geun-hye and Saenuri approval ratings. The 
demographics are as followed, people aged 50s to 80s had a 60 to 70 percent support of Park Chung Hee. 
Additionally, they were categorized on which candidate and party they supported in the 2012 elections. 
Over 65 percent of them supported Park Geun-hye and her Saenuri colleagues. See Gallup Korea, Gallup 
Korea Daily Opinion No. 174. 
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The Dokdo Islands Dispute, Part I 
Authors Lee Seokwoo, Lee Hee Eun, Harry N. Scheiber, and Jon M. Van Dyke 
research the historical and legal analyses behind the Dokdo Islands dispute.151 The 
authors’ essays introduce the territorial clashes between Korea – inclusive of both North 
and South – and Japan.152 Seokwoo and Hee Eun’s research is a brief historical overview 
on the origins of the conflict. Whereas, Scheiber and Van Dyke follow up by describing 
the legal disputes behind them; they are particularly interested in the treaties and 
international negotiations that led to such contentions. 
Seokwoo and Hee Eun label Dokdo as one of the last vestiges from Japan’s 
colonial age (1895-1945). The authors also suggest that the issue is similar to Japan’s 
claim on Russian Northern Territories (Kurile Islands) and Chinese-Taiwanese Senkaku 
Islands (Diaoyudao Islands). All three case studies share the theme of unresolved World 
War II negotiations; additionally, Dokdo is seen as more of a victim due to direct and 
ineffectual US-Pacific oversight. 
Japan’s claim to Dokdo officially began in 1905 when the Shimane Prefecture – 
located in Honshu island near Hiroshima – incorporated most territories surrounding the 
East Sea (Sea of Japan). Japan’s 1905 claim was an effect from their decisive victory in 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).153 The result was international acknowledgement 
                                                 
151 Seokwoo Lee is a Professor of International Law at Inha University, Incheon; Hee Eun Lee is 
an Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Handong International Law School, Pohang; Harry N. 
Scheiber is a Professor of Law and History at University of California, Berkeley; and Jon M. Van Dyke 
is a Professor of Law at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa. 
152 “Dokdo” is the Korean term for the islands while “Takeshima” is the Japanese label. The UN 
also labels them “Liancourt Rocks.” The tiny islands are situated in the East Sea (Japan Sea) located east 
of South Korea’s Gangwon province and North of Japan’s Honshu island. It is also worth noting that the 
name “East Sea” is also a similarly contentious issue. Likewise, Japanese label the sea “Sea of Japan 
(Japan Sea)” while Koreans and the UN label it “East Sea.” 
153 The Russo-Japanese War occurred during the peak of Japan’s Meiji Reforms (1868-1912). 
Japan’s decisive military victory is partly attributed to the successful naval battles led by Admiral Togo 
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(The Treaty of Portsmouth) for Japan’s East Asian protectorate rights. Initially, Dokdo 
was not mentioned as a territory, however, Japanese officials eventually labeled the 
islands as terra nullius. In other words, Dokdo was an uninhabited area – perhaps 
unknown to pre-twentieth century Western-Japanese cartographers – and by default was 
in Japan’s sphere of influence.154 
The timeline shifts to the aftermath of Japan’s August 1945 surrender and the 
effects from the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. After former Imperial territories 
gained independence, the treaty sought to conclude compensation and reparation claims. 
While land reforms and infrastructure remuneration were addressed in the former 
colonies, Dokdo was overlooked once again. Because of this, Dokdo’s ownership has 
been a strain on Korean-Japanese relations for more than five decades.155 
The authors conclude by outlining four points describing the issue from a Korean 
perspective. First, the issue at heart is about past Japanese aggression lingering on until 
contemporary times. Second, Imperial Japan’s takeover of the Korean peninsula is further 
exacerbated by the violent use of military force to incorporate remote islands. Moreover, 
Dokdo’s spanning reach in the East Sea was used to benefit Japanese military and 
commercial ventures at the expense of Koreans. Befittingly, modern Korean academia 
emphasizes the last two points. 
                                                 
Heihachiro, labeled by Western media as the “Asian Horatio Nelson.” The war quickly ended in one year 
resulting in the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth. The Treaty was administered by Theodore Roosevelt, who 
won a Nobel Peace Prize from it, and put an end to Russian expansionism while signaling Japan’s 
hegemony in Asia. This status gave Japan exclusive protectorate rights over Korea and Manchuria, 
thereby signaling the beginning of the Imperial Era. See Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 
121. 
154 Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and 
International Justice” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal and International Justice (Leiden, Netherlands: 
Brill Publishers, 2011), PDF e-book, 1. 
155 Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, 2. 
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Third, Korea has a “tremendous amount” of historical evidence, and more 
importantly, ancient records mentioning sparse occupation.156 Lastly, modern Japanese 
scholarship still perpetrates past aggressions in a “nationalistic tone.”157 For example, 
memorials like the Yasukuni Shrine and “textbook distortions” offer no apologies for past 
transgressions of international order; this is compared to Germany’s full contrition 
regarding Nazism. The diminutive references towards Imperial war crimes and military 
aggression are meant to justify past wrongdoings and to “promote” a “distorted version” 
of patriotism and nationalism.158 
 
The Dokdo Islands Dispute, Part II 
 Scheiber and Van Dyke’s essay focus on the diplomatic and legal aspects of 
Dokdo. Scheiber’s basis is that Korea has a very strong claim to the islands, and, if an 
“international tribunal were to adjudicate the dispute, Korea would likely prevail.”159 He 
                                                 
156 The Goryeo-Song (circa 1145CE) book Samguk Sagi is an anthology of historical documents 
detailing Korea’s Three Kingdom Era, otherwise known as the histories of Baekjae, Silla, and Goguryeo 
(57BCE – 668CE). The anthology contains manuscripts and maps describing the “State of Usan-guk.” 
Usan-guk was founded and ruled by Silla general Kim Isabu (ruled during the 6th century CE). Samguk 
includes maps of Usan-guk with islands spread east of Ulleung-do Island, South Korea. Due to these, 
Korean historiography asserts that Kim Isabu incorporated Dokdo into his rule centuries before Japan 
first laid eyes on the rock islands. See Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo,” 
1-4; and Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF), Dokdo, 24 and 55. 
157 Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, “Chapter I: Overview – Dokdo,” 2. 
158 The Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja) is a Shinto memorial constructed in 1869 by the Meiji 
Emperor. The shrine commemorates individuals, soldiers and civilians, who died while serving Japan, 
and came under controversy after World War II. Japanese officials decided to enshrine most soldiers that 
served in World War II and beyond. This included war criminals found guilty by the 1946 International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). The most infamous official was former Imperial Army 
General and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo (1884-1948). The IMTFE found him guilty of being a leader in 
enacting “aggressive war tactics against various nations” and the inhumane treatment of war prisoners 
and civilians. Tojo was also found guilty of contributing to the massacre of millions mostly located in 
Manchuria and Korea; he was later executed by hanging. See Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 601; 
and Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 137 and 230. 
159 Harry N. Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality: Perspectives from Law 
and History on War Guilt in Relation to the Dokdo Island Controversy,” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal 
and International Justice, ed., Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers, 
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explains that the Dokdo issue is mostly resolved as most international legal entities 
attribute the islands as Korean territory. However, a concrete conclusion is yet to be as 
the legal world awaits Japan’s official recognition of Dokdo as Korean territory.160 
 Scheiber furthermore expands on Dokdo litigation by criticizing two of Japan’s 
“conventional legal frameworks,” ones that are still used today. First, the terra nullius 
argument cites that Imperial Japan was in their rights to incorporate unclaimed or 
undiscovered territory. However, this argument is rendered moot by many ancient 
documents, such as Samguk Sagi, alongside other recorded recollections from medieval 
trading vessels. Plainly put, a meticulously recorded history strongly disavows terra 
nullius. Moreover, Japan’s use of this argument further cements Imperial history as a 
“progression” that forced “Korea into a subservient status” intent on being “exploitative” 
through “cruel rule.”161 
 Secondly, the vague territorial borders created by the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
is used by the Japanese government as a defense. Scheiber notes that Korea’s exclusion 
from treaty negotiations renders it impotent under current laws. If international courts 
were to resolve the issue now, Korea’s past omission would allow the treaty to be thrown 
out under outdated clauses.162 
 Subsequently, Scheiber posits that historical context was a crucial variable that 
may have avoided the conflict altogether.163 Scheiber and Van Dyke attribute the United 
                                                 
2011), PDF e-book, 13. 
160 Scheiber., 17. 
161 Ibid., 16. 
162 Ibid., 17. 
163 Scheiber and Van Dyke note that Korea’s exclusion is attributed to a variety of variables. The 
most prominent is General Douglas MacArthur’s sympathetic views towards a war-torn Japan. 
MacArthur’s sentiments created a protective screen for Japanese negotiators. Furthermore, while the 
Korean War was escalating in 1950, MacArthur was under the role of Supreme Commander for the 
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States’ ineffectual attitude as a primary variable for American officials staying on the 
sidelines; equally, their motives are also up for debate. One prominent reason was that 
high-ranking US bureaucrats were distracted with Cold War Korean border clashes – 
later escalating into the Korean War – and could not be bothered with resolving such 
isolated claims. Subsequently, Japanese negotiators took advantage of the distraction and 
excluded “Takeshima Island” as part of the territorial compensation clauses.164 
 Conversely, in exercising their right to exclude “Takeshima Island,” Japan 
inadvertently forced themselves to agree to all terms set forth by the 1943 Cairo 
Conference and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation.165 The clause in the Cairo Conference 
states that “Japan will be . . . expelled from all other territories [inclusive of all Pacific 
islands].” The Potsdam clause further cements these ultimatums by “limiting Japanese 
sovereignty limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and to such 
minor islands as we determine.”166 The “minor islands” label is accentuated as this term 
is subject to changing times, thereby entailing that Japan should reevaluate all claims, 
through UN oversight, to any contested islands. 
In summary, postwar Japanese negotiators cleverly conveyed initial negotiations 
in their favor, but, due to the outdated and arbitrary nature of such clauses, current 
                                                 
Allied Powers (SCAP). One of the SCAP’s tasks was to transform Japan into a manufacturing hub to 
help provide a stable supply line for Pacific forces in Korea, and later Vietnam. Due to this, the SCAP 
overlooked – whether intentionally or out of ignorance is up for debate – wartime issues, such as Dokdo 
disputes and sex slavery (“comfort women”). Building Japan’s new economy and without any 
hinderances was the main priority. See Andrew Gordon, 282; and Jinwung Kim, 349-350 and 257. 
164 Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality,” 24. 
165 The Cairo Conference and Potsdam Proclamation were conferences that outlined Japan’s 
terms of unconditional surrender. Explicitly, these conferences demanded that Japan give back all lands 
taken during World War II and to abolish any form of enslavement and indentured servitude among 
affected regions. The conferences were led by Allied forces; however, the only Asian power present was 
China’s Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) represented by Chiang Kai-shek. Korea was, therefore, 
left out of crucial negotiations that dictated the future of the peninsula. See Harry N. Scheiber, 19-21. 
166 Scheiber, “Chapter II - Legalism, Geopolitics, and Morality,” 19. 
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international courts can easily discard them. Furthermore, Van Dyke warns that in 
hindsight Korea’s exclusion from vital negotiations left out needed historical context – 
such as almost a millennium worth of recorded ventures – that may have swayed General 
MacArthur, also known as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), into 
a more sympathetic role. This ultimately doomed what should have been a small issue 
into decades worth of antagonism and fervent nationalist propaganda perpetrated by both 
Korean and Japanese politicians.167 Figure 5.2 and Maps 5.1 and 5.2 contain pictures, 
translations, and geography to help visualize the conflict. 
 
                                                 
167 During Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency (term: 2003-2008) Korean public-school curriculum, 
from primary to secondary, required students to study Dokdo history. Likewise, Japanese curriculum 
includes “Takeshima” claims while disregarding ancient Goryeo-Song history. In 2008, the conflict 
escalated when Korean officials temporarily recalled the Japanese ambassador in Seoul as an attempt to 
protest the whitewashing of history. See Jon M. Van Dyke, “Chapter III,” in Dokdo: Historical Appraisal 
and International Justice, 39; and Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 326 and 357. 
 
Figure 5.2. Pictured is a translated excerpt taken from the government textbook Yeogi-neun Dokdo. Please note the 
top source labelled “삼국사기 (1145)” is the Goryeo-Song anthology Samguk Sagi. Source: Northeast Asian 
History Foundation (NAHF), Yeogi-neun Dokdo, 55. 
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The “Comfort Women” Issue, Part I: Masculine Perspectives 
Watanabe Kazuko analyzes how East Asian patriarchy influenced the “comfort 
system.”168 Starting from 1918 and ending in 2000, Watanabe gives a brief history of 
Japan’s prostitution system.169 She posits that the primary variable in Japanese sex 
culture are the impenitent positions instilled by “Confucian patriarchal culture.”170 She 
also adds that “Confucianism had taught [women] that [their chastity] was more valuable 
than their lives.”171 Consequently, this created a “chastity myth” that collectively bound 
both men and women.172 
The myth was not only tied to women but also to men. Men were stigmatized with 
hyperactive libidos while a woman’s worth was acquiescent to their virginity. Moreover, 
men – fathers, brothers, and husbands – whose loved ones were “deflowered” were 
branded as weak protectors under the same system and, therefore, were subject to be led 
by more dominant men.173 
Another factor that amplified patriarchal culture was wealth. Watanabe notes that 
“‘Wealthy Japan’ has become the most notorious country in the world for recruiting and 
exploiting women.”174 In other words, as Japan’s wealth flourished so did the 
normalization of the sex industry.175 Watanabe posits that during the “First Wealthy Era 
                                                 
168 Kazuko Watanabe was a Roman Catholic nun and professor at Notre Dame Seishin 
University, Okayama. 
169 Kazuko Watanabe, “Trafficking in Women's Bodies, Then and Now: The Issue of Military 
‘Comfort Women’,” Peace & Change 20, no. 4 (1995): 22. 
170 Watanabe mentions that Confucianism is a cultural set of laws originating from Ancient China 
that spread throughout East Asia. She mentions that it is highly patriarchal due to the power position 
originating from fatherly figures. Thereby, women, especially the youth, are relegated to a submissive 
position. 
171 Watanabe, “Trafficking in Women’s Bodies,” 22. 
172 Ibid., 23. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid., 27. 
175  “Wealthy Japan” is a two-era dichotomy. The first era of prosperity began during the end of 
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(1912-1945)” Japan’s strong Confucian culture – manifested through military, business, 
and civilian spheres – was a benefactor that created the “comfort system.”176 Moreover, 
the SCAP’s oversight and punishment system during Japan’s post-World War II recovery 
(1945-1952) was collectively lenient. Such clemency still lingers on the current polity’s 
agenda, one that mostly consist of males. 
This mentality ultimately carried over into the “Second Wealthy Era (1960s-
1991),” a period known for Japan’s ascension as an economic superpower. Concurrently, 
domestic sex industries, such as local red-light districts, and international sex tourism 
flourished. When collectively combined, Watanabe posits that this is a strong motif for 
modern Japanese culture’s “non-recognition of past crimes” or, in other words, 
insensitivity and willful ignorance of wartime sexual abuse.177 
Watanabe’s emphasizes that in 2000 and beyond Japan shows some signs of 
capitulating to international pressure; she labels this era as part of Japan’s 
“instrumentalist nature.” This post-modern nature was achieved through “women’s 
                                                 
the Meiji Emperor’s reign until the World War II (1912-1945). The second era began shortly after the 
SCAP’s exit and lasted until the Japanese Real Estate Asset Burst (1960s-1991). See Watanabe, 26-27. 
176 For contextual history, the “comfort system” officially began in 1932 when Imperial military 
clashed with Chinese officials in Shanghai. The “Shanghai Incident” prompted Japanese authorities to 
quickly set up more bases and civilian outposts around colonies and protectorates. Nearby, sprawling 
entertainment districts appeared overnight. Expatriate Japanese – consisted of military, civilian, and 
government officials – used these districts for their leisurely activities, most notably, gambling and 
nightlife. According to official records from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local women were 
“recruited” to become “hostesses, entertainers, and waitresses.” As a result, these districts were known as 
“comfort stations” with the sole intention of providing hospitality services. Equally, female workers were 
colloquially known as “comfort women.” After the 1945 Japanese surrender, US officials published a 
report, Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces, detailing a large government sponsored “brothel 
system” that “recruited, coerced, and forced” colonial subjects solely for prostitution with little to no 
compensation. See Toshiyuki Tanaka, Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During 
World War II and the US Occupation (London: Routledge, 2007), PDF e-book, 1-10, 84, and 103. 
177 Yangmo Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances? Japanese Policy on the Comfort 
Women Issue,” Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (2015), 243. 
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collective voices” becoming a “great force for [contrite] changes.”178 Watanabe 
concludes that Confucian patriarchy still affects the government’s perturbed apologetic 
responses. Additionally, her solution involves NGOs playing a bigger role in informing 
the public about the plight of “comfort victims.”179 
 
The “Comfort Women” Issue, Part II: Japan’s Stance on Contrition 
Ku Yangmo focuses on Japan’s apologetic stances towards the “comfort system.” 
Ku attempts to answer the question as to “why Japanese behaviors differ over time in 
addressing apologies and compensation.”180 His research centers mostly on quantitative 
deduction. Ku sets up a three-tier case study using causal theory in which he analyzes and 
correlates various dependent (DV) and independent variables (IV) through a 
chronologically leveled setting.181 
The first tier of the study involves government “contrition responses.” This is 
Ku’s DV (outcome variable) while the IVs are geopolitical and economical eras.182 He 
labels his outcome variables on a three-level response: “no contrition, shallow contrition, 
and deep contrition.”183 Ku’s second tier evaluation identifies a dichotomous IV labelled 
as a “strong or weak transnational activism power (TPA).”184 
                                                 
178 Watanabe, “Trafficking in Women's Bodies,” 29. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 243. 
181 Ibid., 243 
182 Ibid., 245. 
183 “No contrition” means no acknowledgement and no compensation for past crimes. “Shallow 
contrition” means unofficial acknowledgement by some politicians; however, public references – 
represented through government textbooks and reports – are non-existent. Also, some form of 
compensation, usually aid funneled through Japanese NGOs, is present. “Deep contrition” means full 
government recognition of crimes and reparations through government funds for affected victims. 
184 Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 247. 
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TPA is defined as progressive or conservative political cooperation among 
activists, nationalists, and NGOs. TPA may also include international laws, such as the 
Rome Statute.185 Ku categorizes “strong TPA” as a “progressively ruled government 
body with low nationalist priorities and high social justice policies.” A “weak TPA” is a 
conservative government with high nationalism and low social justice priorities.186 Ku’s 
conclusion, or third tier analysis, combines and evaluates all variables from the first and 
second tier. 
The third-tier analysis uses two axes of IVs. The first axis is arranged in four 
levels and split among four chronological decades starting from the 1950s and ending in 
the mid-2000s. Ku chose these eras due to the importance they had in catering to 
“Instrumentalism.” “Instrumentalism” is defined as a “state taking interest in contrite 
stances when there is a security and/or economic advantage as a result.”187 The second 
axis consists of labels portraying TPA sentiments and the various degrees of 
“Instrumentalism.” 
Ku’s data depicts the 1950s to 1980s as a conservatively-ruled era that held “no 
contrition” stances. This is further amplified by low geo-economic interests from former 
“comfort-system countries.” However, the years between 1991 to the mid-2000s show 
the government shifting their stance from “no contrition” to “shallow contrition.” This is 
due to the rising fiscal and military positions posed from South Korea, China, and 
                                                 
185 The Rome Statute is an international treaty passed in 1998. The treaty created the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) which is a successor to the UN’s International Crimes Department. 
The goal of the ICC is to hold responsible and punish entities responsible for “crimes against humanity.” 
Crimes include genocide and war atrocities. However, the term “atrocities” is not concretely defined due 
to the changing nature in defining what constitutes the act. See Carmen M. Argibay, “Sexual Slavery,” 
379, 385. 
186 Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 247. 
187 Ibid., 246. 
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Taiwan. In addition, North Korean security threats among nearby Japanese borders 
further affected the shift away from “no contrition.”188 Conversely, apologetic measures 
have largely been ignored for countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia who have 
lower geopolitical influence compared to their East Asian counterparts. 
The article ends with Ku acknowledging change, albeit very slowly, due to 
regional and economic factors shifting away from Japanese interests. However, the most 
recent twelve-year span data suggests that apologetic stances regressed quickly during 
some periods of conservatively-ruled legislative and judicial branches. This may suggest 
that international policies and condemnation have little influence over government 
stances when compared to geo-economic variables.189 
Similarly, Ku posits that the modern resurgence of Japanese conservativism – 
seen through Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – may 
“dampen transnational factors;” or in other words, apologetic stances will most likely 
regress or be ignored under LDP leadership.190 Figure 5.3 provides a chart to better 
situate Ku’s variables. 
                                                 
188 Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 264. “Comfort-system countries” include 
Korea, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
189 Ibid., 265. 
190 Ibid. 
Figure 5.3. Ku’s independent and dependent variable alongside hypotheses from other scholars. Chart 
made by author. Source: Ku, “National Interest or Transnational Alliances,” 246-248. 
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* * * 
 
 Park’s bushido society was alive and well through his successor, Chun Doo-hwan; 
and for a moment, it looked as if Chun’s use of Park-styled governance would hold up. 
South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s was a booming society, abject poverty was abated, 
and a new Western-modeled consumerist culture immersed a thriving middle-class. This 
rags-to-riches story, nevertheless, came at a high cost. At the same time, Chun engulfed 
the nation by amplifying Park-styled autocracy, thinking that this was the reason South 
Korean society was booming and that he can get away with all power projections. 
Behind-the-scenes, however, a new form of nationalism was solidifying as a 
result. Minjung nationalism was a response to Chun’s oppressive regime. Starting in 
1979, as a result from the Busan-Masan protests, this ideology formed through student 
protests and was an initial failure – with Chun’s forces easily suppressing any dissent 
through violent means. However, within a decade, minjung used democracy as a vehicle 
while incorporating a big-tent philosophy. People from all walks of life, inclusive of the 
disenfranchised, used minjung nationalism to promote universal suffrage and to vent 
decades of pent-up rage against elderly poverty, gender income inequalities, and ignored 
wartime atrocities. 
The next section, therefore, finishes the timeline by analyzing the events that led 
to minjung and to Chun’s eventual demise. Moreover, modern-day realities of both Park 
and minjung nationalism are assessed side-by-side with current events, ones that are 
eerily similar to the Park-Chun era. 
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Analysis – Park’s Legacy and Nationalism Today (1989 Onwards) 
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Chun’s Doo-hwan’s rule was in its eighth year and the dictator showed no signs 
of stopping. The decade was mired in constant, often violent demonstrations, but no 
matter how volatile the decade was minjung flames kept burning. Within nine years since 
the Bu-Ma and Gwangju Protests (1979-1988), minjung became a solidified ideology 
with a single end goal: the implementation of direct democratic elections. Similarly, the 
primary variable that ousted Chun was overwhelming, massive, and diverse public 
protests; however, there are additional factors, such as popular culture, religion, and 
American response, that played an important role in shaping minjung nationalism from 
the late 1980s onwards. 
The first part of this chapter, therefore, seeks to explain the outside factors that 
influenced minjung in the 1980s and how that set the foundations for contemporary South 
Korean nationalism. The external variables examined are the socioeconomic events that 
occurred domestically and internationally. Subsequently, these actions led to the 
culmination of minjung nationalism during the 1987 June Struggle. Prerequisite events 
leading up to June are therefore examined as well. Specifically, spiritual and feminist 
roles are reanalyzed as imperative factors that contributed to Chun’s removal and 
minjung’s ascension. 
The second part takes some of these foundations, correlates them to modern times 
(1990s-2010s), and concludes by exploring the future of South Korean nationalism. In 
other words, it will discuss the role of minjung in the post-Chun era and the effects that it 
may have on future generations. Accordingly, Park’s legacy is examined to determine 
which vestiges of Park nationalism stick around today and whether they still impact 
modern Korean government and society.  
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Part I: The End of the Chun Era 
 Chun’s Economy 
 The 1960s to 1990s are dubbed “The Miracle on the Han River” due to South 
Korea’s exponential economic growth.1 However, the term “miracle” is a misnomer that 
suggests an unseen force bestowed South Koreans with sudden wealth; this would be 
akin to winning the lottery. Undoubtedly, Park’s economic reforms and a determined 
citizenry were key forces behind the miracle, and this, of course, did not happen 
smoothly. 
 Park’s economy during his last days was firing on all cylinders partly due to a 
series of Five-Year Plans (1962-1986). However, the years 1979-1981 were tumultuous 
politically and economically.2 This was due to Park’s death and the subsequent vacuum 
that occurred; most prominently, this void caused the Korean market to crash. Hence, in 
the first time since 1962, South Koreans experienced negative growth and uncontrolled 
inflation.3 
Chaebol companies, on the other hand, were still undergoing what Park intended 
them to do, mass exporting, and by this standard, chaebol was extremely successful.4 
This tactic required tremendous amounts of capital, and, befittingly, high profits are 
needed to sustain it. Chaebol economics did the exact opposite, revenue, sales volumes, 
                                                 
1 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From “Land of the Morning Calm” to States in 
Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 442. 
2 Myung-koo Kang, “Compressed Modernization and the Formation of a Developmentalist 
Mentalité,” in Reassessing the Park Chung Hee Era, 1961-1979: Development, Political Thought, 
Democracy, & Cultural Influence, ed., Clark W. Sorensen and Hyung-A Kim (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 167. 
3 Se Jin Kim, “South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and Its Economic and Political Impact,” 
Asian Survey 10, no. 6 (June 1970): 525. 
4 Sungjoo Han, “South Korea: The Political Economy of Dependency,” Asian Survey 14, no. 1 
(January 1974): 50. 
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and export quotas were easily achieved but profits were nowhere to be seen. Instead, 
Park’s administration was highly adept at securing low-interest loans from the US, Japan, 
and the IMF, which, in turn, sustained the export economy.5 
Chun’s regime, on the other end, did not begin with the head start that Park’s did. 
Rather, it was during Park’s last year where the cracks of the chaebol economy showed. 
Park’s slow alienation from Western allies due to his nuclear armament programs and 
opposition crackdowns diminished his access to these loans. Furthermore, this was 
exacerbated by the 1979 Oil Shock and aggressive “pump and dump” exporting.6 
As reported from a 1990 US Embassy report, Americans business leaders from 
the Park-Chun era were suspicious of the chaebol economy: 
In the mid-1970s, the Korean economy displayed significant growth 
and began to compete with the U.S. for international markets. In 
response to aggressive Korean economic ventures, the U.S. began to 
demand fair market access in Korea. In the 1980s this economic 
competition caused serious friction as American trade and budget 
deficits rose to an all-time high. To reduce the trade deficits, the U.S. 
pressured for access to the Korean market.7 
 
Chun eventually caved to US trade pressures, thereby opening some markets to American 
companies; however, the damage was done. South Koreans saw the first hiccup in their 
newly modernized market and the state of reliance that bushido economics was based 
on.8 
Just like the Bu-Ma protests, Park never saw the consequences of the 1979-1980 
crash; Chun did, however. People were starting to see the facade behind bushido 
                                                 
5 Han, “Political Economy,” 55. 
6 Se-jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and 
Fall of Chaebols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), PDF e-book, 34. 
7 Myung H. Kim and James R. Corcoran, US-ROK Frictions: Causes for Anti-Americanism, 
government report (Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1990), 20. 
8 Chang, Financial Crisis, 57. 
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nationalism. For example, bushido economy emphasized financial autonomy through 
sheer will and strength; however, the absence of cheap loans made this anything but 
independent. Chaebol CEOs, employees, and the public saw just how dependent their 
economy was on global factors as inflation skyrocketed upwards to 25 percent while 
household wealth stagnated.9 In short, Chun’s initial economic tenure can be summed up 
in one sentence: the chaebol and bushido economy were nothing but a paper tiger.10 
Christianity and Women 
  The months leading up to the landmark “June Struggle” saw the culmination of a 
decade’s worth of protests. The last transformation of minjung nationalism was in sight, 
and not even the protestors knew what would become of it. While the protests were 
initially carried out by university students, the urban poor, and artists, Chun’s handling of 
the economy – in particular, the dismantling of Saemaul undong in the early 1980s – 
garnered the anger of one of Park’s most loyal constituents, the rural population.11 
For context, Chun’s administration diverted Saemaul funds, among many other 
Park era programs, from rural communities due to the economic turbulence of the 1980s. 
Likewise, village communities felt the oncoming economic pressure – accumulated 
wealth vanishing overnight – and emigrated to metropolises as a result. Still, their 
                                                 
9 Chang, Financial Crisis, 57. 
10 To combat this, Chun’s Chief of the Ministry of Economics, Kim Jae-ik (1938-1983), freed up 
large amounts of capital from chemical and agricultural industries, two areas that heavily contributed to 
Saemaul undong’s successes. See Kihwan Kim, “Kim Jae-Ik: His Life and Contributions,” xii. 
Consequently, this stopped inflation, but also revealed the weaknesses of the “clientelist model.” 
Economists Nam Chang-hee and Chong Ku-hyun succinctly sums up the 1980s economy as a “symbiotic 
relationship.” Meaning, due to the intimate connection between the state, chaebol, and Saemaul undong, 
when Kim passed said austerity measures not only did communities feel the pressure so did chaebol, 
investors, and government coffers as well. See Chang-hee Nam, “South Korea's Big Business 
Clientelism,” 357. 
11 Keesing's Worldwide, “Assassination of President Park Chung Hee - Mr. Choi Kyu Hah 
elected President - Cabinet formed by Mr. Shin Hyon Hwack - Other Internal Developments, August 
1979 to March 1980,” Keesing's World Events April 1980, April 2, 1980, 30216. 
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poverty followed them to the cities. What the former villagers did gain, however, was a 
newfound appreciation for spiritual comfort. Consequently, a burgeoning and relatively 
new urban community came from those same villages, and surprisingly, women 
constituted a good portion of it.12 
These female villagers, who were once relegated to housework and family life, 
emigrated to urban areas in droves with the hopes of providing for their impoverished 
families.13 This group, although still a minority, was paid severely low wages. Usually, 
women were relegated to menial positions in healthcare, clerical, hospitality, and textile 
services.14 Nevertheless, no matter their position many of those women shared one thing 
in common, Christianity. 
 The power of the burgeoning Christian movement cannot be understated. It not 
only affected the minjung movement and its leaders, such as Kim Dae-jung, it also 
inadvertently gave a voice to the disenfranchised, including female laborers, the elderly, 
and the disabled. One such woman, among many others, was Song Hyo Soon. Song lived 
in a fatherless household with her disabled mother and younger siblings. She also came 
from an impoverished village that did not see the effects of Saemaul undong. In the late 
1970s, at the age of sixteen, she migrated to the city intent on working in a factory as the 
family’s sole bread earner.15 
                                                 
12 George Katsiaficas, Asia's Unknown Uprisings, Volume 1: South Korean Social Movements in 
the 20th Century Volume 1 (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), PDF e-book, 284. 
13 While it is hard to get an accurate estimate of women urban migration, there is data showing 
increasing female secondary-industry employment – in this case warehousing and manufacturing. From 
1963 there was about 186,000 employed female urban workers; however, in 1980 that figure rose six-
folds to 1,166,000. The research also suggests that many of these workers were young and unskilled, 
usually emigrating from nearby farming provinces. See Kyung A. Park, “Women and Development,” 
131-133. 
14 George Katsiaficas, 284. 
15 Soon-Hwa Sun, “Women, Work and Theology in Korea,” Journal of Feminist Studies in 
Religion 3, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 129. 
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Ms. Song was fired from her factory job after filing a complaint to the Labor 
Bureau after years of dangerous working conditions. Immediately, she banded together 
with other affected women and found solace in spirituality. Not only did Song voice the 
plight of her recently terminated female coworkers but also the sentiments of the nation’s 
oppressed. Song wrote: 
[She and her friends] rented a room near the factory to continue the 
fight. The first night, ten women sat together to have dinner. Since they 
did not have a table, they used the floor. One of them said grace: “Oh, 
God, we will trust you and depend on you even in the most difficult 
situations. Please take care of us and keep us from giving up and from 
compromising with injustice.” They sang a protest hymn often sung 
by Christians and students, and cried.16 
 
The hymn’s appeal with both students and Christians was not an act of coincidence; 
rather, this was the core of minjung nationalism. Korean citizens from all walks of life 
shared Song’s feelings, and towards the end of the 1980s, realized they were living in an 
elitist society – a society Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson warned about. Ironically, this 
society was also one General Park sought to destroy when he took over Rhee’s oligarchic 
government in the 1960s.17 
In short, Park and Chun’s Social Darwinist society expected the weak, pathetic, 
and oppressed to sit out during an era known for vibrant growth and wealth accumulation 
– and for a time, this was the norm. As Song’s story attests, women were just one of 
many minority groups that were marginalized in order for South Korea to flourish. 
However, it was this group, alongside university students and many other activists, that 
also played an important role towards universal democracy. 
                                                 
16 Sun, 130. 
17 Saeyoung Park, “National Heroes and Monuments in South Korea: Patriotism, Modernization 
and Park Chung Hee's Remaking of Yi Sunsin's Shrine,” Asia-Pacific Journal 8, no. 24 (June 2010): 2. 
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Eventually, most oppressed groups came together under similar causes felt by 
Song. These groups contributed just as much sweat and blood for South Korean 
prosperity, so the understanding that Park and Chun’s society sidelined them was an 
infuriating notion. This realization, in turn, allowed Koreans to go back to their minjok 
roots; or put otherwise, Korea’s psyche was now in sync with Sin and Choe’s teachings.18 
After three decades of twisted minjok agendas, the vicious circle was over, and, as Choe 
puts it, Koreans were together again. Just as Koreans had to band together to fend off the 
wrath of Imperial Japan, Koreans were bounded once again with one end goal: to survive 
and replace Chun’s deadly fury with democracy.19 
Kang Myung-koo ties these survivalist propensities to Park-inspired 
“Developmentalist Mentalite.” Kang relates these principles to the teachings of 
sociologist Yim Huisop that “South Koreans [due to strong class consciousness] have a 
tendency to understand and organize human relations and social ethics in order of 
rank.”20 While this may have been true for most of the 1970s and 1980s, 1987 was very 
different. As attested by Ms. Song and reverberated by Christian leaders and minjung 
protestors, 1987 was the year that the teachings of early Korean nationalists were heard 
by the citizenry. Hence, and for a short time, political, gender, religious, and 
socioeconomic lines were transcended in order to accomplish the impossible.21 
 
 
                                                 
18 Andre Schmid, “Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'aeho and the Politics of Territorial History 
in Korea,” Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 1 (February 1997): 27. 
19Andre Schmid, 29. 
20 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmental Mentalite,” 180. 
21 Ibid., 180. 
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Kukbon 
A common superhero plot is when each hero wields an extremely different but 
beneficial set of skills with one goal in mind: to stop evil. Working together to achieve 
this is difficult, sometimes violent, as egos may get in the way. The heroes may also clash 
on occasion, failing to stop evil as a result. However, usually at the very end, success is 
eventually achieved after each hero ignores their differences and convenes together for 
the greater good. Colloquially speaking, this plotline draws many comparisons with 
Kukbon and the June Struggle. 
Kukbon (pronounced gook-bōn) was an organization consisting of the best that 
minjung offered. It was diverse in nature and had a will that could not be broken even 
with the worst of beatings. Most notably, Kukbon was comprised of protest leaders from 
all different parts of the nation. Some groups included were blue-collar workers, doctors, 
women, farmers, artists, and religious leaders from different sects – notably Christian and 
Buddhist.22 As late as the mid-1980s, these groups had little connection with each other, 
each assembly having their own set of sociopolitical goals of course.23 
Minjung diversity, however, was not new and was a detriment eight years prior 
during the Bu-Ma and Gwangju Protests. The lack of leadership and discipline led to 
spontaneous and broken nationwide protest, and suffice it to say, not much was 
accomplished. Leaders knew that if this was repeated, more tragedy would occur. 
Likewise, Park and Chun officials knew this tactic very well, and, taking a cue from the 
KCIA playbook, their plan was to always divide and conquer.24 
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One way that Park effectively divided the opposition’s strength was by installing 
a Neo-Confucian hierarchy in every aspect of society, from business to farming and to 
consumerism.25 Chun’s regime effectively copied this for most of the 1980s; however, 
1987 saw the last of it. Protestors finally figured out that division among them worked 
terrifyingly well for elitists, and more so, it had a solidifying a grip over minjok 
principles. Kukbon sought to counter this through experienced leadership, rigid 
discipline, timed and organized mass protesting, and a fight to the death attitude. 
The leaders chosen for this task were the experienced and meticulous Reverend 
Oh Choong-il and the compassionate – yet orderly – Buddhist monk Gi Son. The 
headquarters chosen was Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul; the frontline soldiers were 
thousands of desperate, yet passionate, university students; and their moral and physical 
support were millions of protesters nationwide. Finally, the chosen date to start mass 
protests was around the anniversary of the Gwangju Massacre, May 18.26 Kukbon was 
finally solidified and became a forced to be reckoned with. Three-decade’s worth of 
bushido agendas finally met their match, and, in June, South Korean society and minjung 
nationalism took center stage. 
 The June Struggle 
 The June Struggle is recorded as an event that lasted about nineteen days, from 
June 10 to June 29, but actual protesting began in late May. The May-June protests were 
a constant back-and-forth with state authorities – and encounters were often violent with 
                                                 
Killing,” Interview by Park Bo-gyoon, Korea Joongang Daily, November 3, 2015, 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3011054. 
25 Seung-Mi Han, “The New Community Movement: Park Chung Hee and the Making of State 
Populism,” Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 70. 
26 Katsiaficas, Asia's Unknown Uprisings, 281. 
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no end in sight. This did not matter as millions of protestors felt an aura of invincibility – 
in part due to Kukbon’s leadership. Likewise, and to the befuddlement of state 
authorities, many activists were willfully arrested, tortured, and beaten just to make a 
statement. The turning point, however, was when two university students, Park Jong-chol 
and Lee Han-yol, were killed.27 Koreans, having had enough of senseless killings, were 
in a furor. 
The month of June saw urban areas – the center of Korean finance and 
manufacturing – halt completely. Unexpectedly too, chaebol white-collar workers – the 
last urban support of the Park-Chun era – were fed up with the protests. Granted, this 
group had a lot to lose, such as gainful and well-paid employment, but nevertheless, the 
deaths of the two students along with Chun’s slow capitulation to Western markets 
revealed the dictator and chaebol’s true intentions.28 
Worded differently, the Park-Chun economy only cared about the elites at home 
and abroad. If the elites were willing to easily stamp out two students, then anyone was 
fair game in this dog-eat-dog society. Akin to a pre-Park Korea, the law and order that 
bushido emphasized, and arguably achieved, vanished overnight with the deaths of the 
two students. Koreans from just about every corner and walks of life participated in the 
protests. 
What a sight to behold as well. Taxi drivers to expensive-suited employees – 
dubbed the “necktie brigade” – were all participating in destroying police precincts, 
military outposts, and government offices.29 Furthermore, spectators at home and abroad 
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saw that Koreans were not only willing to sacrifice their well-being but the wealth and 
prosperity they gruelingly built from scratch.30 Nevertheless, and even to the doubt of 
Kukbon leaders, the citizenry kept their composure and order, destruction was kept 
mostly to state facilities and causalities were low. 
One American correspondent, Michael Breen, was taken aback by the ferocity – 
yet well-ordered nature – of the protests: 
Drivers blared their horns as a gesture of support. Police saturated 
protesters with tear gas. They escaped through alleys and regrouped. 
Shopkeepers pulled down their shutters but opened them to rescue 
stragglers spluttering from the gas. The battle line kept shifting. The 
rubble of street warfare was everywhere. Fist-sized chunks of paving 
stone littered main thoroughfares. But there was an order. No shops 
smashed, no cars overturned, nothing burned, and miraculously, no one 
killed.31 
 
Indeed, not an easy feat to achieve, and it only proved that June protestors were not 
willing to stoop to Park-Chun bushido tactics. 
On the contrary, Sin and Choe’s minjok ethics emphasized not to harm their 
Korean brethren.32 The month of June, therefore, signaled the beginnings of South 
Korea’s entrance into a highly developed democracy. For the citizenry, however, it 
proved that minjung’s raw strength lied in the compassion for their land, culture, and 
people – and not in Park’s might-makes-right principles. Otherwise put, minjung is 
minjok, and vice versa. The Chun era personified the last remnant of Park’s agendas and 
now they were both a thing of the past. 
                                                 
30 Dae-jung Kim, Richard Tanter, and Richard Falk, “On Korea,” World Policy Journal 1, no. 1 
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31 Michael Breen, “Democracy Protests,” in Korea Witness: 135 Years of War, Crisis and News 
in the Land of the Morning Calm, ed., Donald Kirk and Sang-Hun Choe (Seoul: Eun Haeng Namu, 
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* * * 
It has been thirty years since Park Chung-hee shaped Korea into his image. Park’s 
“developmental dictatorship” undoubtedly changed Korea’s socioeconomic and cultural 
landscape; however, that was a bygone era. Gone was the age of bushido’s extreme 
Social Darwinism and authoritarianism. This change was accomplished by minjung, a 
movement that installed minjok’s unaltered form back to Korean society. When this was 
achieved, modern Korean nationalism was changed forever. In front of it, was a new 
societal frontier. Part II, thereby, seeks to explain what that new frontier is and the 
elements – old and new – that shaped modern Korean’s patriotism and love for their 
country. 
  
Figure 6.1. Left, the flag (Taeguk-gi) of the Korean Empire (1898-1910). Right, the flag (also named Taeguk-gi) of 
South Korea pictured in the photo “Minju juui yeo Mansae!” (Dear Democracy!). This is the most iconic photo of the 
June Protests and was taken by photographer Koh Myung-Jin. Please note the similarities of both flags and that Sin 
Chaeho and Choe Namson were both born during the short-lived Empire. Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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Part II 
Half a year into 1988, the minjung movement was on the brink of success. With 
millions of protestors nationwide, state authorities were exhausted and literally out of riot 
suppressing gear. In desperation, Chun Doo-hwan ordered the use of live munitions. The 
police force, however, finally realized that Chun’s madness had no bounds and disobeyed 
his orders.33 Concurrently, cities were in an anti-American furor over the lack of 
oversight, simultaneously burning handmade Reagan dummies; as a result, embassies and 
consulates went on lockdown.34 
A 1990 US government report succinctly summed their surprise minjung’s anti-
American attitudes: 
The young generations [generations born in the late 1960s to 1970s] are 
more nationalistic because they have not personally witnessed U.S. 
contributions to liberation in 1945 and to the Korean War in 1950. But 
they do recall the questionable role of the U.S. in the Kwangju incident 
in 1980 and the continuing U.S. pressure for market access during the 
1980s. To this younger generation, the U.S. is just another country out 
to fulfill its own interests.35 
 
American “contributions” since 1945 to post-Korean War, therefore, were – and to the 
dismay of young minjung nationalists – a necessity. South Korea, as John F. Kennedy 
pointed, was a “hopeless” cause while military officials labelled the ROK as 
“burdensome protectorate.”36 However, in the 1980s, American sentiments unexpectedly 
mirrored that past. 
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Just a couple days before the June Protests, US Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage snubbed any involvement in Korean political affairs simply saying that 
“Frankly, we’re really busy.”37 Thinking America would overlook all actions – thereby, 
evoking Bu-Ma and Gwangju results – Chun ordered ROK troops to the cities as a last-
ditch effort to suppress the chaos. ROK troops were nonetheless under the guidance of 
US General John A. Wickham, Jr. The American General immediately dismissed Chun’s 
order on grounds of usurpation, threatening imprisonment for any ROK personnel willing 
to follow the dictator’s lead.38  
America’s blind eye was no more, the Reagan Administration’s panic over losing 
such a close economic and military ally caused the US Secretary of State to demand a 
resolution to the minjung protests. On July 10, 1987, Chun resigned from the presidency, 
and with that the last vestige of Park-era governance was finished. Minjung finally 
succeeded and democracy was immediately enacted on a national and local scale; 
Koreans from all walks of life could now vote for their fates.39 
With Minjung protesting over it was time to rebuild. The ideology succeeded but 
now the need for the movement was in question. While minjung never went away, as it 
was part of minjok ethics, the new sociopolitical frontier Korea was thrust into took 
precedent over people’s everyday affairs. This next part, therefore, seeks to explain the 
characteristics of that frontier. Specifically, what institutions took over bushido 
nationalism; and the affects that Park and minjung still have on Korea today. 
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Park’s Legacy at Home 
After months of exhausting most state resources on protestors, along with 
pressure from American allies, Chun Doo-hwan’s reign ended; Chun resigned on 
February 1988.40 The last elements of the Park era gone. With Park’s agendas at a close, 
analysts from Korea and the world were soon voicing their critiques of Park. 
Domestically, Koreans had a mixed view of Park after Chun’s ousting. Chosun 
Ilbo newspaper editor Lee Young Duk gave a lukewarm comment on Park’s governance: 
We criticized Park Chung Hee because we saw things through the 
prism of American democracy and human rights. But if we had had 
American democracy in the 1960's, would we have achieved this much? 
Perhaps Park Chung Hee's approach was better suited to the public 
consciousness of the time.41 
 
This was further reiterated by former US American-Korean ambassador Richard A. 
Ericson, Jr., in a 1995 interview. Ericson recalled Congress’s sentiments towards Park: 
Americans did not expect this kind of thing to happen [in reference to 
Park’s human rights violations]. This went against all of our values, all 
of our instincts, etc. And that it could not help but fail to influence 
attitudes in significant sectors of the American public, including the 
Congress, and the media, to develop anti-ROK government 
attitudes. . . .42 The American press always portrayed [Park] as an 
autocratic little monster.43 
 
In short, minjung not only ousted Chun but tarnished Park’s legacy at home and abroad. 
However, Park’s unorthodox governance, while heavily criticized, strongly influenced 
the developing world until this day.44 
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Modern Times: A New Frontier 
 Since the pinnacle of South Korean dissidence was over, the reinvigorated East 
Asian republic was moving towards a new future. Elections were held immediately on a 
presidential and representative level, and this time elections were strictly monitored for 
integrity. Many thought the next president was to be minjung leader Kim Dae-jung; 
however, another progressive candidate, Kim Young-sam, split the vote. To the chagrin 
of minjung activists, South Korea’s next president was Chun’s original successor Roh 
Tae-woo (term: 1988-1993).45 
 Even though President Roh briefly led Chun’s former political party, the 
Democratic Justice Party, the National Assembly (NA) saw majority gains from the 
progressive Minju Dang. As such, Roh’s presidency was hamstrung and tarnished from 
past Chun atrocities; and, as an effect, he capitulated leadership to the progressive-led 
NA.46 Some of Roh’s legislative retreats led to the beginning of chaebol regulations, 
creation of safety oversight departments, and more union representation in the 
workforce.47 
 The Roh era also marked South Korea’s entrance into highly developed economic 
territory; similarly, it was undergoing the challenges that comes with the ascension: 
cyclical recessions, high labor costs, and a switch from export to service-oriented 
markets. As Kang Myung-koo posits, “developmental mentalite” was the new society, 
one that mirrored Korea’s Western allies.48 Minjung seemed to be forgotten as the 
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standard of living was rising and Koreans were now participating in a new 
hypercompetitive environment. 
Furthermore, Kim Jinwung details the very fabric of modern South Korea as an 
“egalitarian and individualist” society still heavily engrained with “Confucian hierarchy” 
especially in private affairs.49 Therefore, while Koreans were now past Park’s might-
makes-right governance, elements of bushido were evident through the hypercompetitive 
nature of consumerism and class status – inclusive of job position, education attainment, 
and owning the latest luxury items. In short, the socioeconomic lines that minjung 
transcended was back and possibly more entrenched in people’s everyday lives. 
Otherwise put, bushido culture was gone but Park-style Neo-Confucian nationalism was 
still prevalent in the new consumer culture. 
Nevertheless, that did not matter much to post-minjung Koreans. They were 
experiencing a renaissance of republican representation, lessening restrictions on political 
speech, and worker empowerment. In short, Koreans were enjoying the pleasures of a 
highly developed life. Minjung protesting, therefore, completed its objectives, and the 
time of intense political actions were over. In hindsight, however, this was far from the 
truth as the ghosts of Park and minjung never died but instead were dormant, waiting to 
strike when least expected. 
After Roh’s tenure, the next presidents consisted of former minjung leaders, most 
notably, Kim Dae-jung (term: 1998-2003).50 Kim’s presidency started on shaky grounds 
due to the 1997 recession; however, his tenure was known for shifting South Korea into 
                                                 
49 Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea, 547. 
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the digital age.51 Furthermore, Kim and a newer generation of Koreans took Park’s 
bushido-styled technocracy and tempered it. The overemphasis on educational attainment 
carried over so successfully that Yoon Bang-Song posits that there was a “reverse brain 
drain (RBD)” engrained into Korean culture.52 Eventually, this gave way to the 
hypercompetitive “developmental mentalite” generation and may have exacerbated this 
social phenomenon.53 
In summary, RBD was a product of Park’s technocracy – a vestige of bushido 
academic culture – which instilled a new generation of youths to fervently compete in all 
things academic and materialistic. Nevertheless, these were mostly positive outcomes as 
South Korea turned into a “soft superpower.”54 Chaebol products were now high in 
quality and outselling global competitors such as Sony; Korean broadband and 
telecommunications led the world in innovation; new wave Korean pop culture (hallyu) 
dominated media charts worldwide; and Korean biotechnology research was prevalent 
worldwide.55 
Ghost of Minjung 
 According to You Jung-sung, South Korea was now in the pantheon of highly 
developed “OAO” territory. Koreans proved that their society and economy were robust 
enough to undergo landmark events that would destroy most developing nations. The 
East Asian republic survived numerous society-shattering protests, raised its HDI, and 
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endured two recessions.56 Likewise, Koreans rightfully enjoyed a lifestyle afforded to a 
few select countries with the tumultuous era of Park and minjung now relegated to 
museums and textbooks. Therefore, a new generation of Koreans may have forgotten, or 
perhaps willfully ignored, their developing past; but in 2012, Park’s ghost reemerged 
once again when his daughter, Park Geun-hye (pronounced Pawk Geun Hey) was elected 
to the presidency.57 
The younger Park’s ascension, however, did not come overnight but was foretold 
through minjung past. A newly empowered center-right party, Saenuri, gained 
prominence during the 1997 Financial Crash. Arguably, their strict austerity measures 
and deregulation of chaebol labor laws helped Korea survive their greatest economic 
challenge since the Korean War. To prove this, Geun-hye’s predecessor and former 
chaebol executive – CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction – Lee Myung-bak 
(term: 2008-2013) was easily elected in 2007.58 Consequently, his resignation as Saenuri 
leader allowed for Geun-hye to take his former position; once Lee finished his term, 
Geun-hye won the presidency in a hotly-contested election. 
 Park Geun-hye’s presidency started out controversially and was mired in 
allegations of corruption. However, in 2016, accusations culminated when evidence of 
bribery and “Rasputin-like” control over the executive surfaced between Geun-hye and 
her best friend Choi Soon-sil.59 Dubbed “Choi-Soon-Sil-gate,” comparisons of Park-
Chun elitism resurfaced, thereby signaling that some ghosts never die. As such, Geun-
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hye’s years of avoiding corruption charges signaled one thing: perhaps the new Korean 
generation forgot their minjung roots. 
 On the contrary, just like a yin to a yang, Park and minjung could not exist 
without one another. Consequently, minjung’s ghost resurfaced through the citizenry’s 
rage, emotion’s mirroring the ferocity of the 1980s.60 Immediately, protesters, young and 
old, took to the streets by the millions. As a result, the 2016 Candlelight Protests erupted. 
Protestors nationwide occupied city halls, legislative houses, and the president’s 
residence – the Blue House.61 
 The significance of these protests harkened back to Sin and Choe’s teachings. 
New generations of Koreans were living through a “developmental mentalite” society 
divided by status and materialism; however, the Candlelight Protests transcended these 
lines, and, for a moment, Koreans were now one entity united – they were minjok. 
Ultimately, the Candlelight Protests succeeded, and the younger Park was impeached and 
arrested under corruption charges.62 
Perhaps most notably however, newer generations outdid their minjung 
forefathers. Gone were the days of state-authorized beatings and the burning of 
government facilities. Whether other republics knew it or not, the Candlelight Protests 
proved to the world that modern South Korean nationalism was synonymous with 
peaceful and effective mass protesting. 
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Park’s Legacy Abroad 
 Singapore and 1980s China (People’s Republic of China) saw similar rapidly 
developing eras equivalent to their South Korean neighbors. The leaders of these two 
nations were Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (1923-2015) and China’s Deng Xiaoping 
(1904-1997). Just like Park, they both ruled uncontested for decades by relegating and 
suppressing democratic institutions. But more importantly, all three leaders followed a 
state-building blueprint echoing Park’s “developmental dictatorship.”63 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew 
 On the surface Park Chung Hee’s and Lee Kuan Yew seem contrasted from each 
other. Park’s agendas were based on Imperial bushido institutions while Lee used British 
governance. However, when looking closer, the mentality behind their state agendas were 
almost identical. When it came to economics, in particular foreign markets, Park and Lee 
obsessed over copying the technocratic governance of exporting giants, Japan and West 
Germany. Ezra F. Vogel analyzed these comparisons by explaining how both men 
skillfully acquired all the “help and guarantee needed, through foreign assistance, in 
achieving economic growth.”64 
Primary sources on Lee are not found in Vogel’s analysis; however, using sources 
taken from Lee’s own interviews and memoirs better situates the similarities that the 
Singapore leader had with Park-like technocracy. In a 1979 interview Lee said: 
Workers [in Singapore] were not as proud of or as skilled in their jobs 
compared to the Japanese or the Germans . . . Then you have to educate 
rigorously and train a whole generation of skilled, intelligent, 
knowledgeable people who can be productive.65 
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Furthermore, to achieve this highly educated and capable workforce, both men used 
elements taken from Neo-Confucian principles to instill some form of societal and 
psychological order. 
As evident in Lee’s 1998 memoirs The Singapore Story, the former prime 
minister gave an unapologetic take on his top-down leadership, “Between being loved 
and being feared, I have always believed Machiavelli was right. If nobody is afraid of 
me, I’m meaningless.”66 Furthermore, Lee’s analysis on non-Eastern societies are highly 
reminiscent of Park’s law and order mentality: 
The erosion of the moral underpinnings of Western society which 
having lost its “ethical basis” had to accept guns, drugs, violent crime, 
vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public – in sum the breakdown of 
civil society.67 
 
Without a doubt, Park and Lee emphasized Eastern-styled patriarchal leadership among 
their “households.”68 Lee even stated that: “The ruler or the government does not try to 
provide for a person what the family best provides,” and just like their economies, both 
men wanted rigid stratified order in the citizenry’s private lives.69 
In fact, these polemics came about through the anarchic beginnings of both 
nations.70 Lee further reiterated that modern Singaporean prosperity was achieved 
because of the state’s draconian intervention of lawlessness: 
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[Singaporeans achieved] a well-ordered society so that they can have 
maximum enjoyment of their freedoms. This freedom can only exist in 
an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.71 
 
Using Confucian-inspired agendas, both leaders’ nationalistic leadership was birthed 
through chaos, and as a result, state prosperity was achieved. 
No matter the similarities, however, the two executives never met and whether 
each dictator’s government influenced the other is speculation. In the end, instead of 
discussing which agendas affected one another, it is better to posit that Neo-Confucian 
nationalism transcends political borderlines. As Lee succinctly analogizes, Park’s familial 
socioeconomic perspectives falls in line with what “the family best provides,” no other 
entity – government and business – can take that place.72 
China’s Deng Xiaoping 
 Deng Xiaoping (pronounced Dung Shou’ping), on the other end, was more open – 
and praiseful – about copying Park’s state-building campaigns. Harvard University’s 
Senior US researcher William Overholt met with Park and Deng officials in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Mr. Overholt, during an interview with the Korean newspaper Munhwa ilbo, 
gave his analysis on both dictators: 
President Park Chung-hee carefully observed his efforts to develop the 
economy through the Saemaul Movement. At the time, there were 
many demonstrations by students criticizing Park’s dictatorship, and I 
was deeply troubled by the Korean debate over the issue of economic 
development and democratization. Later, when I went to China, China 
was in the same worry. I think Deng Xiaoping copied the development 
strategy of Korea, the “Park Chung Hee model” as it is.73 
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Park’s bushido-infused state-building certainly had an impact on Deng’s developmental 
agendas that it was even dubbed the “Park Chung Hee Model.” Furthermore, Harvard 
colleague Ezra F. Vogel expanded on the “Park Model” during a lecture at the 33rd 
Korea Foundation Forum: 
Just as Deng Xiaoping rescued China from the chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution and transformed his country into a global economic power, 
I think Korea of today wouldn’t be here if it were not for Park Chung-
hee.74 
 
The “Park Model,” therefore, suggests that strongmen – and whatever nationalist vehicles 
they need – are needed to “rescue” their countries at critical junctions. Rescue in this case 
meant rapidly building a springboard to shoot the state into prosperity. 
For Park, the critical eras include Korea’s destitution after the colonial era and 
through the Korean War (1895-1953); for Deng, it was after Mao’s perilous Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution Campaigns (1958-1976).75 As such, the results for both 
nations were uncanny – instantaneous economic growth and societal order, albeit through 
heavy authoritarian means. This was due in part to their pragmatic stances after decades 
of political and socioeconomic ineffectiveness. 
The key for both leaders was pragmatism. Deng famously analogized this in 
relation to China’s overnight market liberalization, “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or 
white, so long as it catches mice.”76 When compared to Park’s stances on capital loan 
attainment, then it is easy correlate Yoon Bang-Song’s research with Vogel’s.77 In other 
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words, bushido nationalism requires practicality, as seen through the Meiji emperor and 
Park’s adoption of Western institutions. Of course, that comes at a high cost. 
The cost being strict autocratic rule while violently antagonizing opponents and 
drawing the angst of their respective constituents. In Park’s case, Yushin decrees, 
violently suppressing opposition, and alienating close anti-Japanese constituents. For 
Deng, similarly censoring dissent while shunning hardline communist elites – in the case 
of market liberalization.78 Nevertheless, pragmatism is in both of their blood and is easily 
their most observable trait. 
However, there is also a more engrained and darker trait that Park and Deng 
share, one that goes against the very grain of modern minjung nationalism. Their 
Singaporean counterpart, Lee Kuan Yew, has been labelled a “benevolent dictator” due 
to his less violent means of suppressing dissidence but, in contrast, Deng and Park used 
much different tactics during the Tiananmen Massacre and the Bu-Ma Protests. 
Ultimately, this meant that both chairmen suppression tactics transcended time. 
Coincidentally, the 1989 Tiananmen Protests erupted shortly after the 1987 June 
Struggle. 
More importantly, it was a protest enacted by university students reminiscent of 
minjung objectives. Even though each nation’s protestors had their own goals, some 
goals did coincide with each other. For example, citizens demanded democratic 
accountability for hardline politicians and reformation of China’s dependency on state-
                                                 
78 Chung-in Moon, “Modernization Strategy: Ideas and Influences,” in The Park Chung Hee 
Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), PDF e-book, 127. 
 
241 
 
 
owned company finances. Tiananmen, therefore, was a fight against political and 
business elites just like its minjung counterpart.79 
Park and minjung nationalism are the opposite of one another, yet they are still 
one entity. In other words, Park’s legacy at home and abroad are seen through the eyes of 
minjung, and vice versa. From a Singaporean viewpoint, Park and minjung are 
reminiscent of the Neo-Confucian hierarchy so deeply entrenched in the 1970s and 
1980s. In addition, the technocratic culture learned from decades of foreign interaction 
were what Park and Lee envisioned and is still very prevalent today. Consequently, a 
high standard of living was achieved by both nations; therefore, this may be construed by 
spectators as a positive outcome due to autocratic leadership. 
From a Chinese viewpoint, Deng’s pragmatism coincided with Park’s willingness 
to expand the country’s market economy, and, to an extent, be led by foreigners. As a 
result, Chinese development mirrors Park’s “developmental dictatorship” system 
resulting in astronomical poverty alleviation. Even more evident is that Korean 
economist Chang Se-jin and many Western counterparts go as far as to label China’s 
export economy an exact mirror of Park’s chaebol-export system but on a massive 
scale.80 
On the other hand, the practicality in minjung was securing a single cause that all 
Koreans could support. Unfortunately, the Chinese case study shows the darker side of 
South Korean nationalism as well. Minjung’s struggle was tragically repeated during the 
Tiananmen Square massacre with adverse results – the continuation of strict autocratic 
governance.  
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* * * 
 The end of Chun’s reign was one of the last pieces needed to thrust South Korea 
into a highly developed society. Hereafter, direct elections for presidents and 
representatives allowed Koreans to control their fates unimpeded for the first time since 
the inception of their young republic. The ghosts of Park Chung Hee and minjung, 
therefore, were relegated to the annals of history. Furthermore, the “developmental 
dictatorship” blueprint Park created garnered interest from other state-building 
executives. Leaders from Singapore to China displayed many similarities to Park’s 
unorthodox governance and nationalism, thereby ensuring that his agendas live on 
outside Korea. 
 However, Park’s ghost still haunted the peninsula and was resurrected when his 
daughter, Park Geun-hye, was elected in 2013. The ghosts of minjung revived alongside 
Geun-hye amid a flurry of corruption charges and claims of oligarchic governance – 
mirroring her father’s tenure. As a result, the 2016 Candlelight Protests and the younger 
Park’s impeachment was a testament that South Korea’s strongman past and minjung are 
one entity.  
Ultimately, there are still elements of Park’s Neo-Confucian hierarchy in Korea. 
Three decades of bushido and Social Darwinist cultures are still heavily entrenched in 
modern society. However, minjung tempered those entities by focusing those elements 
strictly on technological innovations, high-quality education, and burgeoning a popular 
culture scene. Indeed, South Koreans came a long way from a past riddled with 
destitution, violence, and autocracy. In the end, Koreans from all walks of life 
painstakingly earned their status as an OAO power.  
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A Gallup Poll conducted in August 2015 surveyed voters aged 19 to 55 about 
which “Korean President Did the Best Job.” Park Chung Hee received about 44 percent 
of the votes; Kim Dae-Jung received about 14 percent; and Chun Doo-hwan garnered 3 
percent.1 These three presidents were the main figures of the bushido and minjung 
movements. Therefore, it comes to no surprise that Chun placed close to last in the poll 
due to the overwhelming protests and international condemnation that engulfed his 
presidency. 
 Park’s Gallup support, however, has some significance. Even with the volatility 
during the Yushin decree until his death (1972-1979), Park’s administration received 
overwhelming support from a range of survey-takers citing economics, Saemaul undong, 
and poverty alleviation as his greatest accomplishments. On the other end, Park’s greatest 
transgressions – titled “What He Did Wrong” and receiving more than 70 percent – was 
Yushin and democratic suppression.2 
 Clearly, when coupled with Kang Myung-koo’s “Developmental Mentalite” 
theory, it is possible to surmise that Park’s Neo-Confucian bushido agenda is generally 
viewed favorably among current voters. In fact, Park’s bushido society, inclusive of 
chaebol economics, brought South Koreans rapid wealth and a higher standard of living, 
and due to that, it is received positively by most voters. 
Of course, economic growth came at a significant cost. Park’s governance 
capitalized on five centuries worth of Korean nationalist history combined with the 
deadly Social Darwinist culture of the Imperial Japanese military. For better or worse, 
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Park-era nationalism turned contemporary South Korea into an autocratic, highly 
stratified, affluent, and materialistic-oriented society.3 In so doing, it perfectly falls in line 
with Kang’s thesis and further cements Park with the title of “Developmental Dictator.”4 
On the other end, Park’s Yushin tactics were almost universally despised; and 
therefore, lends credence that minjung was a byproduct of bushido.5 This ideological gap 
verifies one thing: from the 1900s to now, South Korean nationalism cannot be situated 
in one single solid timeline. Referring to Figure II in the Introduction, it is a timeline with 
a main branch, minjok, that deviates into two main branches, bushido and minjung. 
Ultimately, only one branch, minjok, returns into the main timeline. Therefore, the next 
conclusion seeks to combine all aspects of Park and minjung nationalism into an 
organized timeline inclusive of point of divergences and convergences. 
Timeline of South Korean Nationalism from 1900s to 2016 
 In the early 1900s, Sin Chaeho and Choe Namson, as a response to Imperial 
Japan’s takeover, laid the foundation for Korean nationalism; the tenet they advanced 
became what is known as minjok.6 Minjok is an ideology that means Koreans are bound 
to one another by blood and land. Sin and Choe’s ethnic blood-land theory was based on 
the ancient accounts mentioned in the Tan’gun creation story.7 In particular, the ancient 
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lands that King Tan’gun ruled over extended past the peninsula and into a chunk of 
Southern Manchuria; this was known as Gojoseon (Ancient Korea).8 Therefore, Koreans 
from the tip of the peninsula to Manchuria were all one entity bound by ethnicity and 
culture. 
 In 1944, a young Park Chung Hee was a Japanese Imperial officer stationed along 
the Manchurian-North Korean border.9 This location is crucial because Park became 
infatuated with both Imperial institutions and Sin-Choe teachings. Park took these 
elements and created his own version of nationalism. From the Imperial end, Park took 
Meiji institutions and Japanese bushido ethics and fused them with Korean nationalism.10 
The result was a neo-nationalist take on Sin-Choe ideologies. Meaning, Park’s Korean 
brethren were entitled to live in their war-ravaged lands but with one big difference, 
ethnic Koreans were obligated to steer those lands into prosperity and into a “world 
historical society.”11 
 But before Park could enact his societal takeover, South Korea was ruled under 
another dictatorship by the American-backed Rhee Syngman. This regime lasted from 
1948 to 1960. Rhee’s tenure can be summed up as an entrenched oligarchy that promoted 
an elitist socioeconomic structure. Along with Rhee, the oligarchs consisted of corrupt 
government officials and business owners who usually benefited from prewar 
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connections. Park used this to his advantage when Rhee was ousted in 1960 due to 
protests from the students and the poor.12 
General Park swiftly labelled Rhee’s ruling philosophy as an effeminate and 
tainted adaptation of Sin and Choe’s version. Rhee’s Korea, therefore, was weak in 
General Park’s eyes. It did not stay true to the pure-blooded strength posited by Sin and 
Choe's Tan'gun thesis.13 Park’s answer to Korea’s pathetic state was to install bushido 
onto every aspect of his society. In a blink of an eye, the General masterfully enacted his 
blueprint from the polity all the way to the countryside; this was the “Developmental 
Dictator” at his finest.14 
The vehicles Park used were Meiji zaibatsu (family-owned conglomerates) 
economics – disguised and renamed as chaebol – mixed with an intrusive, yet 
independent, form of Confucianism.15 This unique neo-Confucian nationalism established 
a rigid hierarchy with Park situated at the highest position; and the polity, consisting of 
technocrats, were next in line.16 Below them were chaebol institutions who dictated the 
policies of the next in line: the newly-urbanized population.17 Chaebol are mega-
corporations that, with limitless state resources, were tasked with creating a booming 
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market economy. As such, these conglomerates held immense power over newly-trained 
professionals and unskilled laborers alike.18 
The countryside, however, was different and could be considered a separate 
entity.19 For context, before Park’s rule the countryside was ruled by a feudal-like system 
led by elderly yangban landowners.20 But now, in barren rustic villages and towns, Park 
officials gifted youthful farmers with cheap lands. The state supported these farmers 
through the Saemaul Undong program, and instantaneously, upended centuries of 
entrenched caste order in favor of meritocracy. Essentially, this program provided 
limitless subsidies and employment to whoever could modernize infrastructure and 
outperform produce quotas.21 Likewise, this rural and young constituency held immense 
wealth and power and were essentially the head patriarchs of their domains. 
In a nutshell, this was Park’s Korea. South Korea was a brand-new and dynamic 
top-down pyramidal authoritarian system where the executive was the strongest entity. 
Park fathered a young and reinvigorated state, economy, and countryside. This was 
bushido Confucianism and state nationalism in perfect motion.22 Furthermore, a hierarchy 
chart is presented in Figure III to help visualize the structure. 
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Park's nationalist agendas were initially successful. In a decade, from 1961 to 
1971, Park’s Korea saw tremendous growth, industrialization, and the growth of a 
booming middle class; however, with those affluent trends also came the need for more 
advanced governance and representation.23 In the 1971-1972 elections, Park and his 
party, the Democratic Republicans, won a close election against the opposition; and thus, 
Park saw the first signs of his bushido state being taken away from him.24 Accordingly, 
Executive Park instituted the authoritarian Yushin constitution, thereby cementing 
bushido as South Korea’s permanent nationalist institution. This, in turn, began the era of 
strict autocratic governance that ultimately ended with Park's assassination in 1979.25 
As a response, a new nationalist ideology was birthed from 1979 onwards. 
Frequent student protests, starting with the 1979 Bu-Ma massacre, began the ideology 
that is now known as minjung nationalism. Initially, this movement was void of any solid 
goal, with different factions protesting differing goals. As such, minjung dissent was 
doomed to fail and was usually suppressed through violent means.26 
Although an initial failure, minjung nationalism only grew stronger and more 
disciplined during the 1980s. The main catalyst for this growth were the policies of Park's 
successor, General Chun Doo-hwan. Chun, from 1980 to 1987, amplified the bushido 
culture left in Park’s absence in order to eradicate minjung and continue Yushin-like 
autocracy – and this tactic worked very well.27 Chun kept a strong grip on the 
                                                 
23 Myung-koo Kang, “Developmentalist Mentalité,” 181. 
24 Sungjoo Han, “South Korea: The Political Economy of Dependency,” Asian Survey 14, no. 1 
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Wells (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), PDF e-book, 106. 
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government and chaebol kept a strong grip on the market. In short, it appeared as if Chun 
was poised to be the next Park showering Korea with wealth while keeping ultimate 
power. In hindsight, however, Chun became the president that ended bushido 
nationalism. 
In late 1987, minjung took a final solidified form after the tragic results of the 
Gwangju Massacre.28 The new nationalism combined years of diversity and conflicts into 
one package, it was an antithesis to Park-Chun bushido and chaebol culture. Minjung 
now emphasized universal democracy among the oppressed – such as the elderly, poor, 
and women; but more importantly, minjung accentuated unity and strength among all 
Koreans.29 Even with the intense urban protests, minjung protestors miraculously 
survived suppression without breaking into factions. This meant that Sin and Choe’s 
teachings were back in their rawest form and were fully manifested after three decades of 
manipulation by Park and Chun. Simply put, Sin and Choe's minjok manifested itself 
through minjung; both ideologies were one.30 
In 1988 and beyond, minjung nationalism accomplished its goal, Chun resigned, 
and the last vestiges of Park’s bushido state were over. Minjung was the new state 
ideology as Koreans could now vote for their fates in frequent and open elections. Minjok 
nationalism was short-lived, however, due to the completion of its goals. Likewise, 
Koreans questioned the need for it as they rightfully enjoyed their hard-earned affluent 
                                                 
and Park Chung Hee,” in The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, ed., Byung-
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status (OAO status). 31 Bluntly put, South Koreans were now in a good spot and went 
back to their “developmental mentalite.”32 
* * * 
 One thing can be said about Park-styled nationalism: the ideology accomplished 
all the strongman’s state-building agendas. The “developmental dictator” rightfully 
earned his title because South Korean society became fully modernized and prosperous 
under a bushido blueprint. Middle-class affluence was in the reach of millions, but it was 
granted only if the aspiring population played by Park’s rules. Consequently, and just like 
Western counterparts, Park’s Korea during the booming 1970s and 1980s was influenced 
by wealth and materialism resulting in the stratification of Korean society.33 
Kang Myung-koo and Kim Jinwung posit, that Sin, Choe, minjok, and minjung 
were now relegated to textbooks and museums as future generations focused their 
attention on South Korea’s growing “soft-power” status.34 Meaning, combined with 
consumerism, South Koreans were a “credential-fixated” society. “Stratification,” 
therefore, was not only present in material wealth but also in a socioeconomic realm 
wholly influenced by a technocratic and Confucian-hierarchal past.35 
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 However, ghosts never die, and to show the resilience of early Korean 
nationalism, minjok appeared once again in 2016. Remnants of Sin and Choe’s teachings 
were needed when Park’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, became president in 2012.36 Like 
Park and Chun, the younger Park’s presidency was mired in political corruption and 
cronyism. Her offenses were so apparent that protests by the millions of Koreans – 
dubbed the “2016 Candlelight Protests” – from all socioeconomic classes erupted 
overnight.37 This time, however, things were very different. Minjung ascended from its 
volatile past and became a brand-new entity. It became one with minjok once again, and 
now the whole world was watching. Simply put, Sin and Choe’s minjok engulfed not only 
the peninsula but the world. 
The days of mass beatings and destruction of government facilities were gone. 
Minjung was now a peaceful, yet very effective, tool used to combat the ghosts of 
bushido past.38 Just like the 1987 counterparts, minjung accomplished its goal again – 
Park’s daughter was swiftly impeached in December 2016. Minjok nationalism, therefore, 
transcended socioeconomics and “developmental mentalite” boundaries. Even though the 
younger generations may have forgotten their minjok and minjung roots, one thing was 
clear about the Candlelight Protests: minjok is in the blood of all Koreans, and thus, could 
never be forgotten.39 
In the end, Park Chung Hee not only left a permanent mark on the Korean cultural 
and economic landscapes, but he also left a strong impression on global state-building 
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agendas. From Singapore to China and to developing nations all over, remnants of Park’s 
Neo-Confucian bushido nationalism can be seen by any leader wishing – in the pursuit of 
societal affluency – to study the developmental dictator’s blueprints.40 Whether the costs 
for state-building success is worth it in the end is, of course, up to the individual; 
however, one thing is for sure, Park’s nationalist agendas will forever be a divisive issue 
for future Korean generations, politicians, and scholars alike. 
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